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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait. It applied the new 
institutional sociology theory to explain the dominant logics; the community of practices, 
whether the current companies Act (article 15) is adequate and whether these practices 
coincide with international codes, such as the OECD principles of corporate governance, and 
the UK combined code. Twenty-three interviews have been conducted and 819 questionnaires 
have been distributed to legislators, regulators, board members, executive managements, and 
investors to explore their perceptions about the current practices and the factors preventing the 
issuance of a corporate governance code in Kuwait. The findings confirm that there is one 
community of practices within the organisational field of listed companies that contradicts the 
international normative practices around the world. This refers to the fact that the current Act 
has become outdated and weak as a result of the political pressure exerted by the merchant 
families‘ party in the parliament who have established a network of actors between them and 
the government to prevent the issuance of any act that would threaten their power and control 
over the listed companies.        
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Praise be upon the Almighty ALLAH who bestowed me the ability and skills to complete this 
thesis.  
 
Many thanks also to my supervisors, Professor Christine Helliar and Dr. Gwen Hannah, for 
providing me with the opportunity to complete this PhD study under their supervision. I am 
greatly indebted to them for providing academic and technical assistance and appreciative to 
their unlimited support toward improving my research skills. Many thanks for their patience, 
effort and valuable guidance.  
 
Special thanks to my wife, Tagreed, for her patience, care, support and continuous 
encouragement, which has enabled me to complete this thesis. Many thanks are also due to my 
son, Bader, and my two little daughters, Noura and Wadha, for being a source of a joy, 
laughter and encouragement throughout this study. 
 
Last, but not least, I am indebted to all my PhD colleagues in the School of Business, 
University of Dundee, for their lively discussions and conversations. Additionally, my thanks 
to the Public Institute for Social Security, Mr. Fahad Al-Rajaan, and Mr. Khaled Al-Fozan, for 
sponsoring me during my study and for their support.         
 
 
 
xiii 
 
Declaration 
 
I am hereby declare that I am the author of this thesis, that the work of which this 
thesis is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not previously been 
accepted for a higher degree. 
 
 
Signed: ..........................................                  Date: .......................................... 
 
Mr. Ayman Al-Buloushi 
 
 
Certificate 
 
We certify that Mr. Ayman Al-Buloushi has worked the equivalent of nine terms 
on this research, and the conditions of the relevant ordinance and regulations 
have been fulfilled.   
 
Signed: ......................................                      Date: ............................................. 
Professor Christine Helliar 
 
 
Signed: ......................................                      Date: ............................................. 
Dr. Gwen Hannah  
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preface    
 
The effectiveness of a corporate governance code differs from one country to another. The 
success of governance effectiveness and change in countries such as the UK and USA refer to 
their political, legal, and culture factors (Licht, 2001; Licht, 2004; Holm and Zaman, 2012; 
Prentice and Spence, 2006; Lu and Batten, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Roe, 2003).    
Kuwaiti listed companies are controlled by powerful major family shareholders unlike in the 
west that has a dispersed ownership model, so the issuance of a corporate governance code 
may impede the control of these powerful shareholders and prevent possible entrenched self-
interest from prevailing. Thus, the whole of Kuwait society including, investors, lenders, and 
employees … will benefit. One of these powerful major shareholder groups are families which 
are labelled ―merchant families‖ in this thesis. Merchant families seek to list their companies‘ 
shares to enable them to obtain loans from banks to fund their operations. Further, when the 
share prices of their listed companies increase, the wealth of the merchant families also 
increases. Minority investors in this thesis are individual private investors who own a small 
number of listed companies‘ shares for investment. Minority investors are not large 
institutional investors or foreign owned companies, hence, these individuals lack power and 
voice.       
 
Kuwait has suffered from corporate failure and market crashes which may have been due to 
the merchant families. The first crash was in 1981 in the Al-manakh market, but no update or 
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change has happened to the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) that was issued in 1960. The second 
crash occurred in 2008, and again there was no change in the existing Act. Despite Kuwait‘s 
two occasions of corporate failure and market crash, listed companies‘ governance continues 
to date, with no attempt to change the current 1960 Act or introduce a code of corporate 
governance.     
This research examines whether the merchant families, as actors in the organisational field, 
who control Kuwait‘s listed companies, are the main reason for the absence of a Kuwaiti code 
of corporate governance, since the issuance of such a code would threaten their own self 
interests and control. 
The particular singnifance of this research is to provide insights into the current practices of 
Kuwaiti listed companies and explore the factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti 
corporate governance code. 
   
This thesis investigates the influence of the legal and political systems, and cultural factors in 
Kuwaiti society to identify to what extent these factors represent obstacles to a Kuwaiti code 
of corporate governance.     
 
All of the above motivated the researcher to investigate why there has been no change in the 
Companies‘ Act (Article 15) since it was issued in 1960. In particular, the research investigates 
whether the current act is similar to other countries and examines current practices to 
understand the organisational logics, and identify the logic of the actors and their actor 
networks.       
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1.2 Research Questions  
 
Three key research questions attempt to explore the view and knowledge of regulators, 
legislators, board members, executive management, and investors of listed companies of 
current corporate governance practices and the Companies Act (Article 15): 
1.   Why is there no corporate governance code in Kuwait?  
2. Which factors affect corporate governance practices in Kuwait? 
3. Is there a single community of practice? 
 
1.3 Scope of the Research  
 
The thesis uses an interpretive paradigm and a New Institutional Sociology (NIS) perspective 
to examine and interpret the perceptions of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents to 
discover why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait, and explores the factors that 
influence the current practices of listed companies, especially that of the merchant families. 
The thesis also explores whether there is a single community of practice within the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. This community of practice is defined as the 
practices of organisations that share the same cultural, social, and political background where 
isomorphic pressures have shaped current practice to be homogenous rather than 
heterogeneous. Further, the thesis explores the prevailing organisational logics, which are 
based on material and symbolic carriers that are current practices, the Companies Act (Article 
15), networks between the actors, and the beliefs and thoughts.   
   
In order to answer all the above questions, two research methods are used to answer the 
research questions: semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey covering all related 
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groups in the organisational field of listed companies, such as investors, regulators, legislators, 
board members, and executive management. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction to the thesis, 
research topics, research questions, and thesis structure. Chapter two presents an overview of 
the Kuwaiti context, including the establishment of the country, the general background and 
role of merchant families pre and post the oil discovery era, and their impact on the country‘s 
social, political, legal, and cultural environment. 
 
The third chapter reviews and outlines the general literature on corporate governance, its 
history and development, and the factors that influence the issuance of a corporate governance 
code. Also, the chapter reviews previous studies on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in developing countries and how political, legal, and cultural factors influence the corporate 
governance code in these countries. 
 
Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework that is adopted to interpret the research 
findings. This thesis applies a New Institutional Sociology (NIS) perspective to explore the 
dominant logic of the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait and whether there is a 
single community of practices and if so, what types of institutional pressure shape the 
community of practice.  
 
Chapter five discusses the research methodology and methods and justifies the selection of the 
research paradigm, and methods adopted in this study. This thesis uses an interpretative 
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approach to explain the main reason behind the absence of a Kuwaiti code of corporate 
governance based on different groups‘ perceptions. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 analyse and present the findings of the two pieces of empirical work, semi-
structured interviews and a questionnaire survey. These methods are employed to outline the 
primary data of this thesis. Interviews were employed to gather different perspectives from 
different groups about the main reason behind why there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate 
governance, and to identify the institutional factors that influence current practices. The 
questionnaire survey is employed to explore further current practices, whether there is one or 
more community of practice, and also confirm the findings of the interviews about the main 
reason behind the absence of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code.  
 
Chapter eight summarises the findings of the empirical chapters, which outline the main 
obstacles against issuing a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, and identify the dominant 
logics within the organisational field that resist the process of change. The next chapter gives 
an overview of the Kuwaiti context. 
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Chapter 2 
The Kuwait context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The present chapter examines the effects of the political, legal, and cultural factors upon 
corporate governance within the specific context of Kuwait. Following the discovery of crude 
oil in 1936, there was a dramatic change in the economic, political and legal systems in this 
country. The historical context has been explored to identify the role of the merchant families 
in the political, economic, and cultural situation in the country.Section 2.2 illustrates the 
emergence of the state of Kuwait. Section 2.3 compares the economic situations which 
prevailed in Kuwait pre- and post-discovery of crude oil in order to explain the resulting 
transformation in the country‘s economy. In addition, the role of governors and merchant 
families in politics, law and culture in both pre and post-crude oil eras is explained in this 
chapter: Section 2.4 gives an account of Kuwait‘s political situation during the same era, and 
describes the impact on politics of the economic powers of merchant families; the 
development of the legal system as a result of economic change is discussed in Section 2.5; 
and this followed by a review of cultural influences in Section 2.6. First, however, a brief 
account is given in Section 2.2 below of important historical events which led to the 
emergence of Kuwait as an independent state.  
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2.2 The Emergence of the State of Kuwait 
  
 
During the seventeenth century a colony was established in the middle east by the descendants 
of nomadic tribes and clans who migrated from neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq and Iran, to settle on the coast of the Arabian Gulf in an attempt to avoid, not only the 
persistent drought of the desert and its resulting poverty and starvation, but also the threat of 
war from other nomadic tribes who still traversed the desert. On arrival at the coast, the 
migrants built forts to protect themselves, giving rise to the name ‗Kuwait‘, which is derived 
from kut, an Arabic word for ―fort‖ (Casey, 2007).  
 
Casey (2007) highlights the importance of historical events in Kuwait, described in Table 2.1 
below. His account shows that the Al-Sabah, Al-Khalifa and Al-Jalahima families participated 
in government from 1650 until 1765. However, in 1766 the Al-Sabah family became sole 
governors of Kuwait, and attempts to become independent from the Ottoman Empire 
1
 began 
in 1899 when Mubarak the Great signed the Memorandum with Great Britain.  
                                                          
1
 The land of Kuwait before the country was established under the Ottoman Empire. 
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Significant political participation by merchant families took place in 1938 (see Section 2.4), 
the same year that oil was first struck, as a reason of merchant families fearing losing their 
political influence over the governor, which may be explained by the fact that oil provided a 
source of government revenue (see Section 2.3). 
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Table 2.1: Timeline of historical events  
Years Events 
1613 Migrant fishing village established at Kuwait 
1650 Drought forces Bedouin families, later known as the Bani Utub, to migrate from Najd in Central Arabia; the 
Al-Sabah family is among the immigrants. 
1672-1680 Sheikh Barrak bin Ghuraif of the Bani Khalid tribe builds a small fort at Kuwait. 
1710 The Bani Utub, including the Al-Sabah family, settles in Kuwait. 
1756 Sabah Bin Jaber elected Sheikh of Kuwait, founds the Al-Sabah dynasty and rules until 1762; Kuwait is a 
vassal state to the Ottoman Empire before the establishment of the country, as the land of Kuwait was under the 
geographic area of the Ottoman Empire. 
1762 Abdullah 1
st
 becomes sheikh and rules until 1814. 
1766 Al-Khlifah and Al-Jalahima family begin to depart Kuwait, leaving Al-Sabah family in control. 
1775 Kuwait makes first contact with the British Empire through the British East India Company. 
1783 Kuwait‘s fleet defeats the Bani Kaab in a naval battle, fending off invasion. 
1793-1797 Series of unsuccessful Wahabbi invasions of Kuwait 
1814 Jaber 1
st
  becomes sheikh and rules until 1859. 
1859 Sabah 2
nd  
becomes sheikh and rules until 1866. 
1866 Abdullah 2
nd
 becomes sheikh and rules until 1982. 
1892 Mohamed becomes sheikh and rules until 1896. 
1896 Mubarak (Mubarak the Great) assassinates his brother, becomes sheikh and rules until 
 1915. 
1897 The Ottoman Empire recognises Mubarak the Great as the provincial sub-governor of Kuwait. 
1899 January 23: Memorandum between Mubarak the Great and Great Britain recognises Kuwait‘s sovereignty. 
1913 Anglo-Ottoman convention for independence of Kuwait from Ottoman Empire and become under Great Britain 
sovereignty. 
1914 Small desalinisation plant is built. 
1914-1918 First World War: Great Britain recognises Kuwait‘s independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1914. 
1915 Jaber 2
nd
 becomes sheikh and rules until 1917. 
1916 The Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire 
1917 Salem becomes sheikh and rules until 1921. 
1920 Brotherhood invasion and battle of Jahra (Red Fort) 
1921 Ahmed Al-Jaber becomes sheikh and rules until 1950. 
1922 Uqair Protocol; Border Zone is established with Saudi Arabia. 
1934 Kuwait Oil Company receives oil concession from governor (Sheikh), begins exploration. 
1936 First exploratory oil well is drilled in Kuwait. 
1938 a) Parliament movement headed by merchant families advocates popular political representation in 
Kuwait‘s government. 
b) First oil is struck in Burgan field in Kuwait. 
1939-1945 Second World War; prevents development of Kuwaiti oil field 
1946 Kuwait‘s Petroleum Industry begins pumping oil and sells it overseas. 
1950 a) Abdullah Al-Salem (Abdullah 3
rd
) becomes sheikh and rules until 1965. 
b) A massive modern desalinisation plant is built to provide fresh water. 
1960 Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) is founded; Kuwait is a founding member nation of OPEC. 
1961 Kuwait Fund for Arab Economics Development (KFAED) is set up. 
1962 November 11: Kuwait‘s first constitution is ratified by Emir Abdullah 3
rd 
. 
1963 January 23: popular election of Kuwait‘s first National Assembly 
January 29: first National Assembly convenes. 
May 14: Kuwait joins the United Nations (UN). 
Source: Casey (2007) 
Notes: this table shows the historical events of Kuwait since its establishment 
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2.3 Kuwait’s Economic Situation  
 
This section presents Kuwait‘s economy covering two distinct phases, before and after the 
discovery of crude oil which has transformed the country‘s economic activity. The 
development of business and the appearance of joint stock companies are also discussed, 
together with an account of financial crises and examples of manipulation. 
  
2.3.1 Pre-discovery of crude oil 
 
The livelihood of the Kuwaiti population in the pre-crude oil phase was based on agriculture 
and trade, and on other pursuits such as grazing, fishing and diving and life was harsh and the 
state budget depended mainly on tax contributions from merchant families (Al-Qenae, 1968).  
 
Merchant families at that time, were almost 20 families (Al-Qenae, 1968), represented the only 
source of tax payers and sought to expand their business in the country. The increase in their 
wealth was due to: its strategic geographical position as an intermediary in commerce between 
Indian and Arab countries - for instance, shipments of merchandise from India and Saudi 
Arabia passed through Kuwait en route to Iraq and Syria. Further, there was an on-going war 
between Iran and Iraq that provided benefits to Kuwait through its role in linking the Far East 
and India by transferring merchandise from Iraq through its own ports to Europe. These two 
factors explain the volume of business activity which enhanced the wealth of merchant 
families, increasing the level of their tax contributions and in turn expanding their influence 
over the government (Al-Qenae et al., 2002; Al-Temimi, 2006). 
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Since the official recognition of Kuwait as a state in 1756, businesses in pearl diving and the 
carriage of goods and people grew (Al-Shamari, 1985). Pearling was regarded as the most 
important commercial activity, because the majority of Kuwaitis (62 % of the Kuwaiti citizens 
plus the merchant families) were involved (the total estimated population of Kuwait in 1807 
around 15000) (Al-Temimi, 2006). Pearling involved three parties - ship-owner, the financier 
of the trip (both of whom were members of merchant families), and the divers. However, the 
profits of such trips were distributed among the three parties un-equally: the total number of 
merchant fleets in 1800 comprised 461 ships, their divers numbered around 9,200, yet the 
divers received only a basic wage, most of the revenue from trading going to the merchants 
(Al-Temimi, 2006). Growth in the businesses of merchant families, especially in the pearl 
industry, led to merchant domination of the country‘s economy in general and control of the 
pearling boats and trades in particular. The government levied a tax on the pearl industry due 
to the overflow of returns derived from this commerce in 1800‘s (Al-Shamari, 1985). The 
pearl industry in Kuwait at that time was making excessive profits for merchant families, 
which explains the wealth that empowered them (Ismael, 1993). However, the pearl industry in 
Kuwait diminished after the discovery of cultured pearls in Japan in 1859 as the business 
becomes unprofitable and cultured pearls becomes cheaper than the natural one, followed by 
the discovery of crude oil in 1938 that changed the business type of merchants to offer 
services.     
 
Trade in contraband merchandise that bought in cheaper prices than market prices and sell 
them in market price, such as rice and tea from India, also created fortunes for the merchants 
during the pre-oil era. Business and trade were monitored in India by the British governor and 
taxes were enforced over merchandise. However, to avoid the tax levied on all exported 
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merchandise, merchants shipped goods before adding taxes and sold this as contraband 
merchandise in Arab countries at lower prices (Al-Temimi, 2006).    
 
As a result of their economic wealth and dominance, merchant families were favoured by the 
Kuwaiti royal family.  Before the discovery of oil, their primary role was to support the 
country‘s economy. The significance of this role can be illustrated by the efforts made by 
Mubarek the Great, Prince of Kuwait, to placate representatives of a dominant merchant 
family after disagreement with them led to their migration to Bahrain. The prince persuaded 
them to return to Kuwait in order to avoid the negative impact of their migration on the 
country‘s economy since the size of their business represented a major tax contribution (Al-
temimi, 2006).      
 
The situation remained largely unchanged until the discovery of oil in 1938, apart from the 
establishment of a joint-stock company in 1923 by the governor of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmed Al-
Jaber Al-Sabah, who granted a licence to the Transportation by Motors Corporation to be 
formed as a joint-stock corporation (Al-Shamari, 1985).  
 
Since its discovery in 1938, the extraction of crude oil has become the backbone of the 
Kuwaiti economy as it finances a large proportion of the state‘s budget and its development 
plans and is an important source of national income and gross national product (Kuwait Voice, 
2009: Electronic Journalistic Article). This is further discussed in the following section. 
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2.3.2 Post-discovery of crude oil 
 
Oil was discovered in Kuwait in late 1938, but the Second World War caused the first 
commercial shipment launch to be postponed until 1946 (Al-Shamari, 1985). Since 1946, the 
dependence of the country‘s budget has shifted from taxation to oil revenue (Al-Qenae, 1968). 
As in the pre-oil era, Kuwait‘s geography has supported merchant families in their efforts to 
maximise their wealth since the discovery of crude oil. Casey (2007) acknowledges that the 
geography of a country can enhance its wealth and political influence; in the case of Kuwait, in 
holding 10% of the global total reserves of crude oil, the country has particularly benefited 
from its geographical location in building its wealth and in exerting political influence on the 
international community as Casey (2007) notes: 
 
The geography of Kuwait ... covered by a bed of clay, silt, 
gravel, and sand ..., this sediment ... sits on top of a large dome 
that consists of limestone ... this massive rocks caps the reservoir 
of petroleum that provides Kuwait with its wealth and political 
influence.  
    (p.5) 
 
Geological factors such as the location of the onshore oil fields close to the Persian Gulf, the 
flow of oil toward the sea and the ease of drilling in the area have helped Kuwait to produce 
relatively cheap oil compared with the rest of the world. The central geographical location of 
Kuwait in the Persian Gulf, situated between the developed economies in the West and the 
growing economies of East Asia, has reduced transport costs and increased the significance of 
the Kuwaiti oil market (Haji and Al-Salman, 1995; Adelman, 1995). 
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These geographical features, combined with the huge amount of crude oil that was discovered, 
had a positive effect on the country‘s budget. As discussed earlier, the tax levied on the pearl 
merchants was the main source of income before the discovery of crude oil; since 1948, the 
production and profit post-oil discovery have represented a high contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the Kuwaiti economy reached up to 95% in 2004 and 2009. 
However, the percentage of oil contribution to GDP has differed at various times according to 
fluctuations in oil prices: it was at its highest in 1980 (62.2 per cent) and lowest in 1998 (30.5 
per cent). This was because, following the oil embargo in 1973 when the disturbance of oil 
supplies by the Arabs caused prices to rise significantly, there was an oil boom from 1974 for 
six years, and by the end of 1980 the price had reached US$36 per barrel. From 1981, oil 
prices started to decline when the world demand for oil fell, reaching a very low level (less 
than US$10 per barrel) by 1998. Hence, the fluctuations in oil prices have had a significant 
influence on the Kuwait economy (Metwally, 1993; Al-Yousif, 1997; Stevens, 1997).           
 
Table 2.2: total Kuwait’s revenue of crude oil sales  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Kuwait’s 
revenue 
from crude 
oil sales in 
(m $) 
 
62,498 
 
87,446 
 
53,974 
 
67,036 
 
103,490 
Sources: OPEC annual statistic bulletin 2012 
Note: this table shows the annual revenue in Million $ of Kuwait oil sales. 
  
Despite the instability of crude oil prices, economic activity has focused almost entirely on the 
petroleum industry (more than 60 per cent of GDP) and the country controls approximately 10 
per cent of the world‘s known oil reserves (100 million barrels of petrol and 1.5 trillion cubic 
meters of natural gas) and 22 per cent of the total reserves of the GCC countries (Casey, 2007; 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Economic Bulletin). But the Kuwaiti government has not 
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diversified the country‘s income. Because of the dependence on crude oil sales to finance the 
country‘s budget and projects, the economy has been transferred from a productive economy 
to a rentier economy depends on the return from oil sales, observable through an increase in 
local consumption that has led to growth in individual wealth and the entrenchment of the 
bureaucracy (Ismael, 1993; Al-Zumai, 2007).  
 
In contrast with the pre-oil era, when the wealth of merchant families was derived from 
productive activity, after oil had been discovered their affluence was obtained from 
government expenses.  With an abundance of crude oil sales, merchants were tempted to 
maximise their own interests as a result of a monopoly exploitation concession to the Kuwait 
Oil Company granted by the governor, Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, in 1934. Al-Temimi (2006) 
states that the company was a joint-venture corporation owned by the Gulf Oil Corporation, an 
American corporation, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was a British corporation. 
Other foreign corporations were also granted oil exploitation concessions in different areas of 
Kuwait a decade later (Al-Shamari, 1985). Moreover, the governor allowed the British Bank 
for the Middle East to open a branch in Kuwait in 1942 which aimed to exploit revenue 
derived from the sale of crude oil, that was deposited in this bank (Ismael, 1993). This aroused 
feelings of jealousy among the merchant families, so in 1952 they established the National 
Bank of Kuwait (NBK) to share the benefits of crude oil sales with the British Bank for the 
Middle East from the oil revenue that had been deposited in the bank. As a result, the merchant 
families ceased their productive activity and changed to providing services (Al-Temimi, 2006). 
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The introduction of oil in Kuwait strengthened the position of existing merchant families as 
governments sought to enlarge local economies, and family businesses were well placed to 
gain government contracts (Peterson, 2001).  
 
Merchant families not only established the NBK, but followed this by setting up the Kuwait 
National Cinema Company (KNCC) in 1954, the Kuwait Airways Company (KAC) in 1956, 
and the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) in 1957. Trading in company shares occurred in 
small brokerage companies, each of which was treated as an independent market with its own 
prices and supply and demand for shares, largely traded in ten Kuwaiti Dinars for a single 
share. The processes of establishing joint-stock companies continued as government contracts 
grew. The growth of joint-stock companies led the government to interfere to monitor and 
limit the number of establishing joint companies, with the issuance of the Companies‘ Code 15 
in 1960 (Al-Shamari, 1985; Al-Qenae et al., 2002). After this there was a scarcity of 
investment opportunities that resulted in an increase in share prices over their book value, 
which in turn led to inflation. Fearing a sharp decline in share prices and a potential financial 
crisis, the government again intervened in 1976 by buying shares and consequently becoming 
owner of most of these companies. The total amount of government expenditure in the market 
was 500 million Kuwaiti Dinars, to control a bubble in company share prices, which were then 
divided into single dinars instead of ten dinars. The government transferred these joint-stock 
companies to state-owned companies such as the Kuwait Airways Company and the Kuwait 
Oil Tanker Company and created a fortune for the founders (Al-Qenae et al., 2002; Aljoman, 
2011: Journal Article in newspaper). In 1977, the government established the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange (KSE) to organise the trading process. 
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2.3.2.1 Establishment of the Kuwait Stock Exchange and related economic events   
 
The KSE was first established in 1977 as an attempt to organise the share trading processes of 
existing companies. However, both the high demand for shares and the desire to maximise 
short term profits led merchants to establish a new market outside the influence of government 
monitoring and to set up new joint-stock companies in other GCC countries to avoid obeying 
the regulations and away from the eyes of the government‘s monitoring bodies (Aljoman, 
2011: Journal Article in newspaper). These companies became a parallel market to the KSE, 
known as the Al-Manakh market. The number of these companies reached 24 in 1981. During 
the third quarter of 1981, share prices rose dramatically in both the KSE and Al-Manakh 
markets: the KSE was eighth in size by market capital and for several weeks in 1981 the 
volume of trading in both Kuwaiti markets overtook that of the London Stock Exchange. The 
majority of transactions in the Al-Manakh market were paid by post-dated cheques, which led 
to the creation of futures contracts. As a result of the immense profits that were gained through 
the Al-Manakh market, 208 billion shares were traded, compared with 255 million in the KSE. 
However, the vast number of post-dated cheques resulted in a failure to settle at the due date, 
which in turn led to a collapse in share prices and in the market in August, 1982. The total 
unsettled post-dated cheques numbered 28,815, with a combined value of 26.7 billion Kuwaiti 
Dinars, four times the country‘s GDP for the same period (Al-Qenae et al., 2002; Aljoman, 
2011: Journal Article in newspaper). The government stepped in by spending 2 billion Kuwaiti 
Dinars in buying shares, and then again had to support the market in 1986 by forgiving 
investors‘ debts at banks. Furthermore, the government transferred the ownership of listed 
companies to state-owned companies in 1986 (Aljoman, 2012: Journal Article in newspaper). 
From 1987 to 1990, listed companies, such as the National Investment Company, Agility and 
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Zain, were transferred to state ownership. Thus, the government dominated listed companies 
and the country‘s economic activity (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper).       
After the Iraqi invasion in 1991, the KSE was reopened and four years later the government 
sold most of its ownership in companies. A group of merchant families and individual 
investors bought the shares, financed by the banks, which led to the over-pricing of shares 
again in 1996. In 1997 the Central Bank intervened to impose new regulations on banks by 
organising the process of lending money for investments which led to a sharp drop, of about 
40 per cent, in share prices (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). 
The privatisation process occurred in 1995, and today Kuwaiti listed companies, are 
characterised of major shareholders either family or government or both (Aljoman, 2012: 
Journal Article in newspaper).  
 
The major shareholders represent government investment divisions (the Kuwait Investment 
Authority and the Public Institute for Social Security) or merchant families as shown in Table 
2.3. Not all merchant families are listed in table 2.3, however, these families are the most 
influential families in the KSE. The Al-Khurafi family is a major shareholder in 25 listed and 
unlisted companies, eight of which are in turn major shareholders in a further 38 listed 
companies in the KSE (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). The National 
Investment Company (NIC) is also dominated by the Al-Kurafi family, featuring a pyramid 
ownership structure with 119 listed and unlisted companies (Aljoman, 2012: Journal Article in 
newspaper). The NIC is now managed by Jassim Al-Khurafi; he has been the speaker of 
parliament since 2003. 
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The Al-Sultan merchant family is a major shareholder in 9 listed and unlisted companies 
which in turn control a further five listed companies in the KSE (Aljoman, 2011: Journal 
Article in newspaper). The Al-Shayea family, through their unlisted family-owned companies, 
also own three listed companies in the KSE (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). 
Similarly, the Al-Sabah family has invested in ten listed companies in the KSE through its 
own unlisted companies; one of those listed companies (the Securities Group company) holds 
another 12 influential ownerships in listed companies (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in 
newspaper). In addition, the Haider family is a major shareholder in eight listed companies 
which in turn holds a majority of shares in twenty listed companies (Aljoman, 2011: Journal 
Article in newspaper). 
Table 2.3 Merchant families ownership in Kuwait 
Family Number of companies that 
have Pyramid ownership  
Number of listed and 
unlisted companies major 
shareholders in  
Al-Khurafi 8 182 
Al-Sultan 9 14 
Al-Shayea 1 4 
Salem Al-Sabah 1 23 
Hamad Al-Sabah - 164 
Haider 8 28 
Note: these are examples of some merchant ownership in listed and unlisted companies 
 
Merchant families have pyramid ownership structures and control many listed companies. At 
the same time they have political power through their representation in parliament. These 
examples illustrate the prevalence of pyramid ownership structures in the KSE. For instance, 
Hamad Al-Sabah are owners of 164 listed and unlisted companies, while the Al-Khrafi family 
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have 182 listed and unlisted companies, Pyramid ownership is defined as a structure in which 
an apex shareholder, usually a very wealthy family, owns and controls a company, which may 
or may not be listed; this company holds and controls blocks in hundreds of listed and private 
companies, thus placing large proportions of the economy of the whole country under the 
control of a single family. These are the structures that permit tiny elites to control the greater 
parts of the corporate sectors of many countries (Morck et al., 2004; Morck and Steier, 2005). 
They also have greatly augmented political influence relative to their actual wealth, and 
control the development of public policies, including investors‘ protection and enforcement, 
and institutions such as capital markets (Barca, 1995). This is achieved through their ability to 
pay to lobby politicians from their shareholders‘ investments in order to obtain their own 
benefits (Morck et al., 2004).       
 
Evidence of the extent of merchant power and control can be seen in the new listed companies 
at the KSE in 2003. The new listed companies in 2003 were known as paper companies, the 
reason behind calling these companies paper companies refer to their type of operation, as they 
had no operational activities or assets. The only assets that these companies own are the 
number of shares issued to trade. Merchants use rumour and manipulative transaction through 
their listed and unlisted companies in order to raise their paper‘s companies share prices and 
attract investors such as the case of Al-Daar Investment, Agility, Global Investment House, 
and the International group of Investment (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). 
They fabricated a high demand on the paper companies by using rumours that those listed 
papers‘ companies expected to have future projects and contracts that would generate high 
profit. The result was an inflated share price resulting in losses of capital of more than 60 
billion Kuwaiti Dinars by the middle of 2008; the only actions taken against these companies 
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from the monitoring bodies (KSE) was a delisting all of these companies, whereas the boards 
have not been charged (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). Merchants also 
speculated in the market by taking loans from banks despite the Central Bank law restricting 
giving loans for speculation; banks ignore this and continue to fund merchant families. In the 
second half of 2008 the global financial crisis occurred, and local banks in Kuwait became 
more conservative, by restricting loans. The diminished market led to a scarcity of liquidity 
and the capital market value dropped to less than 30 billion Kuwaiti Dinars by the beginning 
of 2009, a 50% drop compared with 2008 (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). A 
minority group of investors claimed that the merchant families were responsible for 
establishing paper companies (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Article in newspaper). However, the 
KSE did not take any action and the courts did not support investor protection.  
 
The above examples show that the merchant families have power and influence. Minorities‘ 
interests are not protected since the only action taken was delisting the listed papers‘ 
companies.  
  
A further example of manipulation of the KSE by merchant families is the corruption of Midan 
Company, which was established in 1992 and listed in 2008. The main core of its business was 
based on opening and managing a dental clinic (Aljoman, 2012: Journal Article in newspaper). 
The company‘s share price rose sharply by 214% during the nine months from March, 2011, to 
January, 2012. The share price increased from 0.580 to 1.820 Kuwaiti Dinars, leading to a rise 
in the market capitalisation of the company to 273 million Kuwaiti Dinars, despite losses of 
around fifty per cent of total assets; furthermore, there was no disclosure of future projects or 
new operational profits. A dramatic increase in the company share price occurred on 15 
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December, 2011, its value rising by 87% from 0.790 to 1.480 Kuwaiti Dinars with one single 
buy order of 2500 shares. This reflected positively on the company‘s share price, which 
increased from 118.5 million to 222 million Kuwaiti Dinars.  This occurred despite the book 
value falling 63 per cent from 0.133 million in December, 2009, to 0.049 million Kuwaiti 
Dinars in September, 2011; the KSE ignored these events (Aljoman, 2012: Journal Article in 
newspaper).                 
 
All of the above examples show that the merchant families are powerful and influential, and 
this power refers to their control over a number of listed and unlisted companies (pyramid 
ownership) that maintains their political influence over the decision makers in the country, as 
they have not yet been charged over their manipulative transactions.      
  
The next section further discusses the significance of political factors and the effect of the 
economic power of merchant families on the political situation in Kuwait. A comparison is 
also made of the political role of merchant families and the governor during pre-oil and post-
oil eras.  
2.4 Political Situation 
 
Peterson (2001) states that in the Gulf countries the ruling and merchant families, represent the 
top elites, and exercise both political and economic power. The political role of merchant 
families is subsidiary but important as they have strengthened their position through alliances 
with the ruling families. In the pre-oil era, merchant families controlled finance, especially in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Dubai, which in turn strengthened their position and 
influence over the rulers. Throughout the oil era, the merchant families have tended to support 
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the ruling families because of their shared mutual interests. In this way, merchant families 
have gained security, protection and legitimacy while the ruling families have gained 
prosperity (Peterson, 2001; Al-Haj, 1996). The next section further explains the political role 
of merchant families in pre- and post-crude oil eras, as well as the 4 assemblies that were 
established (1785, 1921, 1938, 1962) and will further explain the role of merchant families in 
those assemblies.   
2.4.1 Pre-discovery of crude oil 
 
After the establishment of Kuwait in 1710, the political structure, including administrative and 
judicial systems, was under the control of three families: Al-Jalahima, representing the 
management of maritime affairs; Al-Khalifah, which managed trade; and Al-Sabah, which 
supervised the welfare and judicial systems in the country (Al-Rumi, 2005). Consequently, the 
government that emerged was based on the principle of participation, and since then there has 
been no single dominant authority, democratic systems have been firmly established. 
However, the principles of participation did not continue as, in 1758, Sabah Al-Sabah (the 
first) became the governor of the country and the country came under a single dominant 
authority, Al-Sabah family (Al-Sabah, 2010: Journal Article in newspaper).   
 
The economic power of merchant families before the discovery of crude oil was reflected in 
their tax contributions, which were the main source of the country‘s revenue. In turn, the 
merchants exerted pressure on Prince Mubarak in 1785 to agree to their participation in 
political issues by choosing members of their families as representatives in a newly established 
parliament, claiming it was necessary to share decision-making since they provided the 
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country with its funds. Fearful of a budget deficit if the merchant families ceased to pay taxes, 
the governor approved this request, and as a result the first parliament in Kuwait, in 1785, was 
comprised of a majority of merchant families. Despite parliament having no authority, and its 
duties being restricted to holding consultations with the governor, it was seen as a way of 
stabilising the Kuwaiti government (Al-Qenae et al., 2002). Hence, the economic power of 
merchant families enabled them to exercise political influence over the governor (Sheikh 
Abdullah Al-Sabah).  
Due to the 1785 assembly having no authority over their members, the members of the 
assembly failed to attend the session when they realised that they had neither power nor 
permission to contribute to the decision making and the parliament was dissolved after 6 
months as the members were not attending. The merchant families kept raising their claim to 
the governor of Kuwait at that time, Sheikh Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, and since to have real 
political participation in managing the country‘s affairs. The result of this continued lobbying 
was that a second assembly was established in 1921. The second assembly again lacked a due 
process of elections since the governor appointed the members of the assembly; Sheikh 
Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah appointed 12 members, all from merchant families. The assembly 
became famous as the assembly of merchant families, as all of the members were from 
merchant families (Yousef, 2010: Journal Article in newspaper; Al-Qenae, 1968). Al-Rumaihi 
(1994: Academic Forum) asserts that it was the role of Kuwaiti merchant families and their 
involvement in politics that led to the emergence of parliament and democracy in Kuwait. 
However, this consultative parliament in 1921 did not continue for more than three months as 
the members failed to participate in the decision-making process or manage the country‘s 
affairs efficiently because of their diverse business interests.        
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However, the post-crude oil era saw changes to the government‘s financial dependency on the 
influence of the merchant families, and the country‘s budget became more dependent on the 
revenue from oil sales. 
2.4.2 Post-discovery of crude oil 
 
The early stages of crude oil exploration, which began in 1936, resulted in the merchant 
families becoming concerned that the government may achieve financial independence. They 
therefore continued to exercise pressure by requesting an extension of their authority over the 
state‘s decision-making process, especially in so far as any legislative role would maintain 
their fortune. The 1921 assembly was the first step toward political participation, but the 
merchant families recognised that, since the governor appointed his own members, their 
involvement was not in fact sought (Yousef, 2010: Journal Article in newspaper). 
 
Pressure on the governor, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, led to the establishment in 1938 
of a third Consultative Council as the first elected legislative assembly. The voting was 
restricted to just Kuwaiti men, with 14 members, headed by Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-
Sabah (a cousin of the governor), appointed by the governor Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-
Sabah. Although short-lived, it was an attempt to create a real democratic institution compared 
with other previous assemblies in 1785 and 1921 (Yousef, 2010: Journal Article in 
newspaper). 
 
Since the first commercial shipment of crude oil in 1946, the country shifted from being 
funded by taxation to oil revenue, and the role of merchant families diminished (Al-Qenae, 
26 
 
1968). However, the merchant families changed their business model and in 1959 set up the 
board of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), which they dominated. 
Their underlying aim was to combine their financial power to allow them to intervene in 
political issues. Moreover, they established a newspaper, known as Al-Qabas, in an attempt to 
persuade readers to adopt their views (Al-Temimi, 2006). The National Library had already 
been established by the merchant families in 1923 to raise awareness of the political situation 
in order to influence public concern and to convince ordinary citizens of the necessity of 
participation in the country‘s politics (Al-Mdairies, 1999).      
 
Merchants consolidated their economic power through the KCCI and extended influence over 
the general public by using the media, in efforts to persuade the governor, Sheikh Abdullah 
Al-Salem Al-Sabah, to write a constitution for all Kuwaiti citizens.  This would enable them to 
participate in legislation by constituting a parliament in which all members were elected by the 
citizens.  The first elections to the Constituent Assembly took place on 19 June, 1961, marking 
the beginning of a modern parliamentary democracy. The parliament was responsible for the 
constitution of the country. The new constitution was introduced in 1962, granting a 
participatory role for the members of the Constituent Assembly in the enactment of codes and 
legislation. On 1 November, 1962, the draft constitution was approved by the then governor, 
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah. Parliament then resigned after the constitution was 
approved as the duty of the constitution assembly was just to set and approve the constitution 
of the country. The governor, according to the country‘s constitution called for a new election 
in 1963. The constitution came into force on 29 January, 1963, when the first National 
Assembly was convened (Al-Qenae et al., 2002; Al-Qenae, 1968). 
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The National Assembly's financial responsibilities include the approval of the state budget and 
the final accounts. It also supervises executive power, by submitting questions, initiating 
discussions and setting up commissions of inquiry. Such supervision can lead to a vote of no-
confidence against a minister and result in his resignation. A vote of no-confidence against the 
prime minister is not allowed, but the Assembly has the right to decide not to cooperate with 
the prime minister. In such a case, the issue is taken to the Governor (Sheikh), who may either 
relieve the prime minister of his office and appoint a new cabinet, or dissolve the Assembly 
and hold fresh elections (Kuwait Voice, 2009: Electronic Journalistic Article). 
The National Assembly has the right to set up standing committees as well as ad-hoc 
committees from among its members, which include those for Petitions and Complaints, 
Interior Affairs and Defence, Financial and Economic Affairs, Legislative and Legal Affairs, 
Affairs of Education, Culture and Guidance, Health, Social Affairs and Labour, Foreign 
Affairs, Public Utilities, Protection of Public Funds and the Defence of Human Rights. 
Committee members‘ elections now depend on connections and party influence with the 
government, which is itself represented by members of parliament who vote for election to 
committees (Yousef, 2010: Journal Article in newspaper).   
 
The early creation of councils in Kuwait (and Bahrain) initiated the political role of merchant 
families. Peterson (2001) reports that the merchant families in Kuwait have long been heavily 
represented in the National Assembly, and Jasim Al-Khurafi, scion of perhaps Kuwait's 
wealthiest family, serves as Speaker. Merchant families chose to become involved because of 
the prestige of membership which advances their interests. Merchant families, through their 
presence in the parliament, tend to back the government against liberals, tribalists and 
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Islamists. They back the government and support the status quo because they have the most to 
lose from political or economic turmoil in terms of wealth and position; many of them have 
prospered financially and raised themselves socially from their close association with the 
ruling family (Peterson, 2001).  
 
Merchants support the government as a result of the competition they face from an emerging 
middle class who seek a larger share of the spoils and increased participation in politics. The 
general citizenry are opposed to this because of issues of corruption and inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth (Peterson, 2001). 
  
As a result of this opposition, parliament has been dissolved seven times in 1976, 1986, 1999, 
2006, 2008, 2011 and 2012 and parliamentary life disabled in 1976 and 1986. The dissolution 
of parliament was related to scandals that occurred in the Al-Manakh. For example, parliament 
questioned the minister of finance, Jassem Al-Khurafi in the end of the year 1985 to obtain 
information and data about government expenditure in settling the crises, and the names of 
those involved; however, the minister refused to cooperate and the governor, Sheikh Jaber 
Ahmad Al-Sabah, dissolved parliament (Al-Temimi, 2006).        
 
Thus the merchant families in both the pre- and post-oil eras have played a significant role in 
the political situation of the country. The economic power of those families gave them political 
influence over the governors of Kuwait. Before the discovery of crude oil, merchants 
represented a majority in parliament, and in the post-crude oil era they again raised their voice 
and their economic dominance led to the establishment of the National Assembly and a written 
constitution between the royal family and the citizens of Kuwait. The relationship between 
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governors and merchant families continued to reflect their desire to protect their own interests: 
the dissolution of parliament in 1986 following the Al-Manakh crisis is evidence of 
government intervention to compensate merchant families and protect their manipulative 
practices.      
Moreover, merchant families have engaged in manipulative practices in the KSE; laws have 
not been introduced to protect against manipulative groups; and there has been little legal 
protection for the interests of the minorities, who have lost money invested in listed companies 
through manipulative transactions and market rumours (Aljoman, 2011: Journal Articlle in 
newspaper). It is therefore now important to discuss the legal situation and the role of law in 
Kuwait and to examines the development of legislative systems both pre- and post-crude oil 
discovery.    
 
2.5 Kuwait’s Legal System 
 
This section first describes the legal system of the pre-oil era, and then examines the 
differences introduced after the discovery of crude oil.  It also illustrates the relationship 
between the legal system and the merchant families.   
 
2.5.1 Pre-discovery of crude oil 
 
The legal system in the pre-crude oil era was founded on the Islamic legal system (Sharia law). 
Citizens involved in a dispute usually met in either the governors‘ council or the merchant 
councils (Al-Shemari, 2008). However, the judiciary reformed its organisation and began to 
assemble in a single location. For example, in 1920 commercial disputes were resolved 
through the commercial committee, the members of which were appointed by the governor; 
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resolutions were based on the decisions of previous similar cases. In 1928, a specific court 
building was established by the governor of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarek the Great, who 
appointed Sheikh Abdulla Al-Sabah as director of the courts. The building comprised two 
sections, the first for diverse affairs that are concerned with disputes between pearl divers and 
merchant families and the second for the registration of real estate (Al-Shemari, 2008). Such 
relatively uncomplicated business ventures did not give rise to issues that required formal 
regulations in order to administer Kuwaiti commerce. The disputes that arose out of 
commercial activities were resolved by a specialist panel which based its resolutions on Sharia 
law, traditions and commercial customs. This situation continued until the discovery of crude 
oil and establishment of joint-stock companies during the 1950‘s. 
 
2.5.2 Post-discovery of crude oil 
 
A significant number of corporations formed in Kuwait during the 1950‘s which led to a 
surplus of income derived from oil sales by the middle of the decade (Redhwan, 1998), and it 
became necessary to regulate corporate activities. To address this need, the first Companies 
Law was enacted in 1960 (Kuwait Companies Act Article: 15/1960). Shortly afterwards, in 
June, 1961, a treaty was signed by Kuwait and the British Empire to terminate its protection, 
which gave the state of Kuwait full independence. This was followed by the replacement of the 
country‘s currency that was previously approved, which was the Indian Rupee, with a new 
currency called Kuwaiti Dinars, in 1961, which became the only currency accepted in dealing. 
However, the penalties imposed on offending companies remained in Indian Rupees as the 
1960 Company Law pre-dated the replacement of currency in 1961, indicating that no 
amendments had been made to legislation since Companies Law were enacted (Al-Melhem, 
2009).       
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In 1962, the governor, Sheikh Abdulla Al-Sabah, introduced a new constitution in Kuwait and 
called for the elections of the first National Assembly, seeking to involve citizens in the 
establishment of the constitution, which also set the country‘s regulatory and legal system, a 
combination of French civil law and Islamic and Egyptian law, the reason for applying the 
Egyptian French based civil law is because that Egypt first applied the French civil law as well 
as Sharia law, hence Kuwait in 1961 had quoted the Egyptian law (Al-Shemari, 2008). The 
constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and defines its organisation and 
functions. It incorporates the main legal codes, which include the civil, commercial and 
criminal codes and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Al-Shemari, 2008). 
 
The judicial system has three levels. The first level is the Court of First Instance, which hears 
civil, commercial and personal claims, and supports penal actions. The Appellate Courts are at 
the next level, where appeals against sentences from the Court of First Instance are heard. 
Located at the top of the judicial system is the Court of Cassation, which was established in 
1990 to consider the judgements issued by the Appellate Courts to monitor their conformity 
with the law. The provisions of the Cassation Court cannot be challenged. The Judicial Board 
consists of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Appeal Courts, 
together with the Attorney General, the President of the High Court and the Under Secretary to 
the Minister of Justice (Al-Shemari, 2008). 
 
Another court, the State Security Court, founded in 1969, considers issues relating to both 
external and internal state security. The Constitutional Court, set up in 1973, is empowered to 
interpret the constitutionality of legislation with the authority to review electoral challenges. 
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This court is composed of five members selected by the Judicial Council and elected by secret 
ballot, and a reserve member. The law requires that the judges of the Constitutional Court are 
Kuwaiti citizens (Al-Shemari, 2008).  
 
The next section analyses Companies Law and compares it to corporate governance code to 
establish whether the civil law adopted by Kuwait meets international practice. 
 
2.5.2.1 The Companies Law of 1960 and corporate governance practices 
 
This section considers the practices of corporate governance in relation to companies‘ 
ownership structures, the independence of directors, the structure of the board and board 
committees, and attempts at transparency and disclosure, and compares these with the 
provisions of the current Companies Law.  
Before that, it is useful to outline the influences over corporate disclosure and legislation for 
companies in Kuwait. The merchant families, after the discovery of crude oil, specifically in 
the 1950s, established shareholding companies. The government, in 1960, found that the 
number of shareholding companies, the disorganised trading of their shares and the lack of 
legislation that governed these companies made it necessary to issue an Act to oversee the 
process of establishing and monitoring these companies (Al-Melhem, 2009). The result was 
the issuance of the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) in 1960, which requires annual financial 
statements to be submitted to the MOCI together with an audited balance sheet and profit and 
loss account statement, however, there was no stipulation in the legislation about which 
accounting standards were to be followed, and unlike Saudi Arabia, Kuwait did not have any 
accounting standards of its own (Abdallah, 2001). Then in 1992 MOCI made compliance with 
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International Accounting Standards mandatory for listed companies (Abdallah, 2001). The 
MOCI now requires that all listed companies produce financial statements in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
Companies also report to the MOCI on a monthly basis about the monthly transactions volume 
of a company‘s securities traded, and the highest and lowest prices of the company‘s stock, for 
all KSE listed companies (MOCI, 2000). The Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and 
Auditors (KAAA) is the only local professional body of accounting in Kuwait and 
membership of the association requires an individual to hold at least a Diploma in accounting 
(Abdallah, 2001). The KAAA was established in Feb 1973 (kwaaa.org) but only recently 
joined the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in June 2011 (ifac.org). A total of 
2087 members are registered with the KAAA according to the last financial report of the 
KAAA in 2012 (kwaaa.org).     
An external auditor has to be appointed by the board to check that the financial statements 
show a true and fair view. The external auditor has to be registered with the MOCI, hold at 
least a Bachelor of Accounting, and have at least 5 years audit experience (MOCI, 2000). 
Borsuly (2007) has criticised the companies‘ Act 1960 (Article 15) for being outdated. For 
example, insider trading penalties are just 10-200 Kuwaiti Dinar (£25-£450) which is very low 
compared with the penalties for insider trading in other international markets. 
Another criticism of companies Act is, according to the 1960 Companies Law, ownership 
structure is less about company structure than about protection for Kuwaiti investors and 
merchant families from foreign investors. It is stipulated in Article 5 (Section VI) of Law No: 
15/1960 that at least 51% of the capital of every corporation incorporated in Kuwait must be 
owned by Kuwaitis:  
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The amount of the capital and each partner's contribution, 
provided the percentage of the Kuwaiti partners' holdings in 
partnerships that are formed after the operation hereof, shall not 
be less than 51 (fifty-one) per cent of the capital.  
 
Kuwait Companies Law No: 15/1960, Article 5, Section VI, (official 
translation)   
 
In other words, if a foreigner wishes to set up a company in Kuwait, that investor cannot own 
more than 49% of the company`s capital. The rest of the capital has to be from a Kuwaiti 
contributor. A similar restriction was imposed on the foreigners‘ equity ownership in joint-
stock corporations by Article 68 of Law No. 15/1960, which states: 
 
Every joint stock company, which is incorporated in Kuwait, 
shall be of Kuwaiti nationality; all partners shall be Kuwaiti and 
the company's head office shall be in Kuwait. However, as an 
exceptional measure, a number of persons who are not Kuwaiti 
nationals may be partners in a joint stock company (but not 
banking and insurance companies) if it is necessary to invest 
foreign capital or exploit foreign expertise, provided that the 
capital holdings of Kuwaitis shall not be less than 51 (fifty-one) 
per cent and provided also a license to that effect is obtained 
from the government department concerned.  
Kuwait Companies Law No: 15/1960, Article (68), (official 
translation) 
 
The Companies Law therefore protects merchant families from foreign competitors and gives 
them the power to dominate listed and unlisted companies under the 51% ownership rule. 
 
Kuwait has adopted a unitary board of directors as set out in Article 146 of the Companies 
Law (Kuwait Companies Law No: 15/1960, Article 146) but the board should include the 
owners who have been elected or one of their representatives. Boards of directors in Kuwait 
enjoy wide powers in relation to the conduct of the company`s affairs, and the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) has no right to challenge board decisions, unless the AGM restricts board 
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authority by ordinary resolution (Al-Melhem, 2009). Furthermore, the board of directors is 
elected at the AGM in a secret ballot. The minimum number of directors, stipulated in Article 
138 of the Companies Law, is three directors, but the law allows the determination of the 
maximum number of the directors to be provided for in the company‘s memorandum of 
association.  
Because the Kuwait Companies Law is silent about independent directors, the legislature has 
not imposed any obligation on companies to appoint independent directors to their boards. 
Indeed, Article 145 of the Law permits the board of directors to be composed solely of 
executive directors; this Article can therefore be viewed as undermining international practice 
of corporate governance (OECD, 2004; the UK combined code 2012; ICGN), in Kuwait due to 
the absence of independent directors, since controlling shareholders usually appoint 
representatives who act mainly on their behalf and not of all stakeholders.  
 
The separation of the roles of  chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) as recommended by 
several corporate governance codes enhances the independence of the board of directors and 
minimises the potential for conflicts of interest (Mallin, 2004). For instance, the OECD‘s 
Corporate Governance Principles (2004) state that:  
Separation of the two positions may be regarded as good 
practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of 
power, increase accountability and improve the board‘s capacity 
for decision making independent of management.  
 
    (OECD Corporate Governance Principles, 2004, p.63)  
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Moreover, the UK Combined Code (2006) has also recognises the separation of the two roles:  
 
There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of 
the company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibility for the running of the company‘s business. No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decision.  
 
      (UK Combined Code, 2006, p. 4)  
 
The Kuwait Companies Law has no provisions for splitting the role of chairman and CEO, 
which, it could be argued, hinders good corporate governance practice in Kuwait. 
Another issue concerns board committees, which support board decisions and should raise 
transparency. These committees include the audit committee, the remuneration committee, and 
the nomination and corporate governance committee (Rowland, 2002; Charkham and Ploix, 
2005). The creation of such committees in Kuwait is weak, as the Companies Law does not 
recognise them although some companies have taken that step - but the efficiency and 
impartiality of these committees can only be achieved if all members are independent directors 
(Al-Anjeri, 2009: Journal Article in newspaper, member of Parliament). 
 
In addition, the Companies Law fails to enforce disclosure, with specific regard to related 
party transactions: in Kuwait, the Law does not require the board of directors to disclose any 
details of these. Further, the non-disclosure of related party transactions may encourage the 
directors to abuse their power at the expense of the company and its shareholders. Indeed, in 
comparison with other GCC countries, Kuwait is poor as the law in other GCC countries 
provides for other procedures that the directors are obliged to follow in order to validate their 
transactions with the company. For example, the United Arab Emirates Companies Law 
stipulates that directors who are involved in transactions with their companies must disclose 
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their interests to the board of directors for their approval; in addition, such directors have no 
right to vote on their transactions (United Arab Emirates Federal Companies Law No: 8/1984). 
Furthermore, the Saudi Companies Law requires directors who have an interest in transactions 
with their companies to disclose this interest, and also specifies that the chairman of the board 
of directors should present the interested director‘s disclosure to the shareholders at the next 
General Meeting; moreover, the interested director is prevented from voting on the transaction 
(Saudi Royal Decree No: 6/1965; Provision 18 of the Corporate Governance Regulations in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority Pursuant to 
Resolution No. 1/212/2006). 
 
The origin of laws (civil law) adopted in Kuwait since independence may influence corporate 
governance in general and, more specifically, the Companies Law; the Law was issued in 1960 
and, as previously mentioned, penalties remain in Indian Rupees and no update has been 
made; concentrated ownership is encouraged by protecting merchants and major owners from 
foreign competitors, board membership is restricted to owners and their representatives; 
independent directors are not mentioned; CEO duality is common with Kuwaiti listed 
companies (separation of chair position from CEO is rare); board committees are ignored. 
Hence, this thesis will examine the level to which the legal system influences the development 
of Kuwaiti‘s act and corporate governance code. 
 
Thus merchant families may play a major part in the judicial system and the codes and articles 
of the Companies Law has reinforced their control over listed companies. The following 
section attempts to resolve this issue by considering the impact of culture on the activation of 
laws and codes.   
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2.6 Kuwaiti Culture 
 
Culture is influenced by past events, and has been defined as ―the systems of knowledge 
shared by a relatively large group of people‖ (Gudykunst and Kim, 1992). In Kuwait, 
merchant families were socially well connected in the community during the pre-crude oil era 
through their close relationship with governors (Sheikhs). This close relationship was the 
result of their contributions to the country‘s budget, and their governors appointment to 
judiciary and legislative roles. Further, their level of education was higher, achieved as a result 
of their travels across countries, gaining knowledge and the ability to speak different languages 
encouraged a close relationship with the governors. They also contributed to the country‘s 
education system in raising the level of education of citizens with the establishment of the first 
school in 1911, and launched newspapers and magazines. They founded the National Library 
in 1923, using this and other locations for their political symposium. This gave credence to the 
idea that merchants were more educated than other citizens, which raised their social status 
(Al-Mdairies, 1999).       
 
After the discovery of crude oil, their level of education served the merchant families as they 
were the best choice as representatives in the fledgling governments after Kuwaiti 
independence and the establishment of the National Assembly. The first government was 
formed in January, 1962, and included fourteen ministers, three of whom represented the 
merchants and 11 from the royal family. Later appointments strengthened the prominence of 
these families in the community and their ties to the ruling families (Peterson, 2001). 
 
Appointment was not restricted to the ministry or parliament - one of the merchant families 
was hired by the governor, Sheikh Ahmad Al-Sabah, in 1945 to manage his own investments. 
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The same person was appointed to the council that supervised development plans in areas such 
as health, education, council and food supply (Al-Habib, 2012: Journal Article in newspaper). 
This close relationship has continued to grow since the discovery of crude oil up to the present 
day, as a result of the contribution of merchant families to building and developing the 
country. It has become one of the main cultural features of the post-crude oil era, characterised 
by the governors‘ payback to the merchants, including the offer of protection to their 
businesses. The social status of the merchant families has thus increased in the community and 
has placed them above the law. This social status may have an influence in activating codes 
and laws against them, which the thesis will examine (Al-Naibari, 2011: member of 
Parliament, journal article in newspaper; Hussain, 2013: Journal Article in newspaper). It is 
also a cultural norm of Kuwaiti society that merchant families rely on personal networks or 
higher authorities for the successful completion of a business transaction in order to protect 
their interests (Al-Shahed, 2012: Article in newspaper). In summary, the social power that has 
been achieved by merchant families is a cultural feature. They have raised the level of 
education and finance, established personal networks and connections with decision-makers.  
 
Furthermore, corruption, which encourages the expansion of both government and private 
sectors, is another mark of Kuwaiti culture (Al-Anjeri, 2009: member of parliament, Article 
Journal in newspaper). The CPI index for classifying corruption ranked Kuwait a corrupt 
country with a score of 4.3 (on a scale of 0-10, with 0 indicating a high level of corruption). 
This score dropped to 4.1 in 2009, and recovered in 2010 to 4.5, followed by 4.6 in 2011 (CPI, 
2011; CPI, 2012).  However, the recovery period did not continue into 2012, when the 
country‘s classification fell to 12th lowest with a score of 3.8; as the result of a media 
announcement that 13 MPs were receiving bribes from the merchants and the prime minister 
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to vote with the government, which was facing questioning from opposition parties (Al-
Adsani, 2013: member of parliament, Article Journal in newspaper).  
 
Existing forms of corruption in Kuwait can be explained by the violation of law and 
regulations, reflected in the misuse of power and influence as well as in the prevailing 
practices of favouritism, nepotism, bribery, embezzlement of public funds, profiteering and the 
illegal acquisition of privileges and special benefits. Corruption has become the dominant 
influence on decision-making in Kuwait (Al-Tarrah, 2012: Journal Article in newspaper).  
 
One of the factors that has encouraged the increase in power of those who engage in corruptive 
practices is the lack of integrity and transparency inherent in the launch and establishment of 
government tenders: detailed specifications may suggest the potential of a specific company, 
but without offering the opportunity for real competition; moreover,  those with influence 
grant licenses or are involved in the commercial exploitation of state territory under the guise 
of exchange of interests or political benefits, or use bribery (Al-Rashid, 2009: Journal Article 
in newspaper). 
 
Corruptive practice is further exemplified by the assignment of government positions on the 
basis of favouritism, nepotism, kinship and political allegiance; the absence of the principle of 
equality and equal opportunities means that any notion of efficiency is neglected (Al-Rashid, 
2009: Journal Article in newspaper). The complexity of administrative procedures and the 
slow completion of transactions have also encouraged bribery and law-breaking. In addition, 
the pursuit of political interests has led to attempts to influence judicial decisions and to the 
purchase of loyalties and alliances between those in the position of leadership and those 
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involved in corruption (Al-Rashid, 2009: Journal Article in newspaper). Overall, the cultural 
context of Kuwait shows that social and personal relationships are valued in the country, 
specifically between merchant families and the government. Table 2.4 shows the newspaper in 
Kuwait and their ownership. 
 
Table 2.4 Kuwaiti Newspaper ownership  
Title of Kuwaiti newspapers Owned by 
Alqabas A group of 6 merchant families the majority of these families 
are in the parliament  
Alshahed  Royal family 
Alwatan  Royal family 
Alaan  Opposition in parliament  
Altaleea  a weekly newspaper owned liberal association  
Note: this table shows the ownership of Kuwaiti newspaper and political orientation  
 
2.7 Summary 
 
Clearly merchants are well connected with the royal family and decision-makers and may 
consider themselves to be above the law and therefore not accountable. They have achieved 
economic power which has brought them an increased political role and great influence. Their 
presence in both the council and in the National Assembly has extended their connections with 
decision-makers and monitoring bodies. However, a feature of Kuwaiti culture is corruption 
which has had a negative impact on the country‘s classification in international organisations 
such as the CPI. Further, legislative and regulatory systems, represented in Companies‘ Act 
(Article 15), issued in 1960, needs amending. The National Assembly is responsible for these 
amendments, but the merchant families may want to maintain their control over companies 
which may make this difficult. This thesis therefore will explore the role of political, legal, and 
cultural factors and whether these factor helping merchant families oppose any amendment for 
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the current Act or issue a new Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. The next chapter gives 
an overview of the factors that influence the development of corporate governance.        
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Chapter 3 
 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction   
The emergence and development of corporate governance occurred as a result of a series of 
corporate failures (Imhoff, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, the level of development and 
effectiveness of corporate governance has been influenced by a number of different factors, 
which have contributed to the development of a code in many countries such as the UK and 
USA, and may have prevented the issuance of a code in other countries, such as Kuwait 
(Berglof, 1997; Beck and Levine, 2008; Hope, 2003). Hence, section 3.2 provides a brief 
introduction to the definition and history of corporate governance. In section 3.3, the 
development of corporate governance codes will be documented, using the case of the UK as 
an example as this was the first country to issue a code (The Cadbury report, 1992), followed 
by a discussion of corporate governance in the USA such as Enron failure and how it impacted 
on the development and review of the existing UK corporate governance and the OECD 
guidelines on corporate governance, followed by a discussion of the OECD principles of 
corporate governance. The UK and US countries were included to trace how political, legal, 
and cultural factors influence the development of both countries governance practices. Also, 
the development of corporate governance code in France, Egypt, and Germany are 
documented as those countries are similar to Kuwait in their legal system to trace how legal, 
political, and cultural factors influence in the development and effectiveness on governance 
practices, followed by a general discussion of corporate governance in developing and MENA 
countries.  
Also, GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and UAE are included to show 
how legal, political, and cultural factors influence on the effectiveness of their codes, the GCC 
countries are included as they are relevant to Kuwait cultural and political context.   
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After briefly introducing the history and development of corporate governance in the first two 
sections, the following sections illustrate the influence of legal, political, and cultural factors 
on the development of corporate governance. Hence, section 3.4 illustrates the impact of the 
legal and regulatory system on the development of corporate governance, illustrating the 
features of two different legal systems (civil and common law) and their impact on the level of 
investors‘ protection and ownership structure. The legal system applied in different developing 
countries, including Kuwait, is also discussed. 
 
Section 3.5 demonstrates the impact of political factors on the development of corporate 
governance; examples from different countries are given in this section to illustrate how 
political factors can affect the issuance or development of a corporate governance code, such 
as the relationship between powerful merchant families and politicians. The impact of cultural 
factors is discussed in section 3.6, to assess how culture can impact on the issuance and 
development of a corporate governance code.  
3.2 Historical background of corporate governance  
 
Before discussing the development of corporate governance in different countries, it will be 
useful to introduce the concept of corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define 
corporate governance from the perspective of finance, focusing on the protection of outside 
investors from expropriation by insiders. They suggest that corporate governance: 
 
"Deals with the ways by which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment" (p. 737). 
    
Based on Shleifer and Vishny‘s (1997) definition of corporate governance, the expropriation 
by insiders to maximize their self-interest has often been accompanied by corporate failure and 
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scandals and a weak corporate governance system (Brown et al, 2011, Mallin, 2007). The 
history of corporate governance dates back to the start of business (Vinten, 2003) and, like 
other historical processes, is path dependent (Morck et al., 2004); events such as corporate 
failure affects what happens next, such as the development of corporate governance codes and 
laws.  
Although there is often a conservative bias that impedes institutional change, when a crisis 
occurs, the jolt makes change possible (Morck and Steier, 2005). Table 3.1 illustrates cases of 
corporate failure and scandals resulting from poor corporate governance and also shows the 
dates when a corporate governance code was issued in each country. For example, Demirag 
(2005) states that corporate failures and scandals in the USA (Enron, World Com and Tyco), 
UK (the collapse of the Maxwell publishing group), Germany (Holtzman, Berliner Bank, and 
HIH), Korea (the widespread banking distress in 1997), Australia (Ansett Airlines and One 
Tel), France (Credit Lyonnais and Vivendi), and Switzerland (Swissair) brought changes to the 
governance systems in those countries. Also, in GCC countries, almost all those countries‘ 
stock market crashes, such as in Saudi Arabia in 2006, Qatar (2008), the UAE (Feb 2007), 
Oman (1998), and Bahrain (2007) were caused as a result of the manipulation, speculation and 
violation by major shareholders (Alfreedi et al., 2012; Ceil, 2012; Kippreport, 2012).  
 
These corporate failures that caused the stock markets to crash led to external pressures from 
media and society being placed on the governments and regulatory bodies to take policy 
initiatives of a legal or regulatory kind to force institutional change within the organisational 
field, through coercive mechanisms such as issuing corporate governance codes (Demirag, 
2005; Alfreedi, et al., 2012; Ceil, 2012; Abumustafa, 2007).  
46 
 
History shows that the issuance of corporate governance codes has been associated with 
corporate failure and scandals or stock market crashes in the case of GCC countries as a result 
of companies‘ fraud. The following sections (3.4-3.6) illustrate the factors that have influenced 
the issuance and development of corporate governance but, before discussing these, the next 
section illustrates the development of corporate governance in the UK and USA; and globally 
by the OECD as these have been influential on a global scale (Solomon, 2011).  
Table 3.1: Corporate failures attributed to poor corporate governance  
 Companies Date of collapse Country Code issued 
 
Panel A: corporate collapse 
 
 
   
 Maxwell, Poly Peck, BCCI, Marconi 
 
1991-1992 UK 1992 
 Credit Lyonnais 
 
1995 France 1995 
 Babcok, Hotzman, Berliner Bank 
 
1998 Germany 1998 
 Banking Industry (Asian Crisis) 
 
1997 South Korea 1999 
 HIH, Ansett Airlines, One 
Tell 
 
2001 Australia 2002 
 Swiss Air 
 
2001 Switzerland 2002 
 Enron, World.Com, Tyco 
 
2001-2002 USA 2002 
Panel B: GCC markets’ collapse  
 
   
 Stock market crash 
 
1998 Oman 2002 
 Stock market crash 
 
2006 Saudi Arabia 2006 
 Stock market crash 
 
2007 UAE 2007 
 Stock market crash 
 
2007 Bahrain 2010 
 Stock market crash 
 
2008 Qatar 2008 
Sources: Commonwealth of Australia 2010 
Source: ecgi  
OECD, 2004  
Note: the table shows in both panel companies‘ fraud and failure, panel B shows that in GCC countries most of 
companies have failed as a result of fraud that leads to stock exchange crashes. 
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3.3 Development of corporate governance 
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) relate the development of corporate governance across 
countries to institutional pressures such as the strength of the stock market in a country 
(Endogenous forces) which influences the adoption of codes. For instance, a developed stock 
market is likely to encourage the implementation of codes of governance in order to increase 
the efficiency of the country‘s corporate governance system, and economic integration of the 
world economy or the presence of foreign institutional investors (exogenous forces). A country 
such as Kuwait has a weak stock market and few foreign institutional investors and hence may 
have less developed governance. 
 
In this section, the development of corporate governance in the UK, USA, and OECD are 
illustrated as they have been important on the global stage. For example, the OECD principles 
of corporate governance, issued in 1999, built on the UK‘s Cadbury report (1992) and the 
UK‘s Combined codes that was issued in 1998, and the OECD‘s revised code in 2004 
reflected both the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the UK Combined codes (Turnbull, 
2005; Jones and Pollitt, 2004). 
  
Corporate governance started in the UK and was originally driven by the corporate failures and 
scandals associated with some larger companies (Mallin, 2007). The first well-documented 
historical event was the South Sea Bubble of 1720 (Iskander et al., 1999), which placed 
external political pressure on the government and regulatory bodies to prevent further disasters 
(House of Commons, 2011). Since then the laws and regulations governing UK business have 
continually changed to protect stakeholders suffering from corporate collapses (Dragomir, 
2008). 
48 
 
From a US perspective, the economic prosperity of the 1920s ended with the Wall Street crash 
of 1929, which revealed manipulation of the market, internal trafficking, mismanagement and 
the reckless violation of the rights of shareholders and led to a long recession between 1929 
and 1933 (Klein, 2001). As a consequence of these problems, the Securities Act 1933, as well 
as the Securities and Exchange Act 1934, were introduced by the US government (Clarke, 
2004), regulating the governance of companies.  
 
In 1978, the US business roundtable issued a report entitled ―The role and composition of the 
board of directors of the large publicly owned corporations‖, aimed at improving the 
governance capacity of US corporations, whereas the other issuance refers to the Hong Kong 
stock exchange, when they issued their first draft of the ―code of best practice, Listing rules‖ in 
1989, followed by the Irish Association of Investment Managers‘ drafting of the ―statement of 
best practice on the role and responsibility of directors of publicly listed companies‖, in 1991 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
 
The term ‗corporate governance‘ first originated in the UK, with the issue of the Cadbury 
Report in 1992. Jones and Pollitt (2004) state that the quality of this report‘s conclusions and 
the implementation of its recommendations are reflected in the fact that it is now 
internationally recognised as the starting point of the development of corporate governance.  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) resulted from a number of high profile corporate failures that led 
to a growing lack of confidence in corporate activities (West, 2010), which attracted the 
attention of the UK government (Dulewicz, 2004), and a range of significant changes were 
made to British corporate governance by the findings of different committees with the aim of 
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restoring investor confidence in the system (Arcot and Brun, 2006). The UK's approach thus 
involved the creation of committees to deal with specific corporate governance issues, starting 
with the Cadbury Report in 1992, and all being consolidated in the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (last revised 2012).  
    
Since the establishement of Cadbury code by the Cadbury Committee in 1992, UK listed 
companies at that time were enacted, external pressure exerted by many stakeholders including 
shareholders, the professional bodies, and the media led 93% of the UK listed companies had 
comply with the code in 1996 (Dyck and Zingales, 2002).  
The Cadbury Report covers three aspects of corporate governance, namely, the board of 
directors, the shareholders (accountability of boards to shareholders, institutional shareholders, 
shareholder communications, and shareholder influence) and accounting and auditing. First, it 
states that the most important corporate governance mechanism, which required constant 
monitoring and assessment, was the board of directors. Secondly, the level of corporate 
transparency was also shown to play an important role for shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Finally, good corporate governance also encompassed good financial accounting and auditing 
(Jones and Pollitt, 2003; Solomon, 2011; Rani and Mishra, 2008).  
The Cadbury Code was a voluntary code, but was indirectly enforced through the UK Stock 
Exchange, which requires all UK listed companies to state whether or not they complied with 
the code and to give reasons for any areas of non-compliance as an obligation of their listing 
(Arcot et al., 2010; Maier, 2005; The Cadbury Report, 1992).  
Another development in UK corporate governance was the 1995 Greenbury Report, in 
response to calls for the government to reform the structure of boards and directors‘ 
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remuneration, linking pay to the performance of individual directors
2
 (Greenbury report, 1995; 
Carter et al., 2007). The main recommendation was the creation of board remuneration 
committees and the disclosure of directors
‘
 remuneration in corporate annual reports (Hegazy 
and Hegazy, 2010), strengthening accountability and enhancing the performance of the 
directors (Mallin, 2007). The Greenbury Report was implemented by UK listed companies as a 
result of external pressure raised by the media and public concern about the high remuneration 
packages paid to CEOs and executives, exercised by institutional investors and as a listing 
requirement. 
The recommendations of the UK‘s Cadbury and Greenbury codes were reviewed in 1998 by 
the Hampel Committee (Short, 1999), and the UK Combined Code was published in the same 
year, consisting of 18 principles and 48 code provisions related to the Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel recommendations (Hampel report, 1998; Keasey et al., 2005). This was followed by 
the Turnbull Report published in 1999, providing guidance on the implementation of internal 
control requirements (Turnbull report, 1999; Anomah and Agyabeng, 2013).  
 
The OECD first issued its principles of corporate governance in 1999, based upon experiences 
from national initiatives member countries such as the UK Cadbury report 1992, these 
principles were aimed to be reference points and international benchmarks for corporate 
governance for other member and non-members countries (OECD, 1999).     
 
Corporate governance also started to develop in the USA in 2001, with the bankruptcies of 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Aldephia Communication and Global Crossing served as catalysts 
                                                          
2
 In 2002, the UK Remuneration Report Regulation was issued to force companies to publish in their annual 
report: a detailed report of their directors‘ remuneration, a graph of the company‘s total shareholder return over 
five years, and the names of the consultants of the remuneration committee, due to the shareholders‘ calls for 
increased disclosure (Rampling, 2012). 
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for change (Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003). The corporate crisis in the USA reflected the 
necessity to reform US corporate governance and increase regulation, as stakeholders no 
longer had confidence in companies (Clarke, 2004).  
 
US Congress, in 2002, responded to these corporate governance failures by enacting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which is considered the most sweeping reform of American 
business law since the 1930s (Litvak, 2007). 
 
Cornelius and Kogut (2003) argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a compromise 
bill, to gain the political support of both Republicans and Democrats. It was intended to 
highlight and strengthen criminal penalties for top management who falsified financial 
statements and engaged in other types of unethical behaviour. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
required chief executive officers to carefully consider and sign-off audited company reports, 
and strengthened the powers of audit committees and the regulatory oversight of audit firms. 
The collapse of Enron in the USA spurred the UK and the rest of the world into re-evaluating 
issues related to corporate governance, particularly the role of non-executive directors. In the 
UK, the Higgs Committee Report was published in 2003, with a special focus on the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors (Avison and Cowton, 2012). In the same year, the 
Smith Report (2003) reviewed the audit committee‘s role and effectiveness (Ghafran and 
O'Sullivan, 2013). Also, in 2003, the UK revised its 1998 Combined Code, to include several 
of the key recommendations of Turnbull, Higgs, and Smith reports, and consisted of two parts: 
companies; and institutional shareholders (Solomon, 2007; Doucouliagos et al., 2012). The 
impact of Enron on the UK‘s corporate governance code was evident in the Turnbull guidance, 
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issued in 1999 to review how companies were managing risk and internal control, the result 
was revising the first issued guidance in 2005 (Abbas, and Iqbal, 2012).  
 
The OECD, in turn, revised its principles in 2003, to take into consideration the developments 
that had occurred since 1999. The revised principles took note of development and experience 
of the member and non-member countries in the organisation, such as the UK and USA‘s 
development of their corporate governance codes (OECD, 2004).  
In April 2004, the OECD published its revised principles, which include six areas of corporate 
governance. First, was ―... to ensure the basis for an effective Corporate Governance 
framework: a good corporate governance framework should clearly show the responsibilities 
of board members and executive management in the company management and to avoid 
conflicts of interest‖ (OECD, 2004. P. 17). Second, was “... the rights of shareholders: a good 
framework of corporate governance should seek to defend shareholders' interests and help 
them to exercise their rights (OECD, 2004. P. 18). Third, was “... the equitable treatment of 
shareholders: a good framework should ensure that all types of shareholder are protected and 
treated equally, including minority interests and foreign shareholders (OECD, 2004. P. 20). 
Fourth, was “... the role of stakeholders in corporate governance: a good framework of 
corporate governance should extend the company‟s responsibilities to all stakeholders, 
established by law (OECD, 2004. P. 21). Fifth, was disclosure and transparency: “... a good 
framework of corporate governance should ensure the accuracy and timeliness of a company's 
reports, as well as that all significant matters regarding the company operations are clearly 
disclosed, such as the financial status, performance, ownership, corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance (OECD, 2004. P. 22). Finally, was “... the 
responsibilities of the board: a good framework of corporate governance should strategically 
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guide the company towards the attainment of its targets and ensure growth through the 
effective monitoring and evaluation of the management by the board (OECD, 2004. P. 24). 
Moreover, the board is accountable to the company, as a whole, as well as to its shareholders 
(OECD, 2004). 
The development of the corporate governance code continued in the UK as, in 2006, the 
Combined Code was revised to allow the chair to serve on the remuneration committee and 
engage in proxy voting (Tricker, 2012). A further revision was made to the Code in 2008 to 
allow the chair to serve on the audit committee (Mallin, 2011). Also, in the same year, the 
Smith Report (2008) was revised (Avison and Cowton, 2012) and in 2010, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code was issued, that incorporated the role of institutional investors, followed by 
a revision of the code in 2012 (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2013). 
Not just the UK and US have developed their corporate governance codes, Germany has also 
faced strong institutional pressure to change its corporate governance system, with normative 
isomorphic pressure from the EU in order to harmonise the capital market of European 
countries (exogenous forces) (Jackson and Moerke, 2005), and coercive pressure through 
political factors (endogenous forces) (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010) that will be discussed later 
in section 3.5.1. for example, the German corporate governance code first issued in Feb 2002, 
and amended in July 2002, was updated in 2013 (Government Commission of the German 
corporate governance code, 2014) as a result of coercive pressure exercised by foreign 
institutional investors to give more focus to shareholders (Jackson and Moerke, 2005). 
 
Referring to four of the six GCC countries (KSA, Oman, Bahrain, and UAE), the development 
of corporate governance codes, as mentioned earlier in chapter 2, related to market crashes in 
those countries and external pressure from stakeholders for companies to be regulated and for 
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the boards of listed companies to apply corporate governance codes. In Bahrain, a corporate 
governance code was issued in 2010 and became mandatory for listed companies in January 
2011 as a result of market crash and, also the coercive pressure of international foreign 
institutional investors over regulators to enhance business practices (Amba, 2014).  
The Egyptian corporate governance code was issued in 2005 as a voluntary code for listed 
companies after the problem of non-performing loans for Egyptian banks in the late 1990‘s 
due to manipulation and fraud by major shareholders (Sorour, 2009). 
In summary, a number of developments have occurred over the past ten years regarding 
corporate governance around the world (Pickett, 2007). These developments create different 
practices between countries. However, numerous scholars consider some practices to be 
important and to have become a features of good corporate governance practices, such as the 
role and composition of the board of directors, board committees, auditing and information 
disclosure, as well as the selection and remuneration of the CEO (OECD, 1999; Aguilera et al., 
2000; Low, 2002; Bahgat and Bolton, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). These 
recommended international practices are further discussed in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Board membership and independent board members 
 
Since the first appearance of a corporate governance code (the UK Cadbury code, 1992) until 
the last revised OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) and the UK corporate 
governance code (2012), all these codes insist on the existence of independent board members 
on the companies‘ board as a good governance practice (OECD, 2004; Cadbury report, 1992; 
the UK corporate governance code, 2012). The UK corporate governance code (2012) insists 
that the board should include independent board members, so that no individual or small group 
of individuals can dominate the board‘s decision making. 
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In order to clarify the intended meaning of independent board members, it is useful to 
determine the definition of independent members. The meaning of independent is defined by 
Spira (1999) as:  
 
“…freedom from any company connection or relationship which 
might interfere with the exercise of independent judgment”  
                                                                                             p. 263 
 
Another clarification of the meaning of independent board members was introduced by the 
OECD (2004) as: 
“… board members to be independent of dominant shareholders, 
independence extending to not being their representative or 
having close business ties with them.”  
                                                                                           p.64 
The contribution of assigning a sufficient number of independent members to the boards is to 
minimise the control and power of the major owners and increase transparency (Aguilera, 
2005). The OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) and the UK corporate 
governance code (2012) note that, the more independent members on the board, the greater the 
reliability and transparency of the board. 
Another contribution of assigning independent board members is clarified by the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), which state that:  
“Independent board members can contribute significantly to the 
decision-making of the board. They can bring an objective view to 
the evaluation of the performance of the board and management. In 
addition, they can play an important role in areas where the 
interests of management, the company and its shareholders may 
diverge such as executive remuneration, succession planning, 
changes of corporate control, take-over defenses, large 
acquisitions and the audit function.” 
                                                                                        (p. 64).                                  
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Further, independent board members appointed to the board is viewed as a vital component of 
the system of accountability to shareholders, contribute to the greater protection of 
shareholders‘ interests from the major shareholders or the management of the company, better 
monitoring, and a lower level of earnings management (Page and Spira, 2005; Xie et al, 2003). 
After showing the UK corporate governance practices as a developed country and the OECD 
principles of corporate governance as normative international governance code of their 
requirement of board membership and independent board members, other governance 
requirements will be documented that relevant to Kuwait legal system such as France, Egypt 
and Germany. Also the GCC countries codes‘ requirements are also discussed here as they 
relevant to Kuwait cultural and political context. 
For examples, the amended corporate governance code of listed corporations in France (2013) 
also required listed coroporations to appoint a sufficient number of independent board 
directors:   
“The independent directors should account for half the members 
of the Board in widely held corporations without controlling 
shareholders. In controlled companies7, independent directors 
should account for at least a third”. 
                                                                                                                   (p.7) 
 
Also, the German code of corporate governance (2013) insists on assigning independent board 
members to be included in the supervisory board; however, the number of independent 
members is not mentioned in the German codes: 
 “The Supervisory Board shall include what it considers to be an 
adequate number of independent members.” 
                                                                          (p.11) 
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The revised Omani corporate governance code (2014) together with the Saudi corporate 
governance code of listed companies (2006) requires non-executive independent board 
members to be included on the board and to be not less than a third of the total number of 
board members (CMA Saudi Arabia, 2006; CMA Oman, 2014). The UAE corporate 
governance code (2009) is similar to the requirements of the Saudi and Omani corporate 
governance codes requiring a sufficient number of non-executive independent members to be 
on boards; however, the UAE code requires that non-executive independent board members on 
board committees should be qualified with experience and specialisation to be effective 
members (UAE corporate governance code, 2009). The Egyptian code of corporate 
governance (2005) also requires a majority of non-executive board members with an 
appropriate mix of skills, technical or analytical experience (EFSA, 2014). 
In this thesis, the interviewees will be asked about the composition of board membership and 
whether Kuwaiti listed companies have assigned a sufficient number of independent members 
to the board and if not, the main reasons behind the absence of this practice. Hence, the first 
recommended practice is the existence of independent board members. The following 
recommended practice is the existence of board committees. 
3.3.2 Board committees 
 
Another recommended mechanism for improving corporate governance practices is the 
establishment of board committees, namely audit, remuneration, and nomination committees, 
whereby the boards can delegate specific tasks to these committees that include a sufficient 
number of independent members (Spira and Bender, 2004).   
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The amended corporate governance code of listed corporations in France (2013) mandates 
establishing audit, nomination, and compensation committees and other recommended 
specialised committees as determined by the corporation‘s board (corporate governance code 
of listed corporations, 2013). 
Also, the UK‘s corporate governance code (2012) and the OECD principles of corporate 
governance (2004) emphasise the importance of auditing, nominating, and remunerating the 
committees‘ existence, and the process of establishing and selecting the members of those 
committees in companies:  
―When committees of the board are established, their mandate, 
composition and working procedures should be well defined and 
disclosed by the board.‖  
                                                                        OECD, 2004 p.25 
 
 
The Saudi corporate governance code (2006) mandates appointing audit, nominations and 
compensation committees and other recommended specialised committees and that the 
majority of committee members should be non-executive. The audit committee should appoint 
at least one non-executive member who is specialised in accounting and auditing (CMA, 
2006). The Omani corporate governance code (2014) also insists on appointing two main 
committees: an audit and risk management committee where members should all be non-
executive and the majority of them independent; and a nomination and compensation 
committee where at least 3 members are non-executive members (CMA Oman, 2014). The 
UAE corporate governance code (2009) also requires an audit committee and a nomination 
and compensation committee and all members should be non-executive and the majority 
independent members. Each committee should be headed by an independent board member 
(UAE corporate governance code, 2009). 
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The Egyptian code of corporate governance (2005) also requires boards to constitute internal 
audit and financial remuneration committees, and the code recommends that non-executive 
board members participate in those committees and be chairmen (EFSA, 2014). 
3.3.2.1 Audit committee 
 
The UK Cadbury report (1992) was the initiator of the audit committee and its establishment 
process. The report aimed to protect the audit role by insisting on assigning a sufficient 
number of independent board members to the committee to maintain an independent view and 
improve the standard and the quality of financial information (Page and Spira, 2005).    
Further, the Smith report (2003) emphasised the important role that the audit committee plays 
in protecting the interests of the shareholders. The Report explains the role of the committee as 
follows:  
―While all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the 
company, the audit committee has a particular role, acting 
independently from the executive, to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting 
and internal control.‖  
                                                                                           (p. 3). 
 
Xie et al. (2003) strongly recommended that the audit committee members should be 
independent board members with financial expertise. Further, Spira (1999) clarifies that the 
independent members on the audit committee must be free from any obligation to the interests 
of the major shareholders or the company‘s management. The reason behind demanding an 
independent audit committee is referred to the view that states that without independence an 
audit has no value and is meaningless, since the company‘s managers assume that they are able 
to behave dishonestly. Also, the existence of independent members on the audit committee 
raises the objective and value of financial reports, as independent members can give a neutral 
60 
 
view of the company‘s activities and financial position, that can be relied upon since those 
independent members are free from pressure from the management and major shareholders of 
the company (Spira, 1999; Page and Spira, 2005). 
 
The amended corporate governance code of listed corporations in France (2013) requires that 
committee members should be competent in the area of finance and accounting, that at least 
two-thirds of the members should be individuals, and that the committee should not include 
executive directors. Besides, the code also specifies their duties in terms of reviewing the 
accounts, the relationship between the audit committee and the statutory auditors, the 
monitoring of rules securing the statutory auditors‘ independence and objectivity, and the 
operation (corporate governance code of listed corporations, 2013).  
3.3.2.2 Remuneration committee 
 
The existence of a remuneration committee aims to limit excessive executives‘ packages, 
including pension rights and compensation payments, The remuneration committee can be 
seen as an administrative device that ensures an acceptable degree of integrity in the setting of 
executive remuneration (Main et al., 2008). As a response to concerns about directors‘ 
remuneration, the Greenbury Report (1995) stated that:  
―To avoid potential conflicts of interest, boards of directors 
should set up remuneration committees of independent directors 
to determine on their behalf, and on behalf of the shareholders, 
within agreed terms of reference the company's policy on 
executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages for 
each of the executive directors, including pension rights and any 
compensation payments.‖  
                                                                                       (p. 14) 
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The OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) further added the requirements of board 
committees‘ membership by stating that: 
“It is considered good practice in an increasing number of 
countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts 
for board members and key executives be handled by a special 
committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of 
independent directors. There are also calls for a remuneration 
committee that excludes executives that serve on each others‟ 
remuneration committees, which could lead to conflicts of 
interest.”  
                                                                                            (p.61)   
 
The UK Combined Code (2006) also recommended that companies should establish a 
remuneration committee consisting of at least three or, in the case of smaller companies, two 
independent non-executive directors. The Code stated that:  
“The remuneration committee should consult the chairman 
and/or chief executive about their proposals relating to the 
remuneration of other executive directors. The remuneration 
committee should also be responsible for appointing any 
consultants in respect of executive director remuneration.”  
                                                                                       (p. 12) 
 
The amended French corporate governance code of listed corporations (2013) requires a 
committee containing a majority of independent directors and should not include executive 
directors. It also advises the inclusion of an employee director on the committee (corporate 
governance code of listed corporations, 2013, Article 16.1 and 18.1).   
 
3.3.2.3 Nomination committee  
 
Another recommended committee that the UK combined Code (2006) mentioned is the 
nomination committee, as the code reports that:  
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“There should be a nomination committee which should lead the 
process for board appointments and make recommendations to 
the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee 
should be independent non-executive directors.”  
                                                                                               (p. 7) 
 
The board delegates the selection of nominated directors for the company to this committee. 
Hence, the main responsibilities for this committee are identifying directors to nominate and 
evaluating them on an annual basis. The UK corporate governance code (2012) states that the 
nomination committee should lead the process of the board appointments and make 
recommendations to the board. The aim behind establishing a nomination committee is to limit 
conflicts of interest by identifying directors, who should not have a direct or future business 
interest or be appointed by the major shareholders to act in their interests (Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008).   
 
The amended French corporate governance code of listed corporations (2013) requires the 
same number of independent committee members to be appointed and the code authorises the 
chairman to be a member of the committee provided that his/her position is separated from the 
CEO position (corporate governance code of listed corporations, 2013, Article, 17.1).   
3.3.3 Separation of chairman from CEO position     
 
One of the recommended practices in the corporate governance code is the separation between 
the chair and CEO position by splitting the role of planning monitoring and accountability of 
board members from the role of running and fulfilling the boards‘ plan that is the main role of 
companies‘ executives in order to avoid the influence of board members with close ties to the 
CEO (Huse, 2005), since CEO duality fosters power and leadership that weakens the board‘s 
independence from the management and their monitoring role. CEO duality also effectively 
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controls the information available to the other board members, and it is hard to evaluate the 
CEO‘s performance (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Cornett et al., 2008; Heracleous, 2001).  
The term ‗corporate governance‘ first appeared in the Cadbury report of 1992 until the UK 
Combined Code (2012), which recommended that there should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the head of the company to ensure a balance of power and authority, such 
that no individual has unfettered powers of decision (Cadbury Report, 1992). The aim behind 
the separation of the CEO from the chair position is to reduce the dominance of the board over 
the company‘s management, as CEO duality has a negative relationship with the degree of 
board control, and to protect the shareholders‘ rights (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; 
Boyd, 1994; Williamson, 1985). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
recognise this and state that:  
“Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as 
it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase 
accountability and improve the board‟s capacity for decision 
making independent of management.”  
                                                                                         (p. 63) 
The UK Combined Code (2012) also recommends the separation of the role of CEO and chairman:  
 
“There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of 
the company between the running of the board and the executive 
responsibility for the running of the company‟s business. No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decision.”  
                                                                                           (p. 4) 
 
The French corporate governance code (2013) gives the option for board members either to 
separate the chair from the CEO position or to aggregate their duties (corporate governance 
code of listed corporations, 2013, Article, 3.1).   
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The Omani corporate governance code (2014), together with the Saudi corporate governance 
code of listed companies (2006) and UAE corporate governance code (2009) all require listed 
companies to separate the chair from the CEO position (CMA Saudi Arabia, 2006; CMA 
Oman, 2014; UAE corporate governance code, 2009). The Egyptian code of corporate 
governance (2005) states that it is preferred that the chairperson and managing director are not 
held by the same person (EFSA, 2014). 
 
In Kuwait, approximately 90% of listed companies‘ major shareholders run companies 
(Badraan, 2010), and hence, this thesis will explore further how far CEO duality is dominant 
in the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait by asking interviewees and 
respondents about the companies for which they work or in which they invest.   
3.3.4 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Disclosure is one of the important practices that the UK Combined Code (2012) and the 
OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) insist on, as well as being transparent 
towards the stakeholders. The OCED (2004) stated that: 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company.” 
                                                                                       (p.21) 
  
The OECD further states that disclosure should include: a) ― ... material information: about the 
financial and operating results of the company, company objectives, major share ownership 
and voting rights, remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives and the 
selection process and whether they are regarded as independent of the board, related party 
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transactions, foreseeable risk factors, issues regarding employees and other stakeholders, 
governance structure and policies (OECD, 2004. P.50-54); b) ―... information should be 
prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial 
and non-financial disclosure” (OECD, 2004. P. 54); c) An annual audit should be conducted 
by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and 
objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly 
represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects 
(OECD, 2004. P. 54); d) external auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe 
a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit (OECD, 
2004. P. 56); e) the channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely 
and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users (OECD, 2004. P. 56); and f) the 
corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach that 
addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating 
agencies and others, that is relevant to the decisions by investors, free from material conflicts 
of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice (OECD, 2004. P.56). 
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) since it was issued was concerned about the level of disclosing 
information such as disclosing directors‘ remuneration. Information about the relevant 
interests of the directors should be disclosed in the directors‘ report and non-compliance in the 
financial statement. Independent board members and the payment of audit firms for non-audit 
work should also be disclosed, as well as the accounting standards that apply and whether it is 
applicable to the accounting standards (Cadbury report, 1992). Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
found that, the more independent members there are on the board, the greater the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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The French corporate governance code (2013) grants authority to the board of directors to 
define the company‘s financial disclosure policy. Also, the code gives the option for the board 
of directors to choose either a unitary board or a two-tier board, and the board should disclose 
which option it has chosen (corporate governance code of listed corporations, 2013).  
 
These recommended practices will be examined in this thesis to identify whether they exist 
and, if not, the thesis will explore the main reason why such good governance practices are not 
applied in the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies.  
Even though corporate governance codes exist in 5 of the 6 GCC countries, the effectiveness 
and enforcement of these codes is still weak. For example in Saudi Arabia, Al-Twaijry et al. 
(2003) find the coercive role of government to enforce the independency of internal audit from 
executives and board members is very weak. Moreover, Hussain and Mallin (2002) found that 
the effectiveness of the nomination and appointment process in Bahrain is poor. Also Al-Ajmi 
(2009) states that networks and relationships between companies and audit firms in Bahraini 
listed companies is too close giving audit firms non-audit services. Also in Egypt coercive 
pressure from regulators is weak as a result of large powerful blockholders who are immune to 
corporate governance codes (Samaha et al., 2012)  
 
A distinctive aspect of the organisational field of corporate governance (that includes corporate 
governance codes in different countries and also the OECD principles of corporate 
governance) is that of comparing Anglo-Saxon countries (the UK and USA) codes and the 
level of development and effectiveness with other countries; legal and political factors are a 
key aspect of this (Licht, 2004). Holm and Zaman (2012) state that the role of law and 
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regulation in the UK has raised the legitimacy and effectiveness of corporate governance, with 
its response in requiring institutional change as a result of the corporate failures and scandals, 
whether national (Maxwell) or global (Enron) as the failure of Enron has affected the 
development of the UK Combined code and the OECD principles of corporate governance. In 
the USA, besides the legal system, political factors also play a significant role in changing the 
organisational field of corporate governance in the USA by issuing a new act, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act just, as senators and governors were aiming to be re-elected for another period since 
the scandals occurred just before the elections (Romano, 2005; Prentice and Spence, 2006). 
The OECD also has faced political pressure from its members to be active in taking policy 
initiatives and introducing principles of corporate governance after corporate failures (OECD, 
2004).  
 
Further, cultural factors include the lobbying and pressure of both individual and institutional 
shareholders on regulators and legislators that have been important in the development of 
corporate governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2012; Romano, 2005; Prentice and 
Spence, 2006). Thus, legal, political and cultural factors have played a significant role in the 
process of institutional change inside each country‘s national organisational field of listed 
companies, which will be examined later in the thesis, to see if these factors are a reason for 
the absence of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance (Lu and Batten, 2001).  
 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) examine corporate governance practices and cross-country 
diversity from different economic, political, legal, and cultural perspectives, as each offers a 
unique lens through which to explain corporate governance systems and practices. For 
instance, they contribute corporate governance differences between Germany and the US to 
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legal, cultural, and political factors, where the concentration of power in Germany is in the 
hand of banks whereas the power in the US is in the hands of shareholders. From a political 
aspect, workers in Germany, through trade unions, play a significant role in corporate 
governance but not in the US. Cultural and social norms in a society also shape corporate 
governance where, for instance, US executives have a shareholder focus whereas German 
executives emphasise the importance of serving society and balancing the interests of 
employee shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
The following sections illustrate the impact of legal, political, and cultural factors on the 
development and effectiveness of corporate governance codes.      
3.4 Legal and regulatory system influences on corporate governance 
development 
 
The previous section shows that Anglo-Saxon countries were in the advance of corporate 
governance development and hence, it will be useful to discuss a countries‘ legal system and 
whether legal factors have had a direct impact on the development of corporate governance. 
 
There is evidence of a strong relationship between the legal system of a country and the level 
of effectiveness and enforcement of corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Daily et 
al., 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Daniel et al. (2012) state that the response to the 
corporate failures and scandals in the UK and USA provides evidence of the importance of the 
legal structure in the level of protection provided for investors. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999b, 
2000) identify two different legal systems – the Anglo-Saxon common law and the continental 
civil law legal systems – and attribute the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon countries‘ corporate 
governance (the UK and USA) over other countries to their legal and regulatory systems which 
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assists them in being proactive and responding rapidly to corporate failures and scandals, as 
discussed next.    
3.4.1 Common law origins 
 
Common law is dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), 
such as the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1999a, 2000, 2002), which is also an ‗outsider‘ 
system (Rosser, 2003). The characteristic of the outsider common law model is that it relies 
significantly on: equity finance; dispersed ownership; the strong legal protection of 
shareholders; strict bankruptcy regulations and the courts; a lesser role for creditors, 
employees and other stakeholders in the company management; robust requirements regarding 
disclosure; and considerable freedom to merge with or acquire other organisations (Zattoni and 
Cuomo, 2008; Rosser, 2003).    
 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) state that corporate governance codes are more likely to 
be issued and developed in countries with a common law legal tradition, since the common 
law system offers stronger legal protection for minority shareholders, facilitates the 
enforceability of codes of good governance, and  the fact that the ownership structure in these 
countries is dispersed. History shows that crises such as the Maxwell failure led the UK to 
respond quickly and issue the Cadbury Code of corporate governance, which continues to 
develop. Simlarly, in the USA, the Enron crisis in 2002 encouraged the US government to act 
quickly and issue the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
Thus, economic integration in the world economy, government liberalization, and the presence 
of foreign institutional investors are critical forces influencing the adoption of institutionalised 
practices. Countries with effective corporate governance systems become attractive locations 
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for domestic companies to prosper and invest, and also for foreign investors, and thus promote 
economic growth. For example, despite the voluntary nature of the Cadbury Report, British 
quoted firms to a large extent comply with the Code‘s recommendations in terms of dual 
leadership (functional separation of the CEO and chairman of the board) to attract foreign 
institutional investors. However, reinventing the legal system is not easily accomplished and 
does not respond quickly to the process of change because the legal system is deeply 
embedded in the institutional legacies of a given country (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). 
 
Also, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) refer to the superiority of the common law system in the 
USA and UK based on the integrity of their legislators and regulators. Moreover, the existence 
of diffuse ownership in common law countries encourages a high demand for enforcement and 
effective legal systems and codes in order to protect minorities (Pagano and Volpin, 2001). 
Hence, the development and effectiveness of the UK and USA‘s corporate governance is 
related to their legal system. The next section discusses civil law and its impact on the 
development and effectiveness of corporate governance.  
3.4.2 The origin of civil law  
 
Civil law‘s origins relate to the Roman colonies and France, Japan, and Germany (La Porta et 
al., 1999a, 2000, 2002), and is widely used around the world (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). Another classification of civil law countries is the ‗insider‘ model (Rosser, 2003), with 
a high reliance on: bank finance; concentrated ownership; the weak legal protection of 
minority shareholders; a central role for stakeholders in the ownership and management of 
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companies; weak disclosure; and limited freedom to merge or acquire other companies 
(Djankov et al., 2008; Rosser, 2003). 
 
The criticism of civil law countries is that they usually issue codes and recommendations that 
extend to non-listed companies or adopt codes later and have fewer codes (Aguilera et al., 
2011). The civil law tradition uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of 
ordering legal material, whereas the common law tradition is based on judicial precedents 
about specific issues (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004); moreover, civil law 
recommendations are more ambiguous and lenient, to show that codes exist but that the 
process of improving governance practices are unimportant (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Also, 
the civil law system is ineffective in protecting shareholders and their voting rights (Mallin, 
2004). 
 
Mitton (2002) states that the legal protection of minority shareholders and the ability to 
facilitate the issuance and development of codes to protect them is a key element of corporate 
governance and Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) criticise the civil law system as codes of 
corporate governance are less likely to be issued, especially since the ownership structure is 
concentrated in these countries (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
Common law countries are more likely than civil law ones to issue recommendations on the 
separation between the Chair and the CEO, establish an audit committee, set out board 
directorships, recommend the evaluation of board performance, and have strict codes of anti-
self-dealing by insiders. Codes issued by civil law countries tend to cover principles related to 
shareholders‘ rights, employees‘ roles and conflicts of interest (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; 
Djankov et al., 2006, 2008; Hopt, 2013). Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) state that, in civil law 
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countries, controlling families exert enormous influence and where, typically, single families 
control public companies, the issuance of governance codes is hindered (Pagano and Volpin, 
2001). 
 
Hence, the above comparison of the two different legal systems (common and civil law) shows 
that civil law legal systems are weaker on the issuance and development of corporate 
governance codes (Lopez et al., 1998, Lu and Batten, 2001). The next section discusses the 
legal system in MENA and developing countries, especially in Kuwait. 
 
3.4.3 Legal systems in MENA and developing countries 
 
The legal system in the GCC countries vary. Three GCC countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE) follow English common law and three follow French civil law (Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman) (La Porta et al., 1999b). All of the GCC countries apply Sharia law as well as common 
or civil law (Angell, 2006). Since Kuwait‘s independence in 1961, the Kuwaiti government 
has operated an Egyptian French-based civil law system. The Egyptian legal system is based 
on the civil law system and Sharia law, while Kuwait, since independence, depends on 
Egyptian expertise to establish the country‘s legislation and legal system (Huneidi, 1986). 
According to the findings of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999b, 2000, 2002), Kuwait demonstrates 
weak investor protection and has ownership concentration; further, similar to other countries 
with civil law origins, it has issued fewer codes and laws, and has more ambiguous, lenient 
laws compared with common law countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, since 
Kuwait applies civil law, it follows the ‗insider‘ model which, as previously stated, means 
having: concentrated ownership; weak legal protection of minority shareholders; a central role 
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for shareholders in companies‘ ownership and management; weak disclosure; and limited 
freedom to merge or acquire
3
  (Rosser, 2003).  
Other examples of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, include Lebanon, 
which shows that the weak civil law legal system needs to be reformed, together with the 
introduction of a new judicial and legislative system in order to achieve effective corporate 
governance in the country (Saidi, 2004). In Tunisia, that also applies a civil law system, the 
ownership structure affects the quality of corporate governance, with the intervention of 
merchant families in preventing any attempt to improve the quality of the regulation and law 
(Elmehdi, 2007). 
La Porta et al. (1998) examined the ownership structure in the majority of East Asian 
countries, and found too that, in civil law countries, there was a strong negative correlation 
between the concentration of ownership and the quality of corporate governance and the legal 
protection of investors. They concluded: 
“... data on ownership concentration thus supports the idea that 
legal systems matter for corporate governance and that firms 
may have to adapt to the limitations of legal systems that they 
operate in.”   
                                                  (La Porta et al., 1998, pp. 1116 7) 
 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) show the convergence between corporate governance 
practices in common law countries such as the US versus practices in countries that apply civil 
law which are less effective. For example, many European countries have laws in place that 
allow unequal voting rights (as opposed to the one-share, one-vote), that are specifically 
designed to protect family control. Thus, any convergence towards the US model in these 
countries, for example, towards one-share, one-vote dilutes the control that these groups 
currently enjoy. 
                                                          
3
 These features will be compared later with the respondents‘ views outlined in Chapter 6. 
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Hence, both the legal system and the ownership structure (concentrated ownership) are key 
determinants of corporate governance (Mitton, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).    
3.4.4 Concentrated ownership structure  
 
Callaghan (2009) illustrates that the ownership concentration of listed companies is far lower 
in the UK than in Germany or France, where concentrated ownership is common; cross-
shareholdings are far less prevalent in UK, and gives an indication of the legal system‘s 
influence on ownership structure. La Porta et al., (1998) also confirm that civil law countries 
are characterized by concentrated ownership.      
 
Before discussing the impact of concentrated ownership, it is useful to define the different 
types of ownership structures. These can vary, from being highly concentrated in civil law 
countries to being very diversified, usually in common law countries (Singam, 2003). 
Concentrated ownership is usually represented by five different types of ownership: family 
owned; state owned; institutionally owned; part of a group of companies; or a combination of 
these (La Porta et al., 1999a). 
  
La Porta et al. (2002), in their study of 539 firms in 27 prosperous economies found that 
family-controlled firms are far more numerous than firms with widely-held shares, state-
controlled companies and those controlled by institutional investors. In Europe, families such 
as the Peugeots in France, the Quandts in Germany, and the Agnellis in Italy hold large blocks 
of shares and effectively control the largest firms (Barca and Becht, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 
2002).  
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Other studies conducted in developing countries, that have civil law systems, identify family 
ownership structure as the most common type, often exceeding 60% of the total shares of 
companies in these countries. For instance, in 2002, families in Egypt owned 78% of the total 
shares of listed companies; in Malaysia, 20 dominant families owned 80%; family ownership 
reached 75% in Saudi Arabia; an average of 70% was reported in Lebanon; while, in nine East 
Asian companies (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan), more than 67% of firms were family-controlled (Fawzy, 
2003; Singam, 2003; Bin Zulkafli et al., 2003; AlTonsi, 2003; OECD, 2002; Claessens et al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 1999b). Similar findings were reported by researchers who investigated 
other developing countries, including Tunisia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
India and Thailand (Elmehdi, 2007; Young et al., 2008; Ramadani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; 
Veliyath and Ramaswamy, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1999).  
 
Block-holding, a part of family ownership, is a model of ownership structure whereby a group 
of individual merchant families and institutional investors own a controlling percentage of a 
company‘s total shares; this is far more common in countries such as Jordan, Kuwait and 
Oman. The OECD Report (2002) reveals that, in Jordan, large block-holders own 58%; in 
Kuwait, 56%; and, in Oman, 45%. A similar trend can be observed in Latin American 
countries where the prevalent ownership structure in listed companies is block-holders (Lefort, 
2005).  
Another family ownership structure is pyramid ownership, which enables the ultimate 
merchant family owners to control the assets and resources of companies with the least amount 
of capital. This can be defined as a structure in which an apex shareholder, usually a very 
wealthy family, owns and controls a company (which may or may not be listed), which holds 
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and controls blocks of shares in hundreds of other both listed and private companies, thus 
placing the economy of the whole country under the control of a single family. These are the 
structures that permit tiny elites to control vast parts of the corporate sectors in many countries 
(Morck et al., 2004; Morck and Steier, 2005). 
 
Kuwait is characterized by both large block (group of merchant families) and pyramid 
shareholdings, with unusually complex corporate structures and this ownership structure may 
hinder any effort to issue a corporate governance code (Capital Standards, 2010). 
 
Concentrated ownership, accompanied with civil law might bring some advantages, such as 
facilitating the monitoring role and minimizing the conflict between the board and 
management (Patibandla, 2006; Suto, 2003; La Porta et al. 2002; Morck et al., 2000). For 
example in Malaysia the major shareholders are usually well represented both on the board and 
executive management, which proves an advantage in mitigating conflict between the 
managers and owners (Suto, 2003); or by having institutional investors as major shareholders 
who can serve as the company‘s guarantor for its creditors (Patibandla, 2006; Morck et al., 
2000).   
However, some researchers have criticised concentrated ownership structures; for instance, 
Hussain and Mallin (2002) state that a company owned by a family or even a government 
lacks any incentive to comply with corporate governance practices, a view that is supported by 
Singam (2003). The relationship between concentrated ownership and compliance with 
corporate governance will be illustrated further in the next section. 
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3.4.4.1 Concentrated ownership in civil law systems  
 
Under concentrated ownership controlling shareholders or families have the incentive and 
power to extract private benefits in the form of excessive compensation, related-party 
transactions, or special dividends, often at the expense of the companies as well as other 
shareholders‘ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio et al., 
2001). This is particularly relevant in the corporate governance setting of developing and 
MENA countries, where the founding families and/or controlling shareholders tend to 
maximise their private benefits by having a direct or indirect influence on a firm‘s process of 
governance (Haque et al., 2011). Hence, concentrated ownership, common in civil law 
countries, has a direct impact on the issuance, development, and effectiveness of a corporate 
governance code, since such a code might contradict their self-interests (Filatotchev et al., 
2013; Osipova, 2003).  
 
Singam (2003) confirms that self-interest is associated with concentrated ownership and 
suggests that the problem that arises with concentrated ownership in civil law countries is the 
potential for the expropriation of the minority shareholders‘ rights by the controlling 
shareholders, since they are likely to act in their own interests, which may not coincide with 
the best interests of other investors in the firm, the employees, managers or other stakeholders, 
so this concentrated ownership structure is one of the main disadvantages of the civil law 
system (Singam, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For example, controlling shareholders may 
only be concerned with a firm‘s performance from the standpoint of their own personal 
interests, at the expense of other stakeholders (Kim 2006). La Porta et al. (1999b) observe that:  
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“These firms are run not by professional managers without 
equity ownership who are unaccountable to shareholders, but by 
controlling shareholders. These controlling shareholders are 
ideally placed to monitor the management, and in fact the top 
management is usually part of the controlling family, but at the 
same time they have the power to expropriate the minority 
shareholders as well as the interest in so doing.”  
                                                                                           p.511 
 
Although family ownership structure can provide effective monitoring and control, at the same 
time, it can be disadvantageous when there are disagreements among family members and 
between the generations, creating internal obstacles (Klein et al., 2005). Agency problems are 
also likely to occur in this type of structure, since the managers may tend to act in favour of the 
family and ignore other stakeholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003).  
 
This self-interest associated with concentrated ownership in civil law countries may hinder the 
issuance, quality, and effectiveness of corporate governance. For example, in developing 
economies that apply the civil law system, the majority of the corporate sector is controlled by 
a mixture of the state and wealthy families so, in order to protect their self-interest, the latter 
make strong attempts to obstruct the issuance of corporate governance codes (Oman et al., 
2003; Fawzy, 2003). Their resistance harms the development of the legal and regulatory 
system and explains why corporate governance has been ignored for so long is these countries 
(Morck and Steier, 2005).  
Corporate governance principles call for separating the ownership from the management in 
order to ease control over companies (La Porta et al., 1999a). Claessens et al. (2000) examined 
the ownership structure of 2,980 publicly trading companies in nine East Asian countries, and 
found that the separation of management from ownership control is rare and that more than 
two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single family shareholder, which might lead to the 
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expropriation of the minority shareholders‘ rights. These findings indicate that the merchant 
families may oppose any code that diminishes their control over these companies‘ 
management, such as corporate governance principles that call for a separation of the role of 
the Chair and CEO (Cadbury, 1992).   
 
Also, in some civil law developing countries, such as Thailand, Korea and Indonesia, the 
merchant families who control listed companies encourage corporate bribery and corruption 
towards the politicians and government to hinder the development of any regulations, since the 
current legal and regulatory system maintains their control and protects their interests (Morck 
et al., 2004; Khan, 2003).  
 
Also, since civil law countries are characterised by concentrated, family ownership who 
dominate board membership, without any outside independent members, in order to maintain 
their control. The OECD Principles and Combined Code in the UK note that the more 
independent directors are represented on the board, the greater its reliability, transparency and 
level of voluntary disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Moreover, evidence provided by 
Bliss and Gul (2012) confirms that independent directors on boards are prepared to pay more 
for a higher quality audit in order to protect their reputation and avoid legal liability. Further 
confirmation of this is made by Beasley (1996), who found that, the greater the number of 
independent board members, the lower the levels of financial statement fraud.  
 
An example of board structure practices where the board comprises a majority of owner 
families is in India and Taiwan where the family have the authority and power to select the 
CEO, and independent directors are not represented (Veliyath and Ramaswamy, 2000; Young 
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et al., 2008; Tsai et al., 2006), despite the OECD‘s insistence that a sufficient number of 
independent directors should be assigned to boards in order to minimise the control of the 
major owners and increase transparency (OECD, 2004).  
 
Also, in Tunisia, where family ownership is strongly represented, none of the boards contain 
independent board members (El-Mehdi, 2007; Hawkamah, 2008). In Malaysia, the dominant 
family-owned structure has negatively impacted on the corporate governance practices, and the 
market authority has recommended that boards should include independent members (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Pistor et al., 2003). 
 
From the GCC perspective, although the Bahraini corporate governance code and listed 
companies‘ practices show that boards have independent directors, the selection process of 
them is not totally independent, since independent members are selected by the major 
shareholders or boards rather than by nomination committees, which do not exist (Hussain and 
Mallin, 2002). Overall, in MENA countries, even though codes may exist, their effectiveness 
and enforcement are weak (Hawkamah, 2008).  
 
All of the above examples indicate that, under concentrated ownership, specifically family 
ownership, which is the characteristic of civil law countries, the families oppose having 
independent board members, since this will minimise their control and impact negatively on 
their self-interests.   
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Also, as a result of boards being comprised of the major shareholders, with no independent 
members as the majority of civil law developing and MENA countries, such as Egypt, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Nigeria and Thailand, the CEOs are usually selected by the 
dominant family owners (Prevost et al., 2002), and the same person is often both Chair and 
CEO in many of the developing countries (Ramadani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Elsayed, 2010; 
Okike, 2007).  
 
Hussain and Mallin (2002) reveal that there is a sectoral bias as in the majority of listed 
companies in the service sector in Bahrain listed companies, the CEO is selected and 
appointed by the Chair whereas in 76% of listed companies in other sectors, the board selects 
and appoints the CEO. Moreover, 57% of CEOs in all listed companies report directly to the 
Chair, while 29% report to the whole board. Despite the separation of the roles of Chair and 
CEO, the dominant major shareholders, represented by families, have the power to select the 
latter.         
 
In Tunisia, where most Tunisian companies are family-owned, the position of Chair is always 
held by the oldest person in the family and the Chair, rather than the CEO, has the real power 
to manage the company, unless the Chair also holds the CEO position (El Mehdi, 2007). 
Badraan (2010) notes that, in Kuwait, approximately 90% of the major shareholders of listed 
companies control companies‘ boards and consequently have power over the selection of the 
CEO; furthermore, CEO duality is prevalent. In civil law countries, the lack of separation 
between the Chair and CEO relates to the concentrated ownership (Kula, 2005), due to the 
major shareholders‘ preference to control and protect their self-interests (Braun and Sharma, 
2007). 
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Despite that fact that some civil law countries require the separation between the Chair and 
CEO positions, board committees such as a nomination committee in the majority of 
developing and MENA countries do not exist. The Cadbury Code and Combined Codes 
emphasise the necessity for board committees, such as nomination committees, and the 
existence of independent members (Mallin, 2004). But nomination processes are subject to the 
preferences of large shareholders (family ownership) and the selection of nominees typically 
depends upon their close relationship with the controlling shareholders, regardless of their 
experience or qualifications (MENA-OECD Working Group on Corporate Governance, 2005). 
Practices in civil law systems within MENA and developing countries demonstrate that, while 
the majority of listed companies have audit committees, only a very small percentage of these 
are composed of a majority of independent directors in accordance with corporate governance 
practice (IFC and Hawkamah, 2008). The audits committees‘ role is to assist the board of 
directors to oversee and ensure the adequate functioning of internal control mechanisms, as 
well as monitoring financial risk (Abdullah, 2004). 
 
According to the above discussion of the influence of legal factors on the development and 
effectiveness of corporate governance, it becomes clear that in civil law countries, especially 
MENA and developing countries, the legal factor has a direct impact on the development and 
effectiveness of their code. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) found, in their empirical 
study, that a common legal system of a country and the higher level of stock market 
development encourages the implementation of corporate governance codes. Specifically, 
these codes strengthen boards of directors‘ monitoring over the corporate management.  
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With regard to Kuwait, there is no reference in the literature to the board structure and 
composition, or board committees in the country. This thesis therefore contributes to our 
knowledge by examining board structure and board committees in Kuwaiti listed companies 
and the presence of independent board members, as well as exploring the impact of the legal 
system as applied in Kuwait on the process of corporate governance development in this 
thesis. It is assumed that, since the country applies a civil law system, the practices will be 
similar to those in other civil law MENA and developing countries. However, the legal system 
of a country is not the only factor affecting the development of a corporate governance code, 
as explained above, and Roe (2003) and Gourevitch (2003) note that political factors also have 
an impact on this area. Although Germany applies civil law, the political factor of strong 
labour unions and the social democratic party in parliament that promotes the protection of 
stakeholders and workers has resulted in a strong governance system (Matoussi and Jardak, 
2010).  
3.5 The Impact of Political Factors on Corporate Governance 
 
The previous section illustrates how the legal system can influence the issuance, development, 
and enforcement of corporate governance; this section illustrates the influence of political 
factors. The legal rules are derived from politics and culture, and all these factors contributed 
to produce the governance structure in different countries (Matoussi and Jardak, 2012). 
 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) show that political factors influence corporate governance as 
the degree of local embeddedness in terms of organisational practices and politics appears to 
hinder corporate governance practices. 
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Roe (2003) states that the political system that determines the law also shapes the corporate 
governance system. People choose corporate governance practices that hurt them the least, and 
use politics to express their preferences (Licht, 2001; Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  
 
Political parties and lobby groups in different countries have a different orientation with regard 
to regulations, such as corporate governance codes. Some groups support and want to enforce 
a code in all companies while others resist the issuance and development of a code. For 
example, in countries with varied political economies, such as France, Italy, Germany and the 
USA, the centre-left has supported corporate governance reforms while the right has 
consistently resisted them (Cioffi and Hopner, 2006). Callaghan (2009) explains that that 
parties‘ defense of their positions varies from one country to another, depending on their 
constituencies and their core constituencies‘ interests. Cioffi (2006) notes that the resistance to 
pro-shareholder reforms by the more conservative Republicans in the USA and the 
Conservatives in Germany is because it threatens their established interests, power and 
position, and also endangers the alliance between corporate elites and more conservative 
political parties. In both countries, the Conservative party is the defender of corporate family 
owners and the primary political proponents of reform in both the USA and Germany are the 
Democrats.  
 
Evidence that politicians attempt to appease their voter constituencies in order to maintain 
their power is illustrated by the Curley Effect in Boston‘s politics, when the mayor, James 
Michael Curley, used inflammatory rhetoric to drive the merchants and well-educated Anglo-
Saxon voters out of Boston, to cement his political future for a fourth term as Mayor of Boston 
(Morck et al., 2004).              
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Thus party interests - typified by the Conservatives in the USA, Germany, Italy and France - 
influences the level of support for corporate governance reform. If the constituencies of ruling 
politicians represent the controlling merchant families and the corporate elite, politicians may 
resist corporate governance reforms to defend inside corporate interests at the expense of those 
of external stakeholders.   
 
Hence, not only may legal factors influence the development of corporate governance codes, 
but political factors may also play a significant role in the process of corporate governance 
development. Indeed, Roe (2003) challenges La Porta et al., arguing that polity explains the 
differences between ownership structure and corporate governance models around the world. 
Polity includes political institutions, and the political orientations of governments, coalitions, 
ideologies and interest groups that not only define the laws but also determine how they 
actually operate. The channels of political mechanisms that affect corporate governance and 
ownership are extended by Gourevitch (2003, 2005) to either: (i) interest group preferences 
and cross-class coalitions between owners, managers and workers; or (ii) political institutions, 
such as electoral law, federalism, legislative, executive relations and party systems. Polity in 
Kuwait includes the parliament and the government, and this thesis will examine the political 
role of the parliament and the government in the absence of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code and whether the merchant families influence parliament and the government‘s political 
role. This question will be explored later in chapters 6 and 7.  
The next section, explores how political institutions and the political orientations of 
governments may impact the development and effectiveness of corporate governance.    
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3.5.1 Political institutions 
 
Political institutions, usually parliaments and political parties, consist of members of 
parliament who seek votes and hence can be lobbied by various constituent (Matoussi and 
Jardak, 2012). Roe (2003) confirms that, in the USA, politicians seek happy worker-voters and 
hence pass laws to keep the voters happy. Aguilera and Jackson (2010) state that political 
institutions play a critical role in determining the winners among different coalitions 
irrespective of whether the coalition is between employees and politicians (the case of 
Germany) or the coalition is between managers and politicians (the case of USA). 
 
However, in countries characterised by concentrated family ownership, the power of these 
families can be extended to politicians in parliament (Morck et al., 2004; Haque et al., 2011; 
Morck and Steier, 2005; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005).  
In Kuwait, from the first attempt to constitute a parliament, merchant families have lobbied 
politicians, as exemplified by the 1938 parliament that was called the merchant parliament as 
MP candidates were only allowed to be from merchant families (Al-Otaibi, 2010). This thesis 
therefore, explores whether the representation and power of merchant families in parliament 
creates an obstacle to change with regard to the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code.  
 
A close relationship between politicians and merchant families can affect the quality of the law 
(Singh and Zammit, 2006). For instance, in Bangladesh, large family groups exert influence 
over both the government and politicians, as family members are also politicians, and become 
well-connected with the politicians, impacting on the quality of corporate governance (Haque 
et al., 2011). Indeed, the merchant families in more than half the sample of Haque et al‘s. 
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(2011) sample had either become politicians or had developed strong personal and business 
relationships with political leaders, confirming that crony capitalism encourages corruption 
between major shareholders and politicians to maximise their own interests (Uddin, 2005; 
Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Sobhan, 2002; CPD, 2000; Haque et al., 2011). Politics that produce 
regulations and shape corporate governance structure comes of coalitions (Matoussi and 
Jardak, 2012). 
 
Bruner et al. (2002) state that developing countries generally suffer from a corrupt political 
environment with widespread corruption between merchants and the politicians or government 
resulting weak corporate governance. Corruption is defined as ‗the misuse of entrusted power 
for private gain‘ (Transparency International), and includes activities such as bribery, fraud, 
extortion and favouritism (Luo, 2007). Legal codes are meaningless when the politicians, the 
government and the judiciary of a country are all corrupt (Morck et al., 2004). Corruption and 
bribery hinder the quality of corporate governance, and the close connection between the 
merchant families and politicians in developing countries exacerbates this problem (Wu, 2005; 
Charles & David, 2002). For example, despite the wealth of the Arab nations, corruption rate 
is high due to the co-operation between those in power, the government and affluent merchant 
families with each party seeking to maximise its own interests (Khanem, 2011).  
 
Therefore, the overlap between merchant families and politicians makes change difficult, and 
the status quo is therefore maintained (Morck and Steier, 2005). Politicians influence the law 
and the legal system but when politicians begin rent-seeking, the quality of the law 
(specifically corporate governance) will be affected by the relationship between the politicians 
and their interest groups. Mueller (2002) suggests that rent-seeking politicians are more likely 
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to vote for legislation that benefits an interest group if they have received contributions from 
that particular group. He further states that interest groups in corporatist countries are formally 
part of the political decision process, as in Australia, where some union leaders are also MPs 
(Mueller, 2005).  
 
Transparency and accountability are needed to limit the rent-seeking opportunities of 
politicians and merchant families which arise from their mutual self-interest (Rosser, 1999). 
This connection between the merchant families and politicians leads to the pursuit of mutual 
self-interest at the expense of the stakeholders, making reform almost impossible (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000).  
 
Indeed, such rent-seeking has not been limited to developing countries. In the USA, 
throughout the 19th century, politicians were exploited by the controlling merchant families 
who were incorporating new companies, and required special acts of state legislature to be 
tailor-made to suit their needs. This raised concerns about favouritism and political corruption 
among politicians and the merchant families, as these families in turn, supported these 
politicians‘ parties financially (Millon, 1988).    
 
Further evidence of the relationship between merchant families and politicians is provided by 
Gourevitch (2003), who identifies the power of the merchant families to resist regulatory 
change, specifically by lobbying politicians (Gourevitch, 2003). Similar evidence is provided 
by Pagano and Volpin (2001), who assert that, by attempting to influence politicians, families 
benefit from the existing regulatory regimes and can veto any reforms.  
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In Kuwait, the merchant families interfere in parliament and the political system in order to 
gain contracts from government and maximise their self-interest thus hindering the 
development of regulations that may threaten their interests (Alshahed newspaper, 2012). This 
interference has led to increased corruption and bribery in the country, and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that Kuwait‘s position fell to 66 in 2012 compared with 54 the 
previous year,  (Alshahed Newspaper, 2013; CPI, 2011; CPI, 2012). Perhaps one of the most 
famous cases of corruption was that reported in 2011, when 13 Kuwaiti MPs accepted bribes 
of 120 million Kuwaiti Dinar from merchants and prime minister in return for political support 
(AlQabas Newspaper, 2011, AlKuwaitiah Newspaper, 2012).   
 
This thesis therefore, explores whether the merchant families and their representatives in 
parliament are using bribery and corruption to hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate 
governance code and whether the merchant families in Kuwait lobby MPs who are rent-
seeking to veto the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. 
 
Faccio (2006) reports that directors or dominant shareholders are entering politics and that 
politicians are joining boards, especially companies that operate in highly corrupt countries. 
Political connections give firms preferential access to government subsidies, financing by 
government-owned enterprises and banks, and tax breaks, together with exemption from 
burdensome regulations. Faccio notes that firms representing 7.76% of the world‘s market 
capitalisation are run by relatives of their country‘s political leaders. As merchants families are 
well-represented in the Kuwaiti parliament, this thesis also explores whether these members of 
merchant families enter parliament and serve their own self-interests.  
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Another example of merchant families‘ alliances with the government such a situation is 
evident in Mauritius where, after decolonisation, the formation of a broad-based coalition of 
business, government and political leaders took place (Brautigam and Diolle, 2009). The 
business class, dominated by ethnic minorities, believed that the election of a socialist 
government with a Hindu majority posed a grave threat to their interests; thus, the ethnic 
minority merchant families contributed to the Hindu party in the parliament and government, 
which then protected these merchant families‘ interests (Brautigam and Diolle, 2009).         
Thus, in Kuwait the merchant families may form alliances with both the politicians and 
government specially, since the speaker of parliament, Jassem AlKhrafi, belongs to one of the 
most influential merchant families in the country (Kuwait times, 2013). 
3.5.2 Pyramid ownership and political power 
 
The controlling merchant families in their pyramid ownership structures augment their 
political influence relative to their actual wealth, and control the development of both public 
policy, including the level of protection and enforcement, and institutions, such as the capital 
markets (Barca, 1995; Morck et al., 2004). For example, the business empire of the Suhartos 
(Indonesia) provides an example of pyramid family ownership. The family was believed to 
control 417 listed and unlisted companies through a number of business groups, led by their 
offspring, other relatives and business partners, many of whom also held government office 
and were also politicians. Their empire included the position of President of Indonesia and 
their relatives became more powerful once Suharto became president (Claessens et al., 1999). 
Another example is in the Philippines when Imelda Marcos the wife of the Ferdinand Marcos 
the president, stated that her relatives owned practically every business in the Philippines, from 
electricity, telecommunications, airlines, banking, beer, tobacco, newspapers, television 
91 
 
stations, shipping, oil, mining, hotels and beach resorts, to coconut milling, small farms, real 
estate and insurance. Such domination of the country‘s business was linked to their political 
power (Faccio, 2006; Caron et al., 2012).  
 
In Italy, two members of the Agnelli family, which controls the largest Italian industrial group, 
serve as MPs, while Silvio Berlusconi, who controls another of Italy‘s largest pyramidal 
groups, has also served as Prime Minister several times. Cioffi and Hopner (2006) add that the 
ruling Italian Christian Democrat party dominates the political and economic system and 
accepts contributions from merchant families to support it, and the government protects their 
interests. In France, Francois Pinault, the controlling shareholder of Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute, Grand Bazar de Lyon, Rexel and Zodiac, was reputedly a close friend of the former 
French President, Jacques Chirac (Morck et al., 2004).  
 
These examples show that pyramid ownership becomes connected to political influence more 
so than other ownership structure types. Examples of the control exerted by merchant families 
demonstrate how they influence politics, become MPs, head political lobbies, and became 
presidents/prime ministers. This thesis, therefore, examines the influence of merchant families 
who control the pyramid ownership structure over the politicians in parliament in general and 
specifically over the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance.            
 
However, a number of disagreements and debates have arisen about how political theories 
apply to different cases. One critical factor concerns the identity and power bases of 
blockholders, which may differ substantially. For instance, Italy is characterised by a center-
left coalition promoting legal reform, but this reform has had little influence on patterns of 
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blockholding at the firm-level due to the absence of complementary factors, such as foreign 
institutional investors, who would reinforce shifts in power away from existing corporate 
insiders. Moreover, Switzerland underwent major corporate governance reform due to the 
changing preferences of the blockholders themselves to attract foreign institutional investors 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). 
 
Besides the merchant families‘ influence over the political institutions, the government‘s 
political orientation also plays a role in the development and effectiveness of a corporate 
governance code, and is covered in the next section by examining how the government blocks 
corporate governance reform.  
3.5.3 The impact of government practices on the development and effectiveness of 
corporate governance   
 
In Kuwait, the political system is different from other democratic political systems as the 
prime minister and other government members are appointed by Kuwait‘s governor (Kuwait‘s 
constitution, 1962) and members of the parliament are elected every four years by Kuwaiti 
citizens. Both elected MPs and appointed government members are members of parliament. 
This section explores the self and mutual interests between the government and merchant 
families‘ party.  
 
The government‘s practices have a direct influence on the issuance and development of 
corporate governance, assuming that governments seeking political support from parties or 
groups of merchants always hinder the issuance and development of corporate governance 
codes in their country, since this might hinder their mutual and self-interest (Gugler and Boie, 
2008). During 1982, the government introduced the Debt Difficulties Act to support and 
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protect 300 members of the merchant families after the financial crisis of the Al-Manakh 
market crash, instead of enforcing the existing Act over their illegal practices (Al-Shahed 
newspaper, 2013). Examples are given below of how different governments in different 
countries oppose the calls for corporate governance.   
 
The regulative role of the government can play an important role in penalizing manipulative 
companies‘ board, and at the same time if those companies‘ boards are well connected with the 
government they will benefit from the government protecting them from accusations. For 
example, during the Asian crisis of 1997, the Korean and Japanese governments legislated 
corporate governance codes and used cash injections in to failing companies and became their 
major shareholders. The governments‘ policies were to support the merchant owned 
companies but did not issue stricter codes to enhance control over these companies (Yermo, 
2008).   
 
Another government practice, through their state ownership, can play another important role 
by exercising pressure over company‘s management to apply corporate governance or; they 
can protect and enhance the manipulative practices of companies to get political support. This 
is the case of Malaysia since Bliss and Gul (2012) state that, during Mahathir‘s leadership, his 
government used the state-owned company Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) for his own 
purposes by using cash injections from Petronas to invest in politically connected (PCON) 
entities, such as Bank Bumiputra, which was in debt. Petronas was also used to save both 
Malaysian Airlines (MAS) and the national carmaker, Proton, from bankruptcy. Petronas 
together with the shipping company, Konsortium Perkapalan Bhd (KPB), were controlled by 
Mahathir‘s son (Goyal and Park, 2002; Bassett et al., 2007). Mahathir‘s government 
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established relationships with the PCON companies for its own agenda and gain the 
contribution and votes of the merchant families. The merchant families benefited from 
winning profitable contracts or subsidies (North, 1990; Olson, 1993). All PCON companies 
were related to merchant owner companies, and the government sought their political support 
in order to continue leading the country (Kim et al., 2009; Lee, 2009).  
 
The above examples show how governments can impact corporate governance. The Fascist 
regime in Italy also served the interests of the merchant families by launching a massive 
bailout of failing industrial firms and banks in Italy, and transferred them to state-ownership to 
become a giant holding group and dominated the Italian economy for the rest of the century 
(Pagano and Volpin, 2001). When the issuance of an Italian corporate governance code 
occurred in 1998, it was meaningless, because of the high level of state ownership, weak 
securities regulation and shareholder rights, and close and often corrupt relations between the 
corporate elites and senior government members (Cioffi and Hopner, 2006; Morck and Steier, 
2005).  
 
Aguilera and Jackson (2010) refer to the nature of political agency and to the role of the state 
by illustrating how polity elites are much more proactive in supporting pro-shareholder 
reforms in France and South Korea, but much more cautious in Japan and Germany. 
 
In Kuwait, the government through its role of, regulative and ownership, does not show any 
movement to apply a corporate governance code, either voluntary through their ownership in 
listed companies, or compulsory through their regulative role, and this will be further 
examined later in the empirical chapters.    
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In Kuwait, the government has not debated the issuance of a corporate governance code, so 
this thesis explores the possible reasons why this is so. Also, state-owned enterprises are not 
regulated but suffer interference from politicians. For example, in the recent cases of the 
Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) and Kuwait Airways Company (KAC), both companies 
signed contracts with third parties which they then cancelled. In the case of KPC, the company 
signed a joint contract with Dow Corporation for $10 billion but politicians pressed the 
government to cancel the contract on the grounds that the deal was corrupt. The government 
cancelled the contract and a penalty was paid to the Dow Corporation of $2.2 billion. The 
politicians accused KPC‘s executive management of accepting bribes to sign the contract 
(Alanba Newspaper, 2013).  
 
The second case relates to KAC where an MP pressed the government to sign the aircrafts‘ 
leasing contract with his company, that had a price higher than that quoted price by other 
companies, but the member threatened the minister of transportation if he signed any other 
leasing contract (Kuwait News, 2013). These government practices contradict international 
practices of corporate governance, and promote a bad role model to other companies that are 
then mimicked by using state owned enterprises to promote the politicians and merchant 
families‘ mutual interests, which the issuance of a code of corporate governance might 
diminish. 
 
The development and effectiveness of a corporate governance code in Germany refers to the 
political factor whereby political parties push for a high quality, effective code in spite of the 
country‘s legal system being classified as civil law (Matoussi and Jardak, 2012). Hence 
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Germany practices an example of how political factors can impact corporate governance. In 
Kuwait the role of politics may also impact corporate governance. 
     
Hence, political factors have an influence on corporate governance development and 
effectiveness. To date no literature discusses the impact of political factors on the absence of a 
corporate governance code in Kuwait. This thesis therefore explores this and examines the 
influence of politicians, political parties, government practices, merchant families‘ practices, 
and their mutual interests in preventing the establishment of a corporate governance code. 
    
Not only do legal and political factors influence corporate governance but cultural factors are 
also important as the determinants of all laws and regulatory systems (Morck et al, 2004). The 
following section therefore illustrates the influence of cultural factors on legal systems the 
quality of law, ownership structure, and the levels to which corporate governance has been 
adopted and developed. 
 
3.6 Cultural factors on the development of corporate governance  
 
Blair (1995) states that corporate governance consists of: 
 ―the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements 
that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who 
controls them, and how that control is exercised‖  
                                                                        (p. 3). 
 
Blair‘s inclusion of cultural factors as a component of corporate governance motivated Licht 
(2001) and Licht et al. (2002, 2005) to examine the impact of culture on corporate governance 
and ownership structure. They found that the system of beliefs and values that determines the 
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behaviour and actions of individuals within a society can explain the differences in the level of 
investor protection and corporate governance. Attempts to change the law on the books and 
simply incorporate investor rights are insufficient to guarantee improvements in corporate 
governance. Ethnicity, customs, beliefs, shared values and religion all have a significant 
influence on the effectiveness of corporate governance systems and can impede change and 
legal reform (Licht, 2001). The dominance by merchant families of the government, the legal 
and regulatory systems and other organisations reflects the social values of a country, as in the 
case of India, where minorities have few rights and laws cannot be activated against powerful 
families since those merchant families have a social value in Indian society (Licht et al., 2005).  
 
In Eastern Europe the cultural environment is a potential impediment to change. After the 
failure of the communist regimes in 1989-1993, a comparative analysis of Western and Eastern 
Europe shows that the former communist countries of the East have a strongly-authorised 
embedded culture and hierarchy. These values are compatible with a low perception of 
legality. Efforts to achieve social change through legal reform thus face serious challenges 
because other factors play an important role: existing cultural values that institutionalised 
embedded block changes and generate path dependence; adapting and adjusting cultural values 
to favour legal reform occurs only slowly in response to changed life circumstances (Matoussi 
and Jardak, 2012). 
 
This thesis explores the dominant culture in the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed 
companies regarding the level to which the merchant families control and dominate listed 
companies‘ boards and executive management and whether the dominant culture impedes 
institutional change. Also, the dominant culture in Kuwait is that the merchant families are 
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above the law, as evidenced by the government failing to pursue accusations against two 
members from merchant families due to their social status (Alzaid, 2013).  
 
The diversity of culture between different countries influences how people behave, especially 
in multicultural societies, when each ethnic group maintains its own identity (Sendut, 1991). 
This is best exemplified by the behaviour of Swiss companies located in either German- or 
French-speaking Switzerland. Germany and France, are its closest neighbours, and are two 
important economies in Continental Europe, sharing the same legal system but enjoying 
distinct cultural features, which are reflected in the two Swiss regions. The federal law defines 
corporate law in Switzerland, so any differences in corporate governance may therefore be 
explained by cultural influences (Gantenbein and Volonte, 2012). Although Swiss corporate 
governance is close to the Anglo-Saxon model, the ownership structure has a high 
concentration of single families or block-holders, unlike the Anglo-Saxon model that is based 
on dispersed ownership. Furthermore, both German and French culture has influenced 
ownership and board structures: the Swiss German boards are more likely to be two-tiered, as 
in Germany, where the board of directors is separated from the management board and 
contains no executive directors (Gantenbein and Volonte, 2012). In contrast, half of the Swiss 
French boards include the CEO, showing that firms in the French-speaking part of Switzerland 
are significantly more likely to have a single-tier board structure, and that the composition of 
the board differs as a consequence of the language barriers; there is a greater representation of 
directors with French citizenship and of directors who have graduated from a Swiss French 
university on the corporate boards in the Swiss French region. Similarly, German directors are 
more prevalent on the Swiss German boards (Gantenbein and Volonte, 2012). 
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A diversity of cultural values and beliefs is also evident in the different cultures of the USA 
and France, where hierarchy and authority are perceived differently: American culture resists 
hierarchy and centralised authority, whereas in France, these are accepted (Pagano and Volpin, 
2001; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
 
Hence, the dominant culture of Kuwait may resist the change to adopting a new culture by 
changing the current Act and replacing it with a new Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, 
since the dominant culture is based on the merchant families running listed companies.  
 
Matoussi and Jardak (2012) also demonstrate that the US has the highest number of cases of 
shareholders‘ claims in court against listed companies‘ boards and executive management, 
followed by South Pacific; MENA countries represent the lowest number of cases. They 
suggest that MENA countries do not rely on litigation and instead make use of other 
mechanisms of governance (customs and traditions gained from their culture) rather than those 
in the West.         
 
It was mentioned earlier in chapter 2 that, although a group of merchant families were accused 
of engaging in illegal, manipulative transactions, the law and regulations were not activated 
against them. This may relate to the customs and traditions that represent the country‘s culture, 
which will be examined later in the empirical chapters. 
  
Morck and Steier (2005) identify cultural influences in their observation that Canada was a 
notably corrupt country until a few generations ago. It had been colonised by the French, who 
at that time saw Jean Baptiste Colbert as the father of French mercantilism, whose policies 
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encouraged corruption and abuse. Hence, colonisation can transfer a corrupt culture and 
impact on the quality of the law issued in a colonised country.   
 
In Kuwait, corruption and bribery have been part of the community culture since parliament 
was first established, which created mutual interests between the government and the political 
parties in parliament, specifically the merchant group, and continues to be part of the 
community‘s culture (Al-Moqatei, 2013).   
 
The impact of culture can also be seen in the aftermath of the Asian crisis when, in 1997, the 
Korean government reformed the equity markets and the market-based economy. However, 
these reforms did not meet with success due to the cultural beliefs and values of Korean 
society, as the collectivist beliefs of Korean people, with concentrated hierarchies, made it 
impossible to establish a free market economy. Policymakers therefore need to recognise the 
role of culture and understand that fundamental national cultural beliefs can be a key to the 
success or failure of policy implementation (North, 1994; Miles, 2010). 
 
In Kuwait, after the Al-Manakh crisis of 1986, the government stressed the need for listing 
requirements to limit the numbers of listed companies; however, these new regulations proved 
ineffective since, of the 84 new companies listed on the KSE between 2002-2006, the majority 
did not have an operation (called papered companies as they are companies that have no 
operations and in some companies have no location) (Alsaied, 2008). This shows that, 
although regulations and requirements exist, they are not obeyed by the merchant families, 
since they are powerful and cannot be prosecuted as they are above the law.  
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Abdumavlonov (2011) states that the Russian government tried to enhance corporate 
governance by adopting the Anglo-Saxon (outsider) model, but the cultural obstacles 
presented by a communist society hindered its development and activation. As a result, the 
regulations existing within the Soviet Union led to illegal transactions which persist to the 
present day. The distrust which has arisen as a result of the lawlessness and harsh political 
environments of past centuries is a feature of Russian culture: the secret police and citizen 
informants of the communist government have caused a high level of suspicion of individuals 
outside the family or close relationships (Abdumavlonov, 2011). Another cultural norm of 
Russian society is their reliance on personal networks of trusted friends or high authorities for 
the successful completion of business. These cultural features and social norms of the Russian 
people, therefore, make it impossible to implement an outsider system of corporate 
governance: a culture of lawlessness, distrust and problem-solving through personal networks 
is unreceptive to the concepts of transparency, proper auditing, fiduciary duties and the 
protection of minority shareholders (Abdumavlonov, 2011). 
 
This thesis will examine whether close personal and social relationships in actor networks 
between the merchant families and the government and regulators exist and are a cultural 
factor that hinders the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. 
 
Thus, cultural factors can play a major role in hindering the development and effectiveness of 
a corporate governance code. India tried to develop its corporate governance code by applying 
the Anglo-Saxon model; however, the dominant culture resisted the activation of the code and 
built codes that are commensurate with the requirements of their own culture, such as retaining 
concentrated ownership and protecting the merchant families‘ interests; hence, the cultural 
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factors in India have a significant influence on its system of corporate governance and have led 
to a divergence from the Anglo-Saxon model (Bhattacharyya, 2012).   
 
On the contrary, France that has a civil law system, saw the business culture change between 
1985 and 1991 as companies were privatised and widened their businesses internationally. 
These companies funded their operations by loans from international banks and financial 
institutions which resulted in an improvement in their governance. Therefore, the culture 
change in business and normative international influences has impacted corporate governance 
in France (Keasey et al., 2005). 
 
This thesis will therefore explore cultural factors and their impact on the absence of corporate 
governance in Kuwait, and the role of the government in preventing the issuance of a corporate 
governance code.     
3.7 Summary 
 
Enriques and Volpin (2007) refer to the corporate governance reform in Germany and France 
to three main factors: cultural; legal; and political. The cultural factor is represented by 
business becoming more globalised and attracting foreign institutional investors. The political 
factor has come from the pressure from the EU to establish a common regulatory framework 
for European financial markets and companies. The legal factor has resulted from corporate 
scandals that increased public demand for the existing governance framework to be updated.  
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Similarly, in Egypt weak coercive pressure from regulators due to cultural political and legal 
factors has led to non-compliance with the corporate governance code whereby blockholder‘s 
preferences prevail (Samaha, 2012). 
 
Hence, political, legal, and cultural factors have a significant influence on shaping isomorphic 
tendencies toward constituting governance practices in different countries, also they play 
significant role in the process of issuance of governance code and the level of the effeteness. 
     
Chapter two explored the political, legal and cultural factors of Kuwait, including the 
economic situation, and detailed the role of the merchant families in two eras: pre and post 
crude oil discovery. The present chapter detailed three influential factors over the development 
and effectiveness of corporate governance; namely, legal, political, and cultural factors, and 
whether merchant families exert an influence. This thesis will explore the extent to which 
Kuwait‘s current legal and regulatory system influences the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate 
governance and, whether the characteristics of the civil legal system, that encourage a 
concentrated ownership structure and represent the merchant families, makes them immune 
from the issuance of corporate governance in Kuwait. 
The thesis will also explore the influence of political factors through parliament, that is 
responsible for issuing legislation and, hence, whether the existence of merchant family 
members in parliament influences corporate governance. Also, the role of the Kuwaiti 
government will be explored to illustrate whether the government‘s practices share mutual 
interests with the merchant families and make them immune to the issuance of corporate 
governance code. Also, the thesis explores the culture and examines whether this also 
influences corporate governance. Hence, this thesis explores the extent to which each of these 
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factors influences the absence of a corporate governance code in Kuwait, and specifically the 
role of the merchant families through their legal, political, and cultural influence. Also this 
thesis will explore whether the legal, political, and cultural factors helping merchant families 
to influence on corporate governance practices inside the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. Besides, the thesis will explore whether there is one community of practices that 
established by merchant families or there is many. Institutional theory is concerned with 
processes of isomorphism, the construction of legitimacy, and explaining similarities among 
organisations within an institutional field (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010). Thus this theory is 
helpful in examining whether there is a similarity in corporate governance practices within the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies and what isomorphic pressures have been 
exercised that have established one or several community of practice and which pressures are 
preventing the issuance of corporate governance code in Kuwait. Also, in order to answer the 
research question of why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait, and the factors 
influencing corporate governance practices in Kuwaiti listed companies, a NIS theoretical 
framework can be used to answer the how and why in the institutional environment of Kuwait 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
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Chapter 4 
Theoretical framework 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait, with the aim of 
exploring whether there is community of practice within the organisational field of Kuwaiti 
listed companies and understanding the community of practice in this area (Davis and 
Marquis, 2005), which will highlight the dominant organisational logics (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008), which is highly dependent on the network of actors. The term ‗the network of 
actors‘ in this thesis refers to the merchant families association with the government, whereby 
the merchant families‘ power is acquired through their political, cultural, social influence, as 
explained in chapter 3. 
  
Also, several communities of practice may exist within the organisational field of listed 
companies, such as in Kuwait, where no changes have been made to the Companies Act 
(Article 15) since 1960, where there may be institutional factors that: (i) impede any 
isomorphism occurring from normative international practice; (ii) where state owned corporate 
governance practices are mimicked by other companies; and (iii) where the 1960 Act (Article 
15) has any coercive influence. 
Chapter four is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses institutional theory and the 
organisational field; section 4.3 illustrates the organisational logics within the field and the 
concept of competing logics that might create change. Section 4.4 discusses the notion of the 
community of practice and the network of actors within the field. The last section, 4.5, 
provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
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4.2 Institutional theory  
 
Before introducing NIS theory, the reason for not choosing other possible theories, such as 
agency or Actor Network theory, is explained. First, agency theory is a result of problems that 
occur between agents and principals as ―the relationship between the principals, such as 
shareholders, and the agents, such as the company executives and managers‖ (Abdullah and 
Valentine, 2009, p.90). The theory is based on the assumption of the separation between 
ownership and control, which usually occurs in developed markets that are characterised by 
dispersed ownership and active capital markets (Bhimani, 2008). Kuwait however is 
characterised by concentrated ownership, by both the merchant families and the government, 
and the capital market is undeveloped. Thus in Kuwait the shareholders are also entrenched 
board members, with no separation between managers and shareholders. Hence, agency theory 
is not suitable to a country such as Kuwait and will not be helpful in understanding the reason 
why there is no Kuwaiti corporate governance code. 
 
Another theory that could have been applied in this thesis is Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
but, as this research uses interviews and a questionnaire survey that concerns the perceptions 
of stakeholders rather than examining the actors themselves, and the interaction between the 
individual actors, ANT is also not a suitable theory to have been used as it would have 
involved examining practice at the individual micro level rather than a more holistic 
understanding of why there is no corporate governance code (Rowley, 1997).  
 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS) theory is concerned with institutions at more ―macro‖ 
level of the organisational field (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In 
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the initial stage, different organisations may show a diversity of approach, form, and logic, 
causing a fragmented, heterogeneous environment; once a field becomes more established, 
however, there is an inexorable push towards homogenization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Hence, David and Marquis (2005) state that the analysis of the organisational field provides a 
better understanding of the processes of both change and persistence within institutional 
theory, and which community of practices becomes dominant, representing the dominant logic 
of the most prominent actors within the field. 
 
A field, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is a recognized area of social or economic 
activity in which the actors establish relationships among themselves, reconfiguring their 
action models and social structures. Organisations are positioned in relational structures or 
networks that configure their actions and delimit their possibilities (DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
1991). Further, Hoffman (1999) states that a field is formed, not around common technologies 
or industries, but around issues that bring together various fields, such as in this thesis, which 
examines the field of corporate governance in a particular situation – that of Kuwait –, 
encompassing all listed companies from all sectors.  
 
An organisational field is defined as “those organisations that in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resources and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies and other organisations that produce similar services and see themselves 
involved in a common enterprise” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 143). The organisational field 
of Kuwaiti listed companies includes all listed companies from different sectors with the 
regulators and legislators. Scott (1995) adds to the latter definition the fact that organisations 
see themselves as part of the same community that partakes of a system of common meaning. 
In this light, as a recognised area of institutional life, organisational fields represent the totality 
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of the relevant actors; for example, ―a community of organisations that partakes of a common 
meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another 
than with actors outside the field‖ (Scott, 1995: 56). The idea behind analysing the 
organisational field is that the field is inclusive of the role of the other stakeholders not just 
depending on the role of main actors in the field, such as the State, regulators, professional and 
trade associations and product consumers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).    
 
Inside the organisational field, different organisations and individuals try to position 
themselves and bring the focus onto power, domination, and class (Everett, 2002), and the 
position of an organisation inside the organisational field depends on its relative power 
(Misoczky, 2003) and size (Swedberg, 2004).      
 
In Kuwait, the organisational field is listed companies on the KSE, and began to appear as 
soon as the first company was listed in 1952. The related actor networks within this field are 
the merchant families as shareholders, government, regulators, legislators, executive 
management and other stakeholders, such as professional associations. A group of merchant 
families established the first listed company called the National Bank of Kuwait. The board 
and management were headed by the merchant families as the founders of the bank and it still 
continues under their control (Al-Temimi, 2006). More companies were listed in 1954, 1956 
and 1957, and again the merchant families founded these and still head them and maintain 
their control (Al-Shamari, 1985; Al-Qenae et al., 2002).      
  
Thus, merchant families control the board and management of the majority of listed companies 
and engage in networks that cross and overlap (Aljoman, 2011). All listed companies are 
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governed by Act (Article 15) issued in 1960, which does not conform to current international 
principles of corporate governance, and corporate governance in Kuwait may not have 
developed in the same manner as elsewhere. Hence, this thesis seeks to determine why no 
Kuwaiti code of corporate governance has been issued, and how the organisational practice of 
corporate governance in Kuwait differs or is similar to established international norms and 
why this is so. 
 
In order to understand why no code of corporate governance has been issued, it will be helpful 
to identify the dominant logic of actors of the field and focus on the importance of the 
dominant logics and the resistance to change to new competing logics (Lounsbury, 2001; 
Thornton, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The next section illustrates in greater detail 
the role of organisational logics.  
 
4.3 Organisational logics 
 
The organisational field includes different institutional structures which include organisations 
and individuals (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Institutional fields, which it is a part of the 
organisational field, can form as clusters and be influenced by organisations and professions 
through their boundary-spanning identities and interactions where institutional logics become 
―a socially constructed, historical pattern of practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules‖ 
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999:804). Scott (1987) further states that institutional logics become 
taken-for-granted social prescriptions that guide the behaviour of the actors in the fields, who 
have a shared understanding of which goals to pursue and how to pursue them (Scott, 1987, 
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1994). Many organisational fields may contain multiple institutional logics of different actors 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Schneiberg, 2002; Seo & Creed, 2002), 
but often one institutional logic holds a dominant position (Dobbin, 1994; Schneiberg, 2002; 
Reay & Hinings, 2005). 
 
The main actors in the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait are the merchant 
families and the government, who control many of the listed companies. The other 
stakeholders in the field are the professional bodies, legislators, regulators, and trade 
associations. The history of Kuwait, as explained in chapter 2, shows that the merchant 
families in Kuwait have socially and culturally positioned themselves politically through their 
economic power to become more powerful and exert control over the government and the 
country. Therefore, the behaviour of the merchant families may be designed to maintain their 
control over listed companies, and hence oppose any changes to the Companies‘ Act (Article 
15), to avoid threatening their power and control. Indeed, Lepoutre and Valente (2012) state 
that the actors inside an organisational field will oppose any changes being made to the 
dominant logic if the process of change would threaten their control and cause losses to 
themselves.  Liguori and Steccolini (2012) also confirm that larger organisations are less 
motivated to change, as they prefer to maintain their authority within their organisational field. 
However, there might be competing logics among other groups, such as minority investors, in 
the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait, who might support a change to the 
dominant logic that favours the merchant families. 
 
Helms et al. (2012) state that one of the barriers to changing the dominant organisational logic 
is logic pluralism where the logics of different groups of actors, such as the government, 
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organisations, consumers, non-government organisations, and academics each carry a different 
logic and that the move to a new dominant logic takes time. The organisational field of listed 
companies in Kuwait has many actors, such as the government, regulators, legislators, 
parliament, executive management of listed companies, merchant families, and minority 
investors. The question that arises is whether these organisations and individuals all share the 
same dominant logic or whether there is a pluralism of logics and, which of these prevents 
change. 
       
The organisational logic consists of both symbolic and material carriers. Symbolic carriers 
include the embedded norms, rules, and belief systems and the material carriers include the 
routines, relationship systems, and artifacts that materialize and reproduce them (Lepoutre and 
Valente, 2012) or are ―a set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes 
its organizing principles and which is available to organisations and individual to elaborate‖ 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248). Material carriers refer to material artifacts, routines, the 
governance and reward systems, and relationship systems surrounding actors in an 
organisational field (Lepoutre and Valente, 2012). Organisations and individuals inside the 
organisational field conform to the institutional logics through the two main symbolic and 
material carriers.  
 
The symbolic carriers of corporate governance in Kuwait are the Companies‘ Act 1960 
(Article 15), as well as the merchant families‘ belief systems who control listed companies and 
have power. The material carriers are represented by the dominant merchant families‘ 
practices, relationships and networks that allow them to achieve their interests.   
112 
 
 
Hence, this thesis examines whether the dominant symbolic and material carriers of merchant 
families who control listed companies in the organisational field prevent change.  
 
Hyvonen et al. (2012) show in their study that the change process over the dominant logic can 
best be achieved via exogenous jolts or from endogenous sources. They relate exogenous jolts 
to introducing new active agencies in the organisational field, whereby a new actor may 
challenge the existing organisational logic and introduce new competing logics. In Kuwait, a 
new agency, the Capital Market authority (CMA), was established in 2010, and this may work 
towards establishing a new dominant logic and introducing a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code, but as yet this has not yet happened.  
 
A second factor that can assist the process of changing the dominant logic is endogenous, and 
refers to institutional entrepreneurship. Maguire et al. (2004) define institutional 
entrepreneurship as the ―activities of actors who have interest in particular institutional 
arrangements, and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing 
ones‖ (p. 657). According to Sharma et al. (2010), institutional entrepreneurs may be both 
exogenous to the organisation (consultants) or come from within it (managers). However 
Fligstein (1997) states that endogenous change is rare since the powerful actors in the 
organisational field oppose change, as the current dominant logic in the organisational field 
protects their power and control. Liguori and Steccolini (2012) emphasise that intra-
organisational factors, such as represented by powerful CEOs, also may prevent the 
implementation of change, since they might lose their control. Thus, internal management and 
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executives will be examined in this thesis to see whether they impede any change in corporate 
governance practices.   
 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) summarise that, in heavily institutionalized fields, all actors 
may share the same values and institutional logics, whereas fields with competing logics will 
be less institutionalised and more prone to change. Thus, this thesis will examine the extent to 
which corporate governance has become institutionalised in to one logic.  
 
Hyvonen et al. (2012) also suggest that there may be coalitions between entrepreneurs forming 
networks between them that can compete with and change the dominant logic by forcing a 
normative isomorphism within the organisational field. Such networks consist of actors who 
are connected by a set of ties, be they persons, teams, organisations, or concepts (Borgatti and 
Foster, 2003). The merchant families within the organisational field of listed companies of 
Kuwait arguably have built up networks and have become the actors in this network, 
connected with each other by a set of ties, from controlling listed companies to protecting their 
power. This power is derived from the political, cultural, and social factors in the country, and 
the power of the merchant families allows them to create and impose their own practices in 
order to be dominant within the organisational field. One network of actor practices forming a 
normative isomorphism is CEO duality, whereby the same person is CEO and Chair, and most 
listed companies follow this institutional logic, as the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) does not 
prevent CEO duality. Hence, the concept of institutional entrepreneurs might be rare or not-
existent, as the boards of listed companies have a monopoly over the selection of executive 
114 
 
management and, in most cases, these constitute the same people from their merchant family 
network. This thesis will again examine whether this is indeed the case.           
 
The next section discusses how these logics within the organisational field form different 
communities of practices, and specifically questions whether the organisational field in Kuwait 
may have one or several communities of practice.  
 
4.4 Community of practice  
 
Van Baalen et al. (2005) state that a community of practice is a relatively cohesive group of 
people who know each other well and work together directly. These groups may be either 
organisations or individuals that share the same practices, goals, vision, and logics 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Each group‘s logic represents a community of practice, with 
the same fundamental beliefs, norms, and values regarding how cultural, social and political 
systems should work (Ingram and Simons, 2000). Wenger (1998, 2004) states that the 
fundamental characteristics of a community are: the domain (the area of knowledge that brings 
the community together); the community (the group of people for whom the domain is 
relevant); and the practice (the body of knowledge and method which the members share and 
develop together). Therefore, the term ‗community of practice‘ refers to the process whereby 
shared socio-cultural practices emerge among people who share a common goal, vision, and 
identity, regardless of their geographical location (Lave and Wenger, 1991). The difference in 
logics inside the organisational field leads to several communities of practice, as each 
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community‘s shared logics represent different practices from the others (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). 
 
Referring to chapter 2, the ownership of Kuwaiti listed companies has a block-holding and 
pyramid ownership structure, and CEO duality identified by Badraan (2010) is dominant in the 
field as an effort by the merchant families to impose their control over listed companies. 
Therefore, the characteristic of a community in Kuwait is the issue of power and control 
(domain). Merchant families share the value of power and control over listed companies and 
hence comprise one community, and it may resist change to corporate governance since this 
would threaten their power and control (practice).  
      
Hence, the thesis explores whether there is just one community of practice with a common 
knowledge who resist the issuance of a corporate governance code in Kuwait, and whether the 
practices are shared within their merchant family community. For example, organisations 
inside the same community may display a homogenization in their practices; for example, 
listed companies in Kuwait may share homogeneity of practice such as CEO duality. The 
domain inside the community may result in isomorphic tendencies to other listed companies 
and as DiMaggio and Powel (1991) note, isomorphism is:   
 
“The concept that best captures the process of homogenisation”              
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 66). 
 
4.5 Isomorphism 
 
Burton (2000) states that isomorphic tendencies can help us to explain the rapid spread of 
uniform governance structures that have occurred in recent years. Such isomorphism can be 
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typified as ―competitive‖ and ―institutional‖. Competitive isomorphism assumes a system of 
rationality that emphasizes market competition, and is relevant for organisational fields in 
which free, open competition exists. The institutional view of isomorphism is that 
organisations compete not only for resources and customers, but also for political power, 
institutional legitimacy, and social as well as economic fitness, leading, in some situations, to 
irrational practices (Carruthers, 1995).  
 
This thesis is concerned with isomorphism that derives from the institutional pressure that 
steers organisations in a specific direction towards accepting or rejecting changes in their 
dominant practices and codes (Lounsbury, 2007; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001). 
These pressures are exerted by a variety of sources, such as the government, professional 
associations, and competitors (Oliver, 1991), which can take the form of coercive, normative, 
and mimetic forces (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism results from external 
pressures such as that exerted by the government in Kuwait, such as the Companies‘ Act 
(Article 15) 1960, to which all listed companies should comply. Normative forces derive from 
professional communities whose members conform to particular norms and standards as a 
community of practice, and mimetic isomorphism arises from the pressure to imitate other 
successful organisations and their practices (DiMaggio &Powell, 1991).           
Souitaris and Zerbinati (2012) state that it is not just isomorphic tendencies that cause 
homogenisation between organisations but also that each organisation‘s priorities lead to an 
alignment with a specific community of practice. If the organisation prioritises its major 
shareholders (endo-isomorphism), the major shareholders will coerce organisations to follow 
their practices, whereas if the organisation‘s priorities are driven externally, such as by other 
organisations within the field (exo-isomorphism), mimetic or normative isomorphism will 
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occur (Souitaris and Zerbinati, 2012). According to the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed 
companies, it is assumed that endo-isomorphism is dominant, since the majority of listed 
companies are dominated by the major shareholders; hence, the merchant families might 
coerce executive management to follow their practices.  
The role of the Kuwaiti government as an actor and coercive force inside the organisational 
field may be weak as no changes have been made to the Companies Act (Article 15) and no 
corporate governance code has been issued, and hence governmental coercive isomorphism 
may be missing as mentioned earlier in chapter 2, some illegal practices in Kuwaiti listed 
companies by the major shareholders and regulators had no consequences. The power of the 
controlling merchant families may be observed through their practices exerting a coercive 
isomorphism over executives inside the community of Kuwaiti listed companies, since no 
other groups prevent them from or coerce them into changing their practices. Moreover, the 
merchant families may have coercive influence on the government not to issue or develop a 
code. Their organisational logic may then result in a mimetic isomorphism, whereby non 
merchant family owned listed companies follow the practices of the merchant family and 
government owned ones.   
However, there might be some listed companies inside the organisational field that reject the 
existing community of practice and voluntarily apply international principles of corporate 
governance. These, if they exist, will represent a different community of practice and as 
Lepoutre and Valente (2012) note the reason for this may be that decision makers in these 
listed companies may notice a potential opportunity to differentiate themselves from the rest, 
and adopt corporate governance principles, whereas the listed companies that are controlled by 
the merchant families recognize that corporate governance will threaten their interests 
(Thomas et al., 1993)       
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Diagram 4.1 Theoretical diagram of the thesis  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This diagram explains the theoretical framework of the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies 
 
The diagram shows the factors that influence corporate governance practices of Kuwaiti listed 
companies and the coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures show that Kuwaiti listed 
companies have a single community of practice. 
Political  Legal  Cultural  Economic  
Material  Material  Symbolic  Symbolic 
Government 
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Therefore, in order to examine why there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, this 
research will explore corporate governance in Kuwait and determine whether there is a 
dominant organisational logics inside the field and whether the merchant family network of 
actors resist any changes or whether there are competing logics within the field that could 
bring about change. The thesis will explore whether there is a single community of practice 
represented by one network of actors, the merchant families, or whether there are several 
communities of practices within the organisational field. Moreover, this thesis explores 
whether the merchant families‘ practices and logics are the main reason for preventing the 
issuance of corporate governance in Kuwait or whether there are other factors involved. 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the organisational field and logics of corporate governance in Kuwait 
and explains how institutional theory can provide an understanding of the factors that 
influence current practices and the process of change. Within the organisational field, different 
groups might display different communities of practice related to their knowledge, goals, and 
vision.  
The thesis will examine the extent of whether the merchant families dominant logics and 
practices resist the issuing of Kuwaiti corporate governance code by their power which is 
acquired through their political, cultural, social influence. Also, the thesis will examine the 
role of the government and the reason of why they do not develop or issue a corporate 
governance code. To answer these questions, a qualitative method is applied in this research to 
get a richer, deeper perspective of participants‘ perceptions about the factors preventing the 
issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance and the influence of the merchant 
families. The next chapter justifies the choice of qualitative research method.  
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology and Methods 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This study explores the factors that prevent the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code and the influence of merchant families on both current companies‘ practices and the 
prevention of the issue of such a code.  
 
To achieve this aim, this chapter discusses the research methodology and the methods adopted 
to conduct the empirical work for this study. The chapter discusses the main alternative 
methodological frameworks in the literature, and justifies the selection of the research 
paradigm, methodology and methods that are adopted in this study (Hoepfl, 1997).  
 
5.2 Assumption of the research philosophy and methodology 
 
Initially, it is beneficial to explain what research means. Research is a systematic investigation 
process that involves establishing certain facts to find out the reality of something by using a 
scientific method (Fellows and Liu, 2009). Collis and Hussey (2009) pointed out that, 
although research is an important element in and central to business and academic activities, 
there is no agreement in the literature about how it should be defined as research means 
different things to different people. Saunders et al. (2009) define research as: 
―Something that people undertake in order to find out things in 
a systematic way thereby increasing their knowledge about the 
phenomenon under study‖. 
                                                                                                       (p.5) 
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However, the process of conducting any research depends upon the research philosophy  
which is used to inform the understanding of a specific area (Saunders et al., 2007) and the 
research paradigm incorporating assumptions about how they will learn and what they will 
learn during the enquiry  adopted by the researcher (Creswell, 2003). The research process is 
affected by the researcher‘s previous assumptions and beliefs (Hoque and Hopper, 1994), and 
the research process is influenced by the  researcher‘s thoughts  about  the  nature  of  social  
science  and  the  development  of knowledge. 
 
Blumberg et al. (2005) discuss the importance of thinking about what research is in a 
pragmatic way, to support the research strategy and methods that the researcher selects as part 
of that strategy (Blumberg et al., 2005). Saunders et al. (2007) also discuss the premise that 
each paradigm contains important differences, which affects the thinking about the research 
process. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that there are various philosophical assumptions which 
have direct implications when adopting a specific research methodology and influence the 
selection process of an appropriate research paradigm. These assumptions are views about 
the nature of reality, knowledge and human nature. These philosophical assumptions 
influence the research process of examining, collecting, analysing and interpreting findings 
(Bryman, 2012). 
   
The reason for understanding the research‘s philosophical assumptions is that these can assist 
researchers to clarify issues related to their research design by helping them to consider 
what  kind of evidence is required, gathered  and  interpreted,  in  addition  to  helping  to  
provide  answers  to  the  research questions. This knowledge about the philosophical 
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assumptions can also assist researchers to recognise what is appropriate to achieve in terms 
of their research objectives, and also to create and/or identify a research design that may be 
new in their substantive field (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).   
 
The philosophical approaches can be categorized into two types: the first assumption is the 
positivist/objectivist approach, which is based on the belief or assumption that social reality 
and social phenomena are independent of ourselves  and exist regardless of whether or 
not we are aware of them. Therefore, the act of investigating reality does not affect the 
reality. The objectivist  approach  (objectivism) in  social  sciences, meanwhile,  assumes  
that  the  social  world  exists externally, and that its characteristics should be measured by 
objective scientific methods, as used in the natural sciences, such as physics and 
chemistry, rather  than being inferred subjectively through sensation, inspiration experience 
or reflection. The objectivist approach also contains two main assumptions that see reality as 
external and objective (the ontological assumption of the objectivist approach); and sees that 
knowledge is only significant if it is based on the observation of this external reality (an 
epistemological assumption) (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
 
The second approach is phenomenology (subjectivism), which is based on the belief or 
assumption that the world is socially constructed and has a  subjective consciousness. It 
sees the social  reality  and  social  phenomena  as  determined  by  social  actors‘  actions  
and perceptions  (Easterby-Smith  et  al.,  2002)  and  as lying  within  us.  Therefore, the 
act of investigating reality affects the reality. The subjectivism approach focuses on meaning 
and is concerned with understanding the human behaviour involved in the social phenomenon 
from the participant‘s own frame of reference (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Easterby-Smith et 
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al. (2002) suggested that the subjectivism approach focuses on what social actors, both 
individually and collectively, are thinking and feeling about the social phenomenon under 
research. They pointed out that, in a subjectivist approach, researchers, for example, may 
try to explain why people have different thoughts or experiences rather than seek external 
causes and fundamental laws to explain their behaviour. Bryman and Bell (2007) illustrate 
that the central difference between these two research philosophies or approaches relates to 
the question of whether social entities can be considered objective entities with a reality that 
is external to the social actors or whether they should be considered as social constructions 
built from the perceptions and actions of the social actors. 
 
Business research is treated as a component of social science as it deals with human beings 
and human organisations that cannot be predicted; hence, any social study should consider   
the   various   philosophical assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of 
society (Nwokah et al., 2009).   
 
5.3 Assumptions about the nature of social science 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) build on two dimensions, based on assumptions concerning the 
nature of social science and the nature of society respectively (Hopper and Powell, 1985). The 
social science dimension in turn consists of four distinct but related elements assumptions on 
ontology, epistemology, methodology, human nature. Ontology assumptions are made about 
fundamentals and assumptions about the nature of organisational phenomena, researchers 
make claims of what is knowledge (Creswell, 2003). The nature of knowledge is about those 
phenomena or how researchers know them (epistemology) (Creswell, 2003). Human nature 
refers to the ways of studying those phenomena (methodology); in other words, methodology 
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means the processes for studying knowledge (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Gioia and Pitre, 1990; 
Creswell, 2003). Additionally, there are different manners of thinking about research 
philosophy which have been recognised in the social science literature (ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology, as illustrated in Figure 5.1), which searches for 
these in terms of what Burrell and Morgan illustrate as the subjective-objective dimension 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Crotty, 1998; Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 
2008), and epistemology, ontology and axiology (Saunders et al., 2007), and ontology, 
epistemology and methodology (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) and ontology, epistemology, axiology, 
and methodology (Hussey and Hussey, 1997 ; Creswell, 2003), and ontology, epistemology 
and human nature (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). 
 
Another arrangement of assumptions about paradigms is provided by Chua (1986). The first 
assumption regards beliefs about knowledge which involve both epistemological and 
methodological belief. The second assumption regards beliefs about the physical and social 
reality that include ontological beliefs, human intention and rationality, and societal 
order/conflict (Horton, 1966). The third assumption is the relationship between theory and 
practice. The next section will focus on the categorisation of Burrell and Morgan with 
contemporary additions; and will be discussed later. 
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Figure (5.1) A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.3). 
Note: this figure shows Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) scheme for analysing assumptions about the 
nature of social science. 
 
In short, ontology describes our view (whether claims or assumptions) about the nature of 
reality and asks, specifically, whether this is an objective reality that really exists, or only a 
subjective reality, created in our minds. 
 
The first line (ontology) represents the researcher‘s assumptions about the nature of the world. 
Blaikie (1993) describes the definition of ontology as ‗the science or study of being‘ and 
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develops this description for the social sciences to encompass ‗claims about what exists, what 
it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other‘ (p.6). Crotty 
(1998) provided another definition of ontology as the study of the nature of reality or being, 
concerned with understanding ―what is‖, the nature of existence, and the structure of reality. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) considered that the ontological assumption is concerned with the 
basic or most important idea of the phenomena under investigation. The basic ontological 
question concerns the nature of reality. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the 
ontological debate describes views (whether claims or assumptions) on the nature of reality, 
and asks, specifically, whether this is an objective reality that really exists, or only a subjective 
reality, created in our minds. The subjectivists‘ nominalism approach views the social world 
as the outcome of individual consciousness, whereas the objectivist r e a l i s t  approach 
emphasises t he  v i ew that reality is external and exists independently of an individual‘s 
appreciation of it. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) explain that the realism position sees facts as a concrete 
structure in the social world that have an existence that is independent of individual 
perceptions. It assumes that the social world is made up of hard, tangible and relatively 
fixed structures, which exist irrespective of how they are labelled or perceived. On the other 
hand, nominalists assume that the social world is not real and perceive reality as a projection 
of the human imagination (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Burrell and Morgan (1979) explain 
that nominalism assumes that the social world is made up of nothing more than names, 
concepts and labels which are used to structure reality because reality is derived from 
individuals‘ thoughts and conscious mental processes. 
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Ontological assumptions have a direct impact on the epistemological approach, research 
methodologies, and method which, in turn, influence the type of research process and 
analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Therefore, once researchers have decided upon the 
ontological assumption for their research, a particular epistemological approach and research 
methodologies and methods should be followed (Collis and Houssay, 2009).     
 
However, according to Crotty (1998, p.10), the conception that reality exists independently 
of  any  human  consciousness  ―does  not  imply  that  meanings  exist  independently  of 
consciousness‖. The point of attaching meanings to reality, whether from t h e  realist or 
nominalist perspective, brings the issue of epistemology to the fore. 
 
The second line shows that epistemology is coupled with ontology as it consider what 
constitutes reality and is concerned about ‗what is knowledge and what are the sources and 
limits of knowledge‘ (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). Blaikie (1993) describes epistemology 
as ‗the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge‘. Another definition of 
epistemology by Crotty (1998) is that it is ―the theory of knowledge embedded in the 
theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology‖. Hence, epistemology, according to 
Chia (2002), is ‗how and what it is possible to know‘. Epistemology is, therefore, concerned 
with the nature of knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and the way of collecting, 
understanding and explaining human knowledge (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Crotty, 1998; 
Creswell, 2003). Cooper et al. (1999) explain that  epistemology is a branch of philosophy 
which aims at: (i) understanding such concepts as belief,  memory, certainty, doubt, 
justification, evidence and knowledge; and (ii) enquiring into the criteria for  the application of 
such terms, particularly the criteria for identifying  ―the scope and limits‖ of human 
knowledge. Cooper et al. (1999) argued that: 
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―Many people have the impression that epistemology is the most 
central area of philosophy,   or   even   that   philosophy   should   
really   be   identified   with epistemology. Certainly  there is a 
popular image of philosophers as people obsessively and 
almost solely concerned  with determining whether we really 
know the things we ordinarily think we do‖ (p.3). 
 
Considering the epistemological assumption, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified positivism 
and anti-positivism positions. Positivist researchers consider that knowledge exists 
independently of any consciousness and can only be based on empirical observations of 
social reality. They  typically  understand the  social  world  through  explanations  based  
on  predicted regularities  and  causal  relationships  among  its   elements,  and  use  
methods such  as experiments (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Alternatively,  anti-positivism is 
based on the notion  that  knowledge  is  imposed  on  the  object  by the  subject  (Crotty, 
1998). Anti- positivist researchers reject the view that knowledge objectively exists or is 
subjectively imposed, and argue that it is constructed (Crotty, 1998). They consider that the 
social world is mainly relativistic and that there is only one way to understand it. This 
way is through the personal investigation, experience and perspective of individuals who are 
directly involved in the activities under investigation (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Crotty, 
1998). Moreover, anti-positivist researchers typically do not seek laws and underlying 
regularities related to social affairs, as in the physical sciences (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
The third line of the nature of social science is the human nature assumption. The 
relationship between human beings and their environment i s  the main concern of this 
assumption (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the human 
nature debate focuses on the issues of what model of researcher is reflected in social scientific 
theory. This philosophical debate involves two perspectives: determinism and voluntarism. 
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In determinism, everything which happens must happen as it does and could not happen 
any other way. The determinist perspective is based on seeing human beings and their 
experience as the products of their environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Determinist researchers consider that they and their activities are completely determined by 
the situation or environment in which they are located. Furthermore, determinist researchers 
assume that they are detached from what they are researching and regard the focus of their 
research as objects. They are usually interested in investigating the interrelationship 
between the objects they are studying and believe that these objects existed before they 
studied them and will continue to exist after the study has been completed (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
 
The voluntarist perspective, on the other hand, is based on the notion that humans are 
autonomous and free-willed. This view assumes that individuals are the creators and 
controllers of own actions and environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Based on the 
voluntarist perspective, researchers use their values to determine what is recognised as facts 
and the interpretations that are drawn from them.  Furthermore, the voluntarism perspective 
assumes that researchers are involved with that which is being researched (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). 
 
The methodological assumption in the line of the Figure 5.1 is concerned with the research 
process. Collis and Hussey (2009) defined the methodology as the overall approach to the 
research process, starting from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of 
the data. Crotty (1998 p.3) described the methodology as ―the strategy, plan of action, 
process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the 
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choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes‖.  Methodology, therefore, is a research 
design that guides researchers when choosing the techniques or procedures for gathering 
and analyzing the data related to their research (Crotty, 1998).  
 
Burrell and Morgan, (1979) argued that the ontological, epistemological and human nature 
assumptions have direct implications upon the research methodology used because these 
assumptions affect the methods used to investigate and obtain knowledge in the social 
world. They further argue that the different assumptions made by researchers are likely to 
draw them towards different methodologies. Collis and Hussey (2009) argue that the choice 
of methodology is largely determined by the choice of paradigm. They explain that selecting 
a particular methodology is highly dependent upon whether the positivistic (objectivism) 
or phenomenological (subjectivism) approach or paradigm is used, as mentioned above. A 
nomothetic methodology is used by positivistic (objectivist) researchers. This methodology 
uses protocols, techniques and procedures that derive from the natural science (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  The methodology of the objective researcher focuses on testing research 
hypotheses and using quantitative techniques of data analysis to test hypotheses and 
achieve the objective. Thus, it closely resembles an enquiry into the natural science (Chua, 
1986). 
 
In contrast, the methodology of the phenomenological (subjectivism) approach is ideographic 
in nature. This methodology argues that understanding the social world can only be 
achieved by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. This means 
that the analysis should get inside situations and learn the complexities of the particular 
issues under investigation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Under this type of methodology, 
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data can be collected through using methods such as interviews, and case studies. 
 
A distinction between ideographic and nomothetic methodologies is commonly drawn. 
The tendency has been to link quantitative methods with the natural sciences (positivism) 
and qualitative methods with the social sciences (interpretivism) (Mingers, 2001). 
 
5.4 Assumptions about the nature of society  
 
The nature of society may influence the research approach. The work regarding the 
assumptions about the nature of society that has been investigated by Burrell and Morgan that 
society can be viewed from two different approaches - steady and orderly or subject to radical 
change and conflict (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The work has become known as the ―order-
conflict debate‖, which seeks to classify the ways in which researchers view the nature of 
society, Figure 5.2 illustrates these two approaches to society, as described by Burrell and 
Morgan (1979). 
 
Under the order view of the society, researchers assume that social structures depend upon 
logical processes and human action, and is not influenced by society; this view concentrates 
upon explaining the nature of social order and equilibrium, emphasising stability, 
integration, functional co-ordination and consensus (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). By contrast, 
in the conflict view of society, assumes that the structure of society reflects the 
consequences of an individual‘s conflicts and the control of particular groups within society, 
concentrating upon problems of change, conflict, disintegration and coercion (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).   
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Figure 5.2 the Theories of Society: the Order-Conflict Theory 
 
The Order View The Conflict View 
Stability 
Integration Functional 
Co-ordination consensus 
 
Change 
Conflict 
Disintegration 
Coercion 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 13) 
 
Dahrendrof‘s order-conflict theory was criticised by Burrell and Morgan (1979) due to its 
oversimplification of the conceptual issues between the two positions of social structure, 
which might lead to different interpretations of the language used. They argued, for instance, 
that the term ―conflict‖ was interpreted and treated in very different ways in the sociological 
literature. Burrell and Morgan (1979), thus, replaced the order-conflict schema with the terms 
―regulation‖ and ―radical change‖. They highlighted the differences between the two positions 
of the model and presented the regulation-radical change model, as shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
The regulatory standpoint is less judgmental and critical (Saunders, et al., 2007). Saunders, et 
al. (2007) claim that regulation seeks to explain the methods within organisational issues, 
which are organised, and present propositions regarding how they may be enhanced within the 
framework of the model in which things are done. Cooper et al. (1999) states that regulatory 
standpoint concentrates on the fundamentals of society and explanations, using concepts such 
as consensus, order, need satisfaction, integration, and equilibrium (Cooper et al., 1999). 
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Conversely, the radical change perspective is more judgmental and critical. In terms of 
management and accounting, radical change correlates to a judgment about the organisational 
issues which should be performed and proposes methods by which these may be carried out in 
order to create basic changes (Saunders, et al., 2007). Hence, the radical change dimension 
adopts a critical perspective on organisational life, approaching organisational problems from 
the perspective of overturning and seeking to act within the existing state of affairs (Cooper et 
al., 1999; Saunders, et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 5.3 the Regulation-Radical Change Dimension 
The sociology of regulations is concerned with: 
 
The sociology of radical change 
is concerned with: 
The status quo Radical change 
Social order Structural conflict 
Consensus Modes of domination 
Social integration and cohesion Contradiction 
Solidarity Emancipation 
Need satisfaction Deprivation 
Actuality Potentiality 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 18) 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) explain that the sociology of regulation refer to researchers who 
are essentially concerned with providing explanations of a society that emphasises its 
underlying unity and cohesiveness: 
―It is a sociology which is essentially concerned with the need 
for regulation in human affairs; the basic questions which it 
asks tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is 
maintained as an entity. It attempts to explain why society tends 
to hold together rather than fall apart‖.   
                                                                                  (p. 17) 
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The sociology of radical change is concerned with finding reasons for radical change, deep-
seated structural conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction, which its 
theorists or researchers see as characterising modern society. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
defined it as: 
 
―A sociology which is essentially concerned with man‘s 
emancipation from the structures which limit and stunt his 
potential for development. The basic questions which it asks 
focus upon the deprivation of man, both material and psychic‖.  
                                                                                               (p. 17) 
  
5.5 Burrell and Morgan’s framework of research paradigm 
 
Before discussing Burrell and Morgan‘s framework, it will be helpful to define a paradigm. 
Paradigms refer to ―a set of beliefs which drive scientific research‖ (Weber, 2004). Another 
definition is that they are a process of scientific enquiry, based on people‘s philosophies and 
assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Various 
definitions of paradigms can be found in the sociology or business literature. A comprehensive 
definition is that:  
 
―it represents a world view that defines, for its holder, the nature 
of the ‗world‘, the individual‗s place in it and the range of 
possible relationships to that world and its parts‖  
                                                   (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 107). 
 
Paradigms consist of patterns or methods that the members of a scientific community share, 
and represent the diverse philosophical routes that the scientists follow according to their 
discipline (Kuhn, 1977). Paradigms help to clarify uncertainties and can be utilized at three 
distinct levels: the philosophical level (to reflect basic beliefs about the world), the social level 
(to offer researchers strategies for conducting their studies), and the technical level (to identify 
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the methods which should be adopted when performing research) (Hussey and Hussey 1997; 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In general, a paradigm is a way of thinking that reflects 
fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of organisations (Gioia and Pitre, 1990), 
and is usually taken to mean a way of searching for some phenomenon (Gill and Johnson, 
2002).  
 
A research paradigm can be defined as a basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide a 
researcher‘s thinking and research process (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Creswell, 1998). 
Collis and Hussey (2009) defined a  ―paradigm‖ as a way of examining social phenomena 
based on people‘s assumptions and philosophies about the world, the nature of knowledge, 
and how the research should be conducted. Saunders et al. (2009), meanwhile, defined i t  
as a way of examining social phenomena in  order  t o  understand and attempt to explain 
them. According to Morgan (1979), the term ―research paradigm‖ can be applied and used in 
three different ways to help clarify the uncertainties. First, from the philosophical aspect, it 
can be used to reflect basic beliefs about the world. Second, from the social aspect, it can be 
used to provide guidelines about how researchers should conduct their research. Third, from 
the technical aspect, it can be used to specify the ideal methods and techniques that should 
be adopted when conducting research. Thus, Burrell and Morgan (1979) emphasised that the 
research paradigm is a very important component of the research process for several reasons. 
It helps researchers to: (i) clarify the research assumptions regarding their  views of the 
nature of science and society; (ii) provide an understanding of how other researchers 
approach their work; and (iii) design and plan their research based on an awareness of where 
they stand and map out further directions in relation to their attitudes and conceptions.  
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The central idea of Burrell and Morgan is that all theories of organisation are established on 
the philosophy and theory of science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
discuss the approaches mentioned above in terms of two dimensions: the assumptions 
concerning the nature of social science and the nature of society (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Hopper and Powell (1985) commented on Burrell and Morgan‘s framework as follows: 
 
“First, the framework forms a map that can be used to find one„s way 
through the wealth of research, the aims of which are sometimes 
confusing and the results conflicting… Secondly, a practically-
oriented subject such as management accounting has often embraced 
theories from other areas with little concern for their philosophical 
underpinnings….Thirdly, commonly held views and taken-for-granted 
„facts‟ often rest upon assumptions that are not recognized and thus 
not assessed… Fourthly, a map of classification of research according 
to its underlying assumptions may not only be useful as a way of 
organising previous literature, but it may also point the way towards 
new areas of investigation and the discovery of previously uncharted 
territory… Finally, in any research it is suggested that individual 
values, philosophical assumptions, theoretical backing, and research 
methods should all be related to each other and to the aims of the 
research”  
                                                                                     (1985: 429-430). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) build on two dimensions, based on assumptions about the nature of 
social science and the nature of society. The social science dimension consists of four 
components: assumptions about ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology 
(subjective-objective) (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985). The other main 
dimension classifies two dissimilar approaches to the nature of society (regulation-radical 
change): 
“One is concerned with regulation, order and stability and sets 
out to explain why society tends to hold together, the other 
focuses on the fundamental divisions of interest, conflicts and 
unequal distributions of power that provide the potential for 
„radical change”  
                                                (Hopper and Powell 1985: p. 432). 
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They combined the subjective-objective dimension with the regulation-radical change 
dimension to form a model of research paradigms in terms of h o w  the different 
approaches to social science research may be classified. Their analysis provided a useful 
framework for examining how the ontological assumptions about the world form the 
epistemological  concepts  about  the  nature  of  knowledge,  which  in  turn  influence  the 
research objective in terms of the interpretation of its findings (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The result of combining the subjective-objective dimensions and the regulation-radical 
change dimensions lead to dividing sociology into four distinct paradigms; namely, 
interpretive, functionalist, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. Figure 5.4 below 
illustrates these four paradigms. 
Figure 5.4 Burrell and Morgan’s Social Research Paradigms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22). 
 
The vertical axis in Figure 5.4 illustrates assumptions about the nature of society, from 
regulation to radical change. The  regulation  perspective  is  concerned  with  describing  
t h e  current  practice  and  how an organisation‘s   affairs  are  regulated,  then  providing  
suggestions  for  improvement that might be applied to  the current situation. In contrast, the 
radical change perspective is concerned with critical attitudes when studying an 
organisation. It is concerned about the procedures that should be undertaken in an  
138 
 
organisation‘s affairs and provides suggestions with a view to making a significant change to 
the current situation. It is clear that the radical change stance is far more judgmental and 
critical, with the aim of changing the current situation, while the regulation position is more 
descriptive, aiming to improve the current situation (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
The horizontal axis in Figure 5.4, meanwhile, represents substitute views about the nature of 
social science, from intense subjectivism to intense objectivism. The subjectivist position 
affirms to social science; it tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist, and ideographic 
in nature (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Cooper et al., 1999), while the objectivist position 
assumes social science to be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic in nature (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Cooper et al., 1999).  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) define these differences as objective-subjective and regulation-
radical change dimensions (see also, Gioia and Pitre, 1990), which are combined to shape four 
different research paradigms: the functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical 
structuralist (Hopper and Powell, 1985). These research paradigms are used to classify 
organisational research (Ryan et al., 2002). Chua (1986) combines these four dimensions to 
form three paradigms: mainstream accounting research, interpretive research and critical 
accounting research. Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe these paradigms as follows: 
“It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms shares a 
common set of features with its neighbors on the horizontal and 
vertical axis in terms of one of the two dimensions but is differentiated 
in the other dimension. For this reason they should be viewed as 
contiguous but separate – contiguous because of the shared 
characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is of sufficient 
importance to warrant treatment of the paradigms as four distinct 
entities. The four paradigms define fundamentally different 
perspectives for the analysis of social phenomena. They approach this 
endeavor from contrasting standpoints and generate quite different 
concepts and analytical tools”.  
                                                                                           (1979, p. 23) 
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The four paradigms noted by Burrell and Morgan‘s framework define certain purposes, such as 
assisting researchers to clarify their assumptions about their perspective about the nature of 
social science and society, and providing a useful method for understanding other researchers‘ 
approaches. They also help researchers to understand where it is possible to go and where they 
actually are going (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
These four paradigms provide mutually exclusive views of the social world based upon 
different theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of science and the nature of society. 
There is internal consistency under each paradigm in terms of the assumptions about 
individuals, groups, societies, study goals and accepted forms of evidence (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  Burrell and Morgan (1979) argued that the social-scientific reality depends 
upon which paradigm is used. Therefore, the result views the world in a particular way from a 
particular paradigm, and researchers cannot operate in more than one paradigm at any given 
point in time, although they can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time. 
 
 
In the bottom left quadrant of Figure 5.4 is the interpretive paradigm, which is located within 
subjectivism and the regulation of sociology, and is concerned with seeking explanations in 
order to understand the fundamental meaning of the social world. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
stated that: 
 
“The interpretive paradigm is informed by a concern to understand the world 
as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level 
of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of individual 
consciousness and subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participant 
as opposed to the observer of action”  
                                                                                                      (1979, p.28). 
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The interpretive paradigm shares its perspective on the regulation of sociology as the nature of 
society with the functionalism paradigm. On the other hand, functionalism and interpretivism 
have both adopted different assumptions about the nature of social science (objectivism-
subjectivism). In other words, the interpretive paradigm adopts what researchers have 
described as the regulation approach by using a subjective dimension to analyse the social 
world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The analysis of the understanding of human action or 
social phenomena diverges radically from the understanding of natural phenomena motivated 
by the subjectivist nature of interpretive social research (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008). 
 
Researchers who apply the interpretive paradigm aim to understand the subjective 
experience of individuals involved in the social world and the differences between human 
beings in their roles as social actors, which emphasizes the differences between studying 
people and studying objects. Hence, researchers working under this paradigm interpret not  
only their own social roles in accordance with the meanings they give to these roles, but 
also the social roles of others in accordance with their own set of meanings (Saunders et al., 
2009). Thus, the interpretive paradigm recognises that the world could be seen as socially 
constructed (Lukka, 2010; Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
Two intellectual traditions arose f r o m  the interpretative model: phenomenology and 
symbolic interactionism. The former refers to a philosophy that is concerned with the 
question of how we make sense of the world around us (Bryman, 2008), while the latter 
refers to: 
“A continual process of interpreting the social world around 
us in that we interpret the actions of others with whom we 
interact and this interpretation leads to adjustment of our own 
meaning and actions”.  
                                                   (Saunders et al., 2009, p.116) 
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Saunders et al. (2009) explained that interpretivist researchers should adopt an empathetic 
stance to understand this world from their perspective because of the serious challenges that 
arise when entering the social world of the research subjects. 
 
The second paradigm (shown in the bottom right-hand corner of Figure 5.4) in Burrell and 
Morgan‘s (1979) framework is functionalism, which has its roots in the regulation of 
sociology and functionalism approach from objectivism. It focuses on providing explanations 
of the status quo or social order from a realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic 
standpoint. The regulation perspective is dominant under this paradigm and is 
committed to the use of natural science methods to verify or falsify theories and identify 
causal relations (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), the 
functionalist paradigm assumes that the: 
 
“social  world  is  composed  of  relatively  concrete  empirical  
artefacts  and relationships   which   can   be   identified,   
studied   and   measured   through approaches derived from the 
natural sciences”.  
                                                                          (1979, p. 26) 
 
According to the above definition, the functionalist perspective on the social realm is that it is 
reality and that knowledge is tangible, so it is impossible to introduce descriptions of social 
change (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). According to the accounting and business perspective, 
functionalists see phenomena as concrete, real-world relations possessing regularities and 
causal relationships that are amenable to scientific explanation and prediction (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004). The theories developed under this paradigm are assumed to be value free 
and are used to understand and predict behaviour (Otley and Berry, 1994).  
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In the top right corner of Burrell and Morgan‘s framework (Figure 5.4) is the radical humanist 
paradigm, which is located between radical change and subjectivism. Its concern with the 
sociology of radical change is to develop a radical humanist paradigm from the subjectivism 
perspective; in other words, it focuses on how people create and maintain a mode of social 
organisation in which they live and try to change it.  
 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), humanist radical change approaches social science 
and shares the interpretive paradigm from a standpoint which tends to be nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntarist and ideographic in nature. Saunders et al. (2007) state that the radical 
change dimension assumes a critical view of organisational life. For instance, researchers 
adopting this paradigm would be concerned with changing the status quo to overcome the 
barriers  facing  this  emancipation  (such  as  ideology,  power,  psychological compulsions  
and  social  constraints). Burrell and Morgan add that: 
 
“It is a brand of social theorising designed to provide a critique of the 
status quo. It tends to view society as anti-human and it is concerned 
to articulate ways in which human beings can transcend the spiritual 
bonds and fetters which tie them into existing social patterns and thus 
realise their full potential”.  
                                                                                           (1979, p. 32) 
 
In the top right corner of Figure 5.4, the radical structuralist paradigm is located between 
radical change and objectivism. It promotes the sociology of radical change from an objectivist 
perspective, and shares the radical humanist paradigm in terms of the nature of society, unlike 
the radical humanist paradigm, which tries to understand social phenomena from a subjective 
standpoint (Saunders, et al., 2007). Also, this paradigm shares the functionalist paradigm from 
a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic (objectivism) 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The radical structuralist paradigm concentrates on 
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organisational structural relationships within the social world and analyses organisational 
phenomena as power relationships and patterns of conflict (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Structuralists focus on the  fundamental  conflicts  which  are  the  product  of,  and  
reflected  in, the organisational structures  and  relationships  (Hopper  and  Powell,  1985). 
This view of social science research is interested in challenging the social order and 
achieving fundamental change through economic and political crises.  
 
5.6 Research paradigm and methodology  
 
This thesis uses a new institutional sociology theoretical framework to provide a general 
understanding of how different types of institutional pressure (isomorphism) have prevented 
the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance based on the perceptions of 
interviewees and questionnaire respondents and their views about the factors that are 
hindering this issuance. These perceptions are studied to investigate whether merchant 
families in Kuwait are using their political, economic, and cultural influence to hinder the 
issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance or whether other factors, unrelated to 
these families, are involved. 
 
This research area represents the sociology of regulation in Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) four 
paradigm framework, and both the interpretive and functionalist paradigms are positioned 
under the regulation which can be used. The perceptions of the participants are based on an 
interpretive approach, which seeks an understanding of current governance practices within 
Kuwaiti listed companies and the identification of the factors that are preventing the issuance 
of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance through exploring their perceptions. Therefore 
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since the research objective is not to implement radical change, the research paradigm 
employed in this study is the interpretive paradigm. 
 
The empirical enquiry in this thesis is the reason why there is no Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance, and which factors have prevented its issuance. It explores Kuwaiti 
listed companies‘ practices and their level of voluntary adoption of corporate governance, and 
then examines whether there are any external influences affecting the institutionalisation 
process of issuing a Kuwaiti code. In exploring such questions, this thesis relies on evidence 
obtained from the participants‘ opinions, thoughts and views about the empirical 
phenomena of this research, and their perceptions are interpreted within the nominalist 
stance of ontological assumptions. 
 
This research is qualitative in nature, as it aims neither to investigate causal relationships 
between the elements of the social world, nor to predict what happens in t he  social world 
or seek to issue a generalisable law. This approach is following the anti-positivist stance, 
which is a feature of the interpretive paradigm. This research uses semi structured interview 
as the first method of collecting data since this research is qualitative in nature and concerned 
with seeking the perceptions of interviewees about why there is no corporate governance code 
in Kuwait and the factors that have prevented the issuance of a Kuwaiti code. Interviews are 
one research method to gather in depth information in order to give better understanding of 
the current practices to answer why and what factors prevent the issuance of a Kuwaiti 
corporate governance code. Also a questionnaire survey was used as a second research 
method in order to confirm the findings from the interviewees from a larger sample of 
stakeholders involved with Kuwaiti listed companies.  
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Also, this research, in  terms  of  the  human  nature  perspective,  assumes  that the 
participants are part of the business environment; they are influenced by and influence this 
environment by their experience and activities. This relationship with the business 
environment implies that they are neither completely influenced nor determined by their 
environment, but at the same time they are not completely autonomous and free-willed 
either. This research assumes  that  humans  and  organisations  engage in  a  continual, 
two-way  process  of exchange  between  themselves  and  their environment. From the 
institutional point of view, this interchange relation is an essential factor underlying the 
system‘s viability, its reproductive ability or continuity, and the ability to change both the 
current Companies‘ Article 15 and the current listed companies‘ governance practices. It is 
through such interaction and relationships that we can study and understand the current 
practices and factors that are hindering the issuance of corporate governance code in Kuwait. 
 
Moreover, it  is assumed the respondents are likely to be influenced by their experiences and 
the culture of the society in which they live; hence, their perceptions can help us to 
understand why there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. This study assumes that 
these experiences may influence the respondents‘ perceptions of the factors that are hindering 
the issuance of corporate governance. Consequently, this study assumes that both voluntarism 
and determinism will be relevant here, so a moderate position of the human nature perspective 
is assumed. 
 
The different types of research methodology depend upon whether the positivistic 
(objectivism) paradigm or phenomenological (subjectivism) paradigm is adopted. Some of 
these methodologies apply to one paradigm rather than another, and some can be carried out 
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under either paradigm, depending upon the researcher‘s assumptions. Therefore, the 
research methodology should reflect the research philosophy assumptions of the research 
paradigm adopted by the researcher (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
 
As this study is mainly exploratory and qualitative in nature, it does not set up detailed 
hypotheses for subsequent testing. I t s  main aim is to provide a descriptive explanation 
and evidence of the merchant families‘ influence over the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate 
governance code and corporate governance practices in Kuwaiti listed companies, based on 
the perspectives of the respondents. Accordingly, it adopts the ideographic methodology of 
social science, which is based upon the view that one can only understand the social world by 
obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subjects under investigation. The next section outlines 
the research methods employed in this research and justifies the choice of these for use in this 
study. 
 
5.7 Research Methods 
 
The current study employs semi-structured interviews and a  questionnaire survey as the 
main methods for collecting empirical data about  the  respondents‘ perceptions. This 
section outlines these methods and justifies their choice. Semi-structured interviews were 
selected for this study as they are more flexible than structured ones, enabling the interviewer 
to include more questions about the issues highlighted by the interviewees and go on to ask the 
other interviewees about the same things (May, 2001). A case study could have been used in 
this study, however, the results from a case study cannot be generalised across all Kuwaiti 
listed companies to identify if a community of practice exists (Berg, 2007). 
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5.7.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
In this thesis, the first method used for collecting data is semi-structured interviews. An 
interview in general is a conversation between two or more people (the interviewer and the 
interviewee) where questions are asked by the interviewer to obtain in-depth information 
from the interviewees about the phenomenon under investigation (Powney and Watts, 1987). 
The use of interviews as a method for collecting data can be applied in both the positivist and 
phenomenological methodologies, and interviews are also as a qualitative research method. 
This is considered as one of the most useful methods for collecting data, since it helps to 
generate rich insights into the interviewees‘ perceptions, experiences, values, attitudes, and 
feelings (Smith et al., 2009; Walsham, 1993; Kvale, 2008; May, 2001). The interview method 
can be divided into three types; structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. The 
types of question differ between these three types; for instance, structured interviews depend 
on closed questions, unstructured ones on open questions, and semi-structured ones fall in the 
middle of this continuum (Merriam, 2009). 
 
Structured interviews include closed questions that are posed to each interviewee in the 
same way; t h e  interviewer asks the question and then records the response based on a 
standardised schedule (Saunders et al., 2009 and Bryman and Bell, 2007). Saunders et al. 
(2009) refer to this type of interview as an ―interviewer-administered questionnaire‖ because 
a predetermined standardised set of questions is used. The main disadvantage of structured 
interviews is that t hey do  not allow any deviation from, or flexibility in, the questions 
asked (Tracy, 2012; Merriam, 2009).  
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The opposite of this first type is the unstructured interview, which does not require a 
predetermined list of questions, and gives the interviewee the opportunity to respond 
freely about events, behaviours, and beliefs related to the research topic (Saunders et al., 
2009).   In this type of interview, success in obtaining information depends on the degree 
of interaction between the interviewer (researcher) and the interviewee, which in turn 
depends on the experience of the interviewer to manage the interviewees and guide them to 
contribute to the research topic. The disadvantage of the unstructured interview is that it can 
be time consuming to conduct and analyse (Segal and Hersen, 2010; Tracy, 2012; Merriam, 
2009). 
 
The third type is the semi-structured interview, which is more flexible than the structured 
interview but less flexible than the unstructured one. It is the most popular qualitative research 
method when flexible, rich, detailed and comparable answers are sought. 
 
Researchers who undertake semi-structured interviews usually prepare a list of predetermined 
questions covering a specific topic related to the research questions, to all of which the 
interviewee replies, freely expressing their knowledge, experience, opinions, behaviours and 
beliefs in relation to t he  developing discussion. At the same time, an element of structure 
is maintained, which facilitates the analysis and comparison of the interviews.  The 
interviewees may mention issues that give rise to questions in the mind of researchers about 
things that are not included on the list, which enables the interviewer to discover fresh issues 
and gain rich information about the research topic. The flexibility and comparability of semi-
structured interviews can help the interviewer to concentrate on the main objective of the 
interview since he/she can e n sure that all o f  the questions are being covered (May, 
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2001; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Berg, 2007) while at the same time being open to fresh 
avenues of knowledge. 
 
However, concerns have been raised that semi-structured interviews can be time consuming 
and expensive to conduct and anlyse, and there is also the issue of confidentiality especially 
when only a small number of interviews are conducted (Collis and Hussey, 2009).  
 
Despite these concerns, semi-structured interviews are the best available method for 
collecting in-depth information about the beliefs and attitudes of the relevant individuals 
regarding a specific research topic, since the researcher can ensure that all o f  the  interviews 
are conducted in the same way and maintain considerable thought and skill in the interview 
questions (May, 2001; Saunders et al., 2009; Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
 
In this research, semi-structured interviews are employed to gather empirical evidence about 
the interviewees‘ perceptions and beliefs regarding the factors that are preventing the issuance 
of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance and the level of the merchant families‘ influence 
on this. To achieve this, different types of interviewees representing different groups express 
their experiences, opinions, and, attitudes in response to the questions, and raise any other 
relevant information about the reasons why corporate governance is absent in Kuwait. 
 
5.7.1.1 The Interview Process 
 
This research conducted interviews to investigate a variety of different groups‘ views and 
opinions about why Kuwait has not issued a corporate governance code, whether the merchant 
families are preventing the voluntary application and issuance of such a code, whether 
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Company Article 15 (1960) covers all aspects of corporate governance, and which factors are 
affecting Kuwaiti listed companies from voluntarily adopting corporate governance practices.   
 
The interview questions are mainly generated from the literature on corporate governance 
development in general as well as specifically in relation to the factors affecting its issuance 
and effectiveness in particular such as political, legal, and cultural factors. Moreover, 
developing and MENA countries‘ corporate governance development as well as the factors that 
affect the development of corporate governance in these countries are also discussed such as 
mutual interests between merchant families and governments. The interview questions cover 
three main topics: namely: (i) the corporate governance code; (ii) the influence of the 
merchant families and other factors; and (iii) current companies‘ practices. The interview 
questions are provided in both English and Arabic versions and they address the research 
questions, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 The Link between the Research Questions and the Interview Questions 
 
Research Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
1. Why is there no corporate governance code in Kuwait?    
Part A: 1-5 
2. Which factors affect corporate governance practices in Kuwait? 
 
 
Part B: 1-9 
3. Is there a single community of practice? 
 
 
Part C: 1-11 
Note: This table links the research questions with the interview questions. 
 
The first part of question (A) explores whether the current Companies‘ Act 1960 (Article 15) 
is similar to corporate governance principles in other countries, which may explain why there 
is no corporate governance code in Kuwait. The second part of the questionnaire (B) considers 
external factors that may prevent the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code, 
developed from the literature in sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 that discuss how legal, political, and 
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cultural factors influence the development of corporate governance codes in different 
countries. For example, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) state that corporate governance 
codes are more likely to be issued and developed in countries with a common law legal 
tradition. Also Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) show that political factors influence corporate 
governance as the degree of local embeddedness in terms of organisational practices and 
politics appears to hinder corporate governance practices; Roe (2003) also states that the 
political system that determines the law also shapes the corporate governance system, and 
Licht (2001) and Licht et al. (2002, 2005) argue that the system of beliefs and values that 
determines the behaviour and actions of individuals within a society can explain the 
differences in the level of investor protection and corporate governance. These findings in the 
literature raise questions to be asked of the interviewees as set out in section B such as: (Q2) 
Are there any political, economic, cultural or social factors affecting why there is no corporate 
governance code?, (Q4), What is the influence of the merchant families in corporate 
governance in Kuwait?, and (Q7), Do you think that merchant families and their networks 
exert their influence in CMA, Government, or in the parliament? 
The last part (C) considers whether all listed companies have similar practices, and what 
isomorphic pressures have led to having a single community of practice. These questions are 
derived from section 3.3 that discusses the development of international corporate governance 
practices. For example, the OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) and the UK 
corporate governance code (2012), all require independent board members on companies‘ 
boards as a good governance practice. Q1 in part C is concerned about interviewees‘ 
perceptions of how board members should be elected, and why is it done that way and (Q3) 
ask whether companies have non-executive directors on the board, and if so, who appoints 
them, and why is it done that way?   
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Another recommended mechanism for improving corporate governance practice is the 
establishment of board committees, namely audit, remuneration, and nomination committees, 
whereby the boards can delegate specific tasks to these committees that include a sufficient 
number of independent members (Spira and Bender, 2004). In Q5 interviewees were asked 
whether companies should have a nomination; remuneration and audit committee; who the 
members of these committees are and why is that so. 
Another recommended practice in international corporate governance codes is the separation 
between the chair and CEO position, splitting the role of monitoring and accountability of 
board members from the role of running the company which is the main role of company‘s 
executives in order to avoid the influence of board members with close ties to the CEO (Huse, 
2005). Question 2 thus asked how the CEO should be appointed, and why boards chose to do it 
this way, and Q4 asked interviewees whether the chairman should be separated from the CEO, 
and if so why?  
Disclosure is an important practice that the UK Combined Code (2012) and the OECD 
principles of corporate governance (2004) insist on, and being transparent towards 
stakeholders. This recommended practice was asked of the interviewees in Q10, as to whether 
companies treat all shareholders and stakeholders equally, and why they thought that and, 
Q11asked if companies should be transparent and disclose information, and if so why?   
     
After piloting both the Arabic and English version of the interview questions with PhD 
students at Dundee University Business School including Kuwaiti nationals and those also 
researching corporate governance, Twenty-three individuals from different stakeholder 
groups were interviewed who have an in depth knowledge of listed companies‘ governance 
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practices representing board members, executive managers, investors, regulators and 
legislators. The interviewees from each group were selected because they had experience of 
listed companies, and of issuing and enforcing codes, and of current companies‘ practices. 
Access to each interviewee was obtained through personal contacts and networks. 
5.7.1.2 Interview Results and the Questionnaire Survey 
 
In interviews question 3 of section A asked what extent the companies‘ Act (Article 15) covers 
all aspects of corporate governance. This is linked to Q5 in section B of the questionnaire 
survey that asks: “To what extent do you agree with the following, where 1= strongly agree / 
5= strongly disagree that The Kuwait 1960 Companies‟ act (Article 15) is adequate‖. Another 
linkage between the interviews and questionnaire is in Q1 in interviews section C, “How are 
your board members elected, and why is it done this way?‖ and Q8 in questionnaire survey 
“To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence selecting chairmen, selecting 
board directors, and selecting the CEO‖. Q14 in the questionnaire survey asks: “To what 
extent do you agree that the merchant families influence the decision making processes of the: 
regulators, legislators, government, BM, EM, current practice, applying codes and 
regulations, and selecting BMs and Ems‖. This question is derived from different questions in 
the interviews such as: Q9 in section C that asks: “Do all companies comply with the 
Companies‟ Act (Article 15), and for those that don‟t why is that?‖, Q2 in section C: ―How is 
the CEO appointed, and why has your board chosen this way?‖, Q1 in section C: ―How are 
your board members elected, and why is it done this way?‖, Q9 section B: ―Do merchant 
families dominate companies‟ boards, and if so, how and why?‖, Q7 section B: ―Do you think 
that merchant families and their networks exert their influence in CMA, Government, or in the 
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parliament?‖. Finally, Q2 section B asks: ―Are there any political, economic, cultural or 
social factors affecting why there is no corporate governance code?‖. 
The findings from both the interviews and literature informed the second part of the empirical 
work on this thesis which aimed to explore the main factors preventing the issuance of a 
Kuwaiti corporate governance code. In particular, the interview findings raised three issues 
that needed to be addressed in the questionnaire survey. The first was the inadequacy of 
Article 15 and the need for it to be replaced by a new article that included corporate 
governance principles. This issue was highlighted because the interview findings indicated 
that the majority of interviewees stated that the company‘s article is very old and inadequate. 
Therefore, the second part of the empirical study included a wide range of respondents who 
are involved in the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) and practices to confirm the interview results 
regarding the inadequacy of this article. The second issue rasied was that most companies‘ 
practices contradict corporate governance principles, and hence it was important that the 
questionnaire was distributed across a wide sample of involved groups. The third issue 
highlighted that different types of external influence that have an impact on the issuance of 
corporate governance in Kuwait, and that most of these are enforced by the merchant families.  
 
Accordingly,  the  second  part  of  the empirical  work  was  designed  further to explore, 
confirm and  investigate the factors behind the absence of corporate governance in Kuwait 
and the influence of the merchant families in this regard. In particular, the questionnaire 
survey sought to investigate whether the merchant families have a direct and/or indirect 
influence on the decision making process in the country that prevents the issuance of a 
corporate governance code in particular. 
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5.7.2 Questionnaire Survey 
 
This study explores the reason for the absence of a corporate governance code in Kuwait 
through understanding different groups‘ perceptions: board members; executive managers; 
regulators; legislators; and investors. As previously outlined, interviews were used to 
investigate the perceptions of a variety of relevant groups regarding the factors that are 
preventing the issuance of a corporate governance code in Kuwait, and to explore the 
interviewees‘ views about the merchant families‘ influence in preventing the issuance of such 
a code. The questionnaire survey builds on the findings from the interview analysis, presented 
in Chapter 6 and seeks to explore the factors preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate 
governance code in further detail. In particular, the questionnaire survey investigates whether 
merchant families are exercising external pressure over the decision makers in Kuwait and 
the companies‘ management to prevent the issuance or voluntary adoption of the code. 
 
The questionnaire survey is one of the most appropriate data collection methods in social 
science research. It is a research technique for collecting data in which each participant is 
asked to respond to the same set of written questions in a predetermined order. A 
questionnaire survey can be employed wh en  using both the  positivistic (objectivism) and 
phenomenological (subjectivism) research approaches (Kumar, 2005; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Oppenheim, 1998). 
 
Questionnaire surveys a r e  classified into two different types: a self-completed 
questionnaire (which the respondents complete by themselves), and an interviewer-completed 
questionnaire (which the researcher completes for the participants). The former is 
administered in three ways: collective questionnaires (delivered and collected by hand), 
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postal or email questionnaires, and internet-mediated questionnaires, while an interviewer-
completed questionnaire enables the researcher to explain the questions (if necessary) and 
write down the respondents‘ answers (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
 
The questions on a questionnaire survey can also be classified into two different types: open-
ended (which enable the respondents to express their opinions in response to questions as 
precisely as possible in their own words, but the answers might be difficult to code and 
analyse) and close-ended (whereby the respondents are asked to choose from a set of 
predetermined alternative answers ranging from ―totally agree‖, ―agree‖, to ―totally disagree‖ 
the one that most closely resembles their opinion). The characteristic of close-ended questions 
is that the answers are easier to code and straightforward to analyse compared with the 
responses to open-ended questions. However, close-ended questions force the respondents to 
choose one answer from predetermined alternative answers that might not have otherwise 
have come to their mind (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
 
Also, the advantages of using questionnaires as a method for data collection can be 
summarized as being cheaper and less time-consuming compared with other methods, such 
as interviews. They also enable a large sample to be employed, thus providing a wider 
geographical coverage for the research. Moreover, the respondents may feel freer to express 
their opinions without being concerned about confidentiality because the questionnaire survey 
does not require the respondents to identify themselves. Distributing a questionnaire survey to 
many potential respondents and treating the responses confidentially will contribute to an 
increased response rate (Oppenheim, 1998; Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
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However, the disadvantages of using a questionnaire survey is that the respondents 
sometimes misinterpret or fail to understand some of the questions clearly because they are 
unfamiliar with or u n interested in the questionnaire subject. Besides, questionnaire 
surveys may have a ―self-selecting‖ bias towards those who respond to them. These ―self-
selecting‖ respondents may have different attributes or motivations in responding to a 
questionnaire compared to non-respondents. This will have an influential impact if the 
response rate is very low, because the questionnaire findings may not represent the total 
population of the study; also, a low response rate and unanswered questions are common 
problems in a questionnaire survey (Kumar 2005). Another disadvantage of this method is 
that it does not allow the respondents to freely express their views due to the limited 
number of questions and, in the case of close-ended questionnaires, pre-determined answers. 
Also, the issue of the independency of the questions and answers is another disadvantage of 
questionnaire surveys, as prior research shows that respondents usually read all o f  the 
questions before they start answering them, which might, to some extent, affect the 
independence of the questions and answers (Bryman, 2004; May, 2005). 
5.7.2.1 Questionnaire Design and Piloting 
 
It is important that the questionnaire is designed to make it easy for the participants to 
understand the questions and to maintain the logic and sequence of the questions in order to 
make it easier for the participants to read and follow them. Thus, it should be delivered in an 
attractive way to motivate the participants to complete and return it, thus enhancing the 
response rate. All of these factors are very important in maximising the validity and 
reliability of the questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009; Collis and Hussey, 2009; Kumar, 
2005). 
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The self-administered questionnaire that is delivered and collected personally by the 
researcher was applied for this data collection, both to increase the response rate and also in 
light of the fact that, in the Kuwaiti environment, prospective participants often ignore this 
kind of email. Also, all of the questions were close-ended, except the last one, which was 
open-ended, to offer the respondents the opportunity to give their opinions or add any 
further information related to the subject of corporate governance in Kuwait. Almost all of 
the questions utilised a five point Likert scale except for those requiring personal 
information.   
 
Most of the questions in the questionnaire were about the actual governance practices in 
the Kuwaiti listed companies, and were designed to be appropriate for the four groups 
identified earlier. They were prepared in the  light of the research objectives, the 
corporate governance literature review, the factors preventing the effectiveness of corporate 
governance principles, and the results of the interview findings. The questionnaire survey 
addresses the research questions, as shown in Table 5.2.  
The questionnaire survey was prepared in two parts, sections A and B, and questions were set 
in accordance with the three main research questions. In section A questions 1 to 5 covered 
general questions about the respondent groups, ages and their knowledge of the Companies‘ 
Act 1960 and OECD corporate governance principles. In section B questions 10 and 14 were 
set to answer the first research question as is why there is no corporate governance code in 
Kuwait. The second research question of the factors that affect corporate governance practices 
in Kuwait were covered in the questionnaire survey in part B questions 6, 7, and 13. The last 
research question of whether there is a single community of practice was covered in 
questionnaire survey part B questions 8, 9, 11, and 12 (see appendix 3). 
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Table 5.2 The Linkage between the Research Questions and the Questionnaire Survey 
 
Research 
Questions 
Questionnaire 
Survey Questions 1. Why there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance? 
 
  Part B: questions 10, 14 
2. Which factors affect corporate governance practices in Kuwait? 
 
 Part B: questions 6, 7, 13  
 
3. Is there a single community of practice? 
 
 Part B:questions 
8, 9, 11, 12 
Note: This table links the research questions and questionnaire survey questions. 
 
In order to overcome misinterpretating or misunderstanding questions in the questionnaire 
survey, and to improve the response rate, both the English and Arabic versions of the 
questionnaire were piloted and pre-tested among the academic staff and PhD students at 
Dundee University Business School in April 2012 to obtain comments on the wording, 
sequence and structure of the questionnaire. Some of the PhD students said that the content 
and translation of the questionnaire was good. 
In order to improve the response rate and motivate respondents to participate, personal 
contacts and networks were used to facilitate the distribution of the questionnaire before 
travelling to Kuwait. Personal contacts facilitated the process of distribution, and they were 
happy to collaborate and participate. For instance, one of the MPs was a classmate from high 
school and I asked him to facilitate the process of distributing the questionnaires to the 
members of the financial and economic, legislation, and protection of public fund committees. 
He granted me access and introduced me to the MPs to explain the aim behind the study. I 
explained briefly about the concept of corporate governance and the research area. The 
questionnaire was handed to other MPs and collected from their offices, and some of them 
handed them to my old school friend MP. 
Also, the assistant minister for public companies facilitated the process of handing out the 
questionnaire survey by giving orders to the general manager and her assistant to help the 
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researcher and recommended that the most experienced staff should participate in this study. 
The questionnaire consisted of a letter introducing the researcher, the supervisors and the 
university that explained the objective of the research, assured the participants that all of 
their responses would be treated in the strictest confidence, explained how to answer the 
questions, provided the contact details of the researcher, and finally expressed the 
researcher‘s appreciation for the respondents‘ participation in and contribution to the 
questionnaire. 
   
5.7.2.2 Statistical Testing of the Questionnaire  
 
This  section  outlines  and  justifies  the  types  of  statistical  test  used  to  analyse  the 
questionnaire responses. After coding the responses to the questionnaire data according to the 
respondent type (group), the data were then transferred to the SPSS statistical package for 
analysis. As the questionnaire survey focuses on the respondents‘ perceptions of the factors 
that are preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, it is appropriate to 
analyse the respondents‘  responses in terms of their behaviour within different descriptive 
statistical parameters. For this purpose, two types of statistical tool can be used: 
parametric and non-parametric tests. According to Field (2009), the selection of statistical 
tests depends on fundamental assumptions about the collected data.  Field (2009) identified 
four assumptions relating to the use of parametric tests: (i) the data should be normally 
distributed; (ii) the variance should be the same throughout the data; (iii) the data collected 
should be measured at least at the interval level; and (iv) the data from different participants 
should be independent. He explains that if, any of these assumptions are not valid for the  
research data, a non-parametric test is more appropriate. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to evaluate  whether  there  were  significant  differences  
in  the  median  across  the different groups for each question, while the Mann-Whitney test 
was used to identify which pairs of stakeholder group median were significantly different 
from each other. These two tests provide a popular, nonparametric alternative to the one-
way analysis of variance. They are appropriate when the test variable is ordinal or its 
distribution does not meet the assumptions of normal distribution. The only assumptions 
made by these tests are that the test variable is at least ordinal and that its distribution is 
similar across all groups. The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests ranks of the original 
values rather than the values themselves. This is appropriate for the questionnaire used in 
this thesis, because it uses an ordinal scale. In these tests, each case (respondent) is ranked 
without regard to group membership. Then, cases that tie on a particular value receive the 
average rank for that value. After ranking the cases, the ranks are summed within the groups. 
The Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney statistics measure how much the group ranks 
differ from the average rank of all groups (Field, 2009). All tests were conducted 
throughout using a conventional 95% confidence level. 
 
However, the median is likely to be 3 for questions that used a 5-point Likert scale and would 
not provide any useful information for comparing the perceptions of respondents regarding 
the factors preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. Therefore, as 
noted above, non-parametric tests were carried out to examine the differences between the 
four groups, while the  mean was used to measure and compare the perceptions of the 
respondents regarding the factors preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate 
governance to convey more information about the variation in the data. The mean and 
standard deviations are considered to be powerful sociological tools, mainly used judiciously 
for social science research (Oppenheim, 1998). 
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5.8 Summary  
 
This chapter outlines Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) different philosophical standpoints in 
relation to the assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. It also 
outlines the research paradigms and identifies and explains the interpretive paradigm that is 
adopted in the current study. Moreover, it outlines and discusses the two research methods 
used to conduct the empirical research for this thesis. The following two chapters will 
present the analysis of the results derived from the interviews and the questionnaire survey. 
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Chapter 6 Interviews 
6.1 Introduction 
The first research method adopted in this thesis was the collection of data in Kuwait via semi-
structured interviews, conducted face to face, from May to July, 2011. The 23 interviews (see 
Table 6.1), with an average duration of an hour each, captured the views of board directors, 
executive management, legislators, regulators and investors who represent the actors in the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. First, the interviewees were asked about their 
understanding of corporate governance in order to identify how knowledgeable they were 
about corporate governance, as background information to the study. Views were then sought 
about the factors affecting the current governance practices in Kuwaiti companies and 
whether, based on these factors, the actors in the organisational field can introduce a corporate 
governance code in Kuwait. The interviews were recorded with the permission of the 
interviewees and these recordings were later transcribed into Arabic, with relevant parts also 
being translated into English. This chapter presents the results of these interviews and 
highlights the main issues raised, interviewees are coded as shown in Table 6.1. The first point 
to note about the interviews is that the representatives of some companies refused to 
participate in them. These included: the National Investment company; Wataniya 
Telecommunication; the National Bank of Kuwait; Security House; Global House Investment; 
and the Security Group. These companies represented some of the merchant families in 
Kuwait, and one aim of the interviews was to obtain their views on the absence of a corporate 
governance code of practice in Kuwait. However, interviewees I4 and BM5 were from 
merchant families, so at least two responses from these families were obtained. Further, two 
individual major shareholders and the Public Companies Department of the Ministry of 
Commerce also refused to be interviewed, without providing any reason for this. 
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Table 6.1: Interviewee Coding    
Note: Table 6.1 clarifies the types and codes of the interviewees 
 
The first part (A) explores whether the current Companies‘ Act 1960 (Article 15) is similar to 
corporate governance principles, which may explain why there is no corporate governance 
code in Kuwait. The second part (B) considers whether external factors are preventing the 
issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code, specifically, the legal, political and cultural 
factors in Kuwait, both sections are derivate from literature chapter in sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 
Code Role Type of organisation  
L1 Member of Finance Committee Parliament  
    
R1 General Secretary of Development Plan Ministry of Planning  
R2 Deputy Director Kuwait Stock Exchange  
R3 Senior Planner Central Bank  
R4 Commissioner Member Capital Market Authority  
    
E1 Vice CEO for Legal Affairs Investment company  
E2 Vice General Manager Investment company  
E3 Vice CEO Real estate company  
E4 General Manager Real estate company  
E5 CEO Telecommunication company Merchant family 
E6 General Manager Real estate company  
E7 General Manager Food company  
    
BM1 Board Member Real estate company  
BM2 Chairman Real estate company  
BM3 Vice Chairman Telecommunications company  
BM4 Chairman Real estate company  
BM5 Board Member Investment company Merchant family  
    
I1 Investor Minor investor  
I2 Investor Minor investor  
I3 Investor Minor investor  
I4 Investor Major investor Merchant family  
I5 Investor Minor investor  
I6 Investor Minor investor  
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that discuss how legal, political, and culture factor may influence the development and 
effectiveness of corporate governance code in different countries. The last part (C) considers 
whether all listed companies have similar practices and, if so, how far these practices are 
similar to corporate governance international practices, and what isomorphism pressure has led 
to having a single practice, and this part is derivate from the literature chapter section 3.3 that 
discuss the development of international corporate governance practices. 
 
The interviewees were asked if the interview could be recorded. 19 out of the 23 agreed and 4 
refused (E6, BM5, E5, and R2). A full transcription of each recorded interview was undertaken 
by the researcher into Arabic. After transcribing the interviews, the interviewees‘ answers that 
mentioned ‗personal relationships‘ and ‗merchant families‘ were gathered in an excel spread 
sheet to compare each interviewees‘ answer in order to find out how many interviewees agreed 
on these factors as the main theme that linked with the literature review chapter.  
6.2 Merchant families  
 
Clarification is provided about the meaning of the term ‗merchant families‘, as used in this 
thesis. Their views of how the corporate governance code should be applied are also reported, 
as well as accusations made by the interviewees regarding their resistance and suggestions for 
such resistance. Firstly, it was necessary to clarify how the merchant families were represented 
in the analysis. There was a general consensus about their role and the impact on corporate 
governance in Kuwait: 19 (83%) interviewees asserted that some, though not all, families 
would oppose the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance:  
 
R2: “There is opposition to corporate governance in the country 
from some merchant families.” 
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This assertion was also made by the representatives of the merchant families, BM5 and I4, 
who explained that such opposition came from the beneficiaries, a minority who has built a 
fortune through manipulative practice but who were not representative of all merchant families 
: 
 
I4: “The merchant families cannot all be blamed...some who 
oppose it would benefit from the absence of corporate 
governance.” 
 
It was clear that all of the interviewees recognised the existence of two types of merchant 
family.    The first were those who acted in the public interest and called for radical economic 
reform in the country - for instance, by anticipating the Al-Manakh crisis
4 
 in 1977 and 
predicting a similar crisis in 2007:  
 
I1: ―Not all merchant families are the same; there are some who 
fought against Al-Manakh market crises, and in 2007 warned 
investors of another crisis...to differentiate between them you 
can see the companies‟ performance through the crises and 
afterwards...companies headed by the first type of merchant 
family are doing well after the crisis and aren‟t affected.‖ 
  
The second group
5
 represented those merchant families who pursued their self-interest rather 
than those of their investors and other stakeholders, and who had made their fortunes through 
the country‘s financial crises. According to the interviewees, it was possible to differentiate 
between the two types of merchant family by investigating companies registered with the 
Stock Exchange and observing their performance both before and after the crises: the first 
group were those companies that were characterised by stable returns and share prices, 
                                                          
4
 Al-Manakh was an unofficial market for trading shares. 
5
 The organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies controlled by the second group, the first group of 
merchant families have their own private family companies  
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whereas those that collapsed during these crises were led by the merchant families who were 
pursuing their own interests and who control most of the Kuwaiti listed companies: 
 
I1: “An example of those manipulative merchant families is AL-
Daar investment company. Their major shareholders bought 
land and resold it to the company to build a fortune...also 
Global Investment House - their major shareholders invested in 
companies that they already own just to raise their share 
prices... and Al-Duwalyia investment company, that duped 
investors about an elusive investment project which they didn‟t 
own ... these merchant families control most of the listed 
companies.”   
 
After clarifying what is meant by the term ‗merchant families‘, the next section illustrates the 
current practices of listed companies within the organisational field, the role of the merchant 
families in establishing and imposing their practices, and the dominant logics that impose a 
community of practice inside the organisational field. 
6.3 Current listed companies’ practices 
 
This section outlines the community of practice within the organisational field of Kuwaiti 
listed companies, which reflects the material and symbolic carriers of the organisational logics 
(Lepoutre and Valente, 2012). The interviewees were asked about the dominant logics whether 
there is a single community of practice. The following discussion illustrates the current 
practices of corporate governance related to board members‘ selection, board committees, 
CEO‘s selection processes, the level of disclosure and transparency, and ownership structure 
that was early discussed in chapter 3 under the recommended governance practices.  
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6.3.1 Board members’ selection 
 
When questioned about the board members‘ selection process, all of the interviewees stated 
that this was decided by a vote at the AGM; those gaining the highest number of votes 
achieved board membership. However, respondent I6 criticised the voting system as set out in 
the Kuwait Act (Article 15), arguing that there was no justice or equality between shareholders 
- for instance, in some companies, shareholders holding 10% of the total shares often failed to 
win a seat on the board, since the election depended on the numbers voting rather than on the 
percentage of shares; he believed that it would be fairer to recognise that those with a 10% 
ownership should constitute 10% of the total number of board members required -  for 
example, if A‘s board requires ten members, the owner of 10% of the total shares should have 
one seat on the board: 
 
 
I6: “The procedure for selecting board members according to 
the Kuwaiti Act is based on the highest numbers of votes 
gained...however, equality is missing...the best way should be by 
percentages rather than numbers.”  
 
Referring to the existing practices for selecting board members, Solomon (2007) identifies that 
the most important way to promote efficiency would be to create a balance of independent 
members.  
 
In response to the question about the dominant parties on the company boards, 20 of the 23 
interviewees (except the representative of the merchant families BM5, I4, and E5) confirmed 
that the merchant families were the principal members of the boards, and that there were no 
independent board members:  
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I2: “The dominant board members in Kuwaiti listed companies 
are the merchant families...this dominance is achieved by 
government support through their ownership or by alliances 
between the merchant families.”  
 
Ten of the 20 respondents confirming added that dominance of the board membership refers to 
the government ownership besides the merchant families‘ ownership, and they further 
attributed the absence of independent board members to the follow: 
 
R2: “Boards are controlled by the major shareholders ... the 
merchant families and government ... independent board 
members do not exist since there is self and mutual interest 
between those major shareholders.”  
 
Eight of the 20 interviewees (majority investors and regulators) illustrated that the dominance 
of the merchant families and the government was related to personal relationships: 
I2: “The board membership consists exclusively of merchant 
families ... as a result of the government and merchant families‟ 
courtesy and favouritism between them ... the government by 
their ownership will not vote for minority investors.” 
 
They added: 
L1: “The chairman position is used to be in the hand of 
merchant families ... for two reasons ... as a part of social 
position and prestige ... and for protecting their interests ... 
although the government have a higher percentage of ownership 
in listed companies ... they used to delegate the position for 
merchant families for mutual interests between them and 
personal relationship.” 
 
Therefore, the dominant practices within the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies 
is to exclude independent board members and for the board membership to be dominated by 
the merchant families. 
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6.3.2 Board committee   
 
In addition, eighteen respondents stated that board committees, under the current listed 
companies‘ practices, are not required, except for audit committees in listed banks and 
investment companies as a result of the Central Bank forcing banks and investment companies 
to establish audit committees: 
  
L1: “None of the listed companies have board‟s committees ... 
except for the banks and investment companies, which the 
Central Bank forced to have audit committees”. 
 
Although the banks and investment companies have audit committees, however, the 
requirements and recommendations of the board committees‘ membership are not considered 
when selecting the board committee members:  
 
R1: “The audit committees of the banks and investment 
companies have no independent members...and the members of 
these committees are usually selected from the company‟s board 
and management”. 
 
The OECD report of 2009 noticed that the nomination, remuneration and audit committees of 
boards are the key committees for corporate governance. It recommends that they should be 
chaired by independent directors and that the membership of each should reflect a majority of 
these directors (OECD, 2009). 
During the interviews, all of the legislators and regulators stated that the banks and investment 
companies had established audit committees following a ruling by the Central Bank. However, 
the majority of investors (four out of the six) reported that most companies did not have those 
committees, while three of the seven executives stated that their company currently had an 
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audit committee only. Of the five board members, only one stated that his company had set up 
an audit committee, while the others reported the absence of such a committee. From these 
current practices, it is clear that the companies lack nomination and remuneration committees 
as well as the practice of establishing other committees. Respondent L1 further stated that, 
even within the existing audit committees, that are implemented by law in the banks and 
investment companies, the recommendations of international practices in establishing these 
committees are ignored. He attributed the broad problem of the deficient corporate governance 
procedure to the government‘s own practices:  
 
L1: ―During the Central Bank‟s discussion of Kuwait‟s budget, 
the vice chairman stated that the boards constitute committees 
that can help them to evaluate performance and operation...I 
discovered that the audit committee of the Central Bank is 
headed by the general manager of internal auditing...this 
provides a justification for the commercial banks‟ failure to 
adopt either international practices or the concept of 
independent board members.”   
 
Thus the private sector mimics incorrect practices within the government sector, and adopts 
the same procedures and if the governance practices of government were to be amended, then 
others would be forced to adopt this practice. 
 
R1 observed that the absence of board committees refers to the weakness of the current Act 
(Article 15) (the level of enforcement will be further discussed in section 6.4) thus: 
R1: “The current Companies‟ Act does not insist on establishing 
committees nor include any requirements regarding committees‟ 
membership...the act merely mentions that it is the board‟s 
responsibility to select an external auditor.” 
 
Four respondents referred the reason for the absence of those committees to the self interests 
of those merchant families and mutual interests shared with the government; if those 
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committees existed, the merchant families‘ power and control would diminish over the 
companies‘ management as I2 noted: 
 
I2: “The resistance of the merchant families to the establishment 
of those committees ... is a result of protecting their interests ... 
by giving their power and control to those committees to manage 
and control companies ... they prefer to control them directly 
through board membership.”    
 
6.3.3 Duality of chair and CEO 
 
Another current practice is duality in the appointment of the CEO and chair. However, the 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman can help to reduce the domination of 
management over the board (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004) recognise this, stating that:  
 
“The separation of the two posts may be regarded as good 
practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of 
power, increase accountability and improve the board‟s 
capacity for decision- making, independent of the management.”              
(p. 63)  
 
In response to the question concerning the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO, five 
of the six investors stated that these roles should be separated, regulators and legislators agreed 
with the investors‘ statement, whereas four of the seven executives and three of the five board 
members stated that these positions should not separated. So the majority of interviewees are 
happy with the practice of separation.   
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When asked for the current practices in the listed companies, fourteen (four board members, 
three executives, three regulators and four investors) of the respondents (61%) stated that CEO 
duality existed in their companies:  
R2: “In the absence of an act preventing the chairman from 
being the CEO at the same time...the majority of companies are 
characterised by CEO duality, with the aim of imposing control 
over the company‟s management and the board.” 
 
Eight of the interviewees (35%) the majority of whom were executives, stated that, in listed 
companies, the CEO was selected by the board; four other respondents (17%), representing the 
majority of the investors, reported that the selection depended merely on the chairman‘s 
preference; I3 stated further that the chairman relied on his connections when selecting CEOs 
rather than on their track record, in order to maintain control over the company:  
 
BM5: “The CEO is selected by the board members...they 
discuss some recommended names and then vote for the best 
candidate.” 
 
I3: “In Kuwait the CEO is appointed by the chairman...and 
usually the process of selecting the CEO depends on the extent 
to which each candidate matches the chairman‟s interests...it 
doesn‟t depend on the candidate‟s track record.” 
 
It was thus revealed that CEO duality was a dominant practice, a finding that was supported by 
the regulators‘ opinions about current practice. Respondent I6 added that, in some companies, 
the positions appeared to be separate, but in reality the CEO had no authority to take decisions 
without the chairman‘s approval: 
I6: “... even when companies have separated the position of 
CEO and chairman...in practice, the CEO can‟t take any 
decisions without referring to the chairman and accepting his 
recommendation.” 
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The absence of nomination committees and independent members has impacted negatively on 
the selection and separation processes between the chairman and CEO:  
 
R4: “Nomination committees and the concept of independent 
members do not exist...therefore, the selection process is related 
to the chairman‟s preferences and sometimes he prefers to hold 
both positions”. 
 
BM5, who represents the merchant families, stated that the existence of CEO duality is 
legitimate, and highly recommended in order to keep up-to-date about the company‘s 
operation and protect their investment: 
 
BM5: “CEO duality exists in the majority of the listed 
companies as the major investors want to keep an eye on the 
companies‟ transactions ... in my experience, there are no 
regulations preventing this”.    
 
I3 stated that CEO duality exists in some companies just for prestige and courtesy between the 
major shareholders: 
I3: “I know that in some listed companies CEO duality occurs 
just for prestige to introduce himself as the chairman and CEO 
of the company ... the chairman asks all the major shareholders 
to be CEO at the same time ... and those major shareholders 
agree just out of courtesy and favouritism not because he will 
effectively manage the company.” 
 
The current practice of CEO duality within organisational field of this study shows that there is 
one community of practice that contradicts with the OECD principles of corporate governance. 
6.3.4 Disclosure and transparency  
 
The issue of transparency and disclosure and the extent to which this is addressed by the 
company management also drew comment from the interviewees. They were asked if the 
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current companies‘ Act (Article 15) 1960 forced companies to be transparent and disclose all 
information to their stakeholders. The regulators and legislators stated that, while this should 
be the case, in practice, they disclosed only what was required by the Act (Article 15) and no 
more. For instance, R2 claimed that the merchant families were reluctant to disclose 
information: 
 
R2: “Merchant families don‟t like to disclose any 
information...if companies disclose information, such as their 
suppliers and sub-contractors, it will expose their manipulation 
to maximise their self-interest.” 
 
R1 further stated that the weak level of disclosure refers to the weaknesses of the current Act 
(Article 15): 
 
R1: “The act is subjective in specifying the level of transparency 
and disclosure...the merchant families would use this subjective 
level to adapt what they want to disclose...hence the level would 
be too weak.” 
  
However, the executives asserted that there was an attempt to disclose beyond what is required 
by the Act (Article 15); E4 stated:  
 
E4: “If companies are not forced to disclose...the board 
members and executives will disclose what is required by law 
but nothing more.”   
 
This indicates that the majority of interviewees are dissatisfied with the current companies‘ 
practices. The majority refer those practices to the current Act (Article 15), that fails to 
mandate some practices or to specify and clarify other practices, as will discussed further in 
section 6.4.       
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 The board members concurred with the executives about the attempts in their invested 
companies to disclose further. All the investors, except I4, agreed that, while companies 
should be transparent in their transactions and should disclose further, this will not be achieved 
since it was an optional rather than a mandatory requirement and the board members would 
not wish to disclose their manipulative transactions: 
 
I2: “Merchant families control the companies‟ 
management...that management will not disclose any forbidden 
transactions that would lead to the conviction of the merchant 
families ... so enforcement by law is required.”     
 
According to the above respondents‘ statement, they (the I and R groups) show agreement in 
their views, whereas the BM and E groups disagree with them about the level of disclosure and 
transparency that listed companies apply. This explains that there are two competing logics 
within the organisational field, I, except I4, and R groups call for changing the prevailing 
logics whereas BM and E groups (merchant families) resist any changes for the prevailing 
logics.   
 
One aspect of the board‘s structure refers to the representation of independent directors in 
relation to the main role of the board. The OECD principles and Combined Code in the UK 
note that, the more independent directors present on the board, the greater its reliability and 
transparency. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) also find that, the more independent directors 
present on the board, the greater the voluntary disclosure of the company. 
 
R2 stated that the level of disclosure and transparency were missing in the majority of listed 
companies, as companies are buying and selling assets without illustrating why these 
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operations are undertaken, and other companies are appointing and dismissing the executive 
management without explaining why: 
 
R2: “Zain listed company dismissed and replaced the previous 
company management, without explaining why...the Commercial 
Real-estate listed company was selling and buying assets from 
its partner companies without explaining if there was any 
conflict of interest ... all decisions have been taken according to 
the board members‟ preferences and interests ... that will not be 
disclosed to the public” 
 
I3 stated that the regulators failed to disclose the buyers and sellers who trade in the KSE, and 
that most transactions are made between two portfolios that own by the same company in an 
attempt to raise the company‘s shares; hence, this failure by the regulators to disclose 
information reflects on the listed companies‘ disclosure as well, so another mimetic 
isomorphism of government bad practices: 
 
I3: “the same company placed buy and sell order for a specific 
share for speculation to raise share prices ... and the current Act 
and regulations does not enforce the KSE management to 
include the name of the buyer or seller for each transaction 
...this gives chances to manipulated merchant families to build 
fortune and rise their assets.” 
 
Twelve interviewees (four regulators, one legislator, five investors, one executive, and one 
board member) stated that the level of disclosure of transparency within listed companies is 
weak due to the weakness of the regulations and Act (Article 15), as will be discussed later in 
section 6.4. Therefore, the lack of disclosure and transparency is also one of the current 
practices in the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. The interviewees stated that 
this is due to the type of ownership structure within listed companies, specifically the existence 
of family ownership. 
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Therefore, the lack of disclosure and transparency is also one of the current practices in the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. The interviewees stated that this is due to the 
type of ownership structure within listed companies, specifically, the existence of family 
ownership. 
 
6.3.5 Owership structure  
 
The current practices of listed companies, in the interviewees‘ view, appear to contradict the 
principles of corporate governance. Also, the interviewees describe a single community of 
practice within the organisational field, involving CEO duality, a lack of independent board 
members, a lack of disclosure and transparency, and an absence of board committees.  
 
Fiveteen of the interviewees, the majority of whom were investors and regulators (four 
regulators, legislator, 5 investors, two board members, and three executive), stated that, as 
demonstrated by I1: 
 
I1: ―The new listed companies, in order to maintain their control 
over the board and management ... applied the same 
practices...which have become the norm for shareholders who 
are looking to control and protect their self-interest.‖ 
      
The dominant community of practice within the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed 
companies is related to the type of ownership structure in those listed companies as noted 
below.  
 
The interviewees suggested that the merchant families are behind all of these current practices 
in order to maintain their control over the listed companies and so protect their self-interest. 
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The following illustrates the interviewees‘ views about the ownership structure in Kuwaiti‘s 
listed companies and how these affect the protection of the minority shareholders‘ interests.    
 
Such dominance was reported by the interviewees when questioned about the ownership 
structure of listed companies, as all of the interviewees stated that the major shareholders 
dominated the board, and I1 commented that: 
 
I1: “All listed companies are characterised by major 
shareholders...these major shareholders are the merchant 
families and government ownership.”      
 
This observation supports the finding of the OECD (2002) that, in Kuwait, large shareholders - 
institutional investors such as Pension Funds, the Kuwait Investment Authority and the 
merchant families - owned 56% of the shares of Kuwaiti companies, thus representing highly 
concentrated ownership.  
This powerful group of owners would be threatened if a corporate governance code were to be 
introduced, as their control over the management of listed companies might be reduced and the 
self- and mutual interests of the major shareholders would be threatened as well, as I2 stated: 
I2: “It is impossible to issue a code of corporate governance 
since the merchant families exist and control the listed 
companies ... they will fight against issuing the code to maintain 
their interests and keep making a fortune through their illegal 
transactions.” 
 
Singam (2003) claims that the problem with concentrated ownership is the potential for the 
expropriation of the rights of the minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. They 
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may act in their own best interests at the expense of the minority shareholders and other 
investors. La Porta et al. (1999b) similarly explain how the shareholders who control the 
management may only be concerned with a firm in relation to how it affects their personal 
interests, at the expense of the other shareholders.  
 
I6 gives an example to illustrate how the merchant family control and run listed companies to 
maximise their self-interest at the expense of others, showing that the protection of the 
minority interests are weak due to current Act (Article 15) and regulations: 
I6: “Al-Kurafi family since they sold their investment in Zain in 
Africa to get cash...the company and minority shareholders lost 
a lot, whereas that family generated over a billion dollars from 
both dividends, as the family are both the major shareholder and 
the broker of the deal”.        
 
Pyramid ownership was mentioned by the interviewees (15 interviewees, the majority being 
investors, regulators and executives) as negatively impacting on enforcement and activating 
the codes and regulations, as this type of ownership gives the merchant families political 
power. This will be discussed further in section 6.5, to press on the government and regulators 
to disable the codes and acts. I3 stated that: 
I3: “Since Al-Khurafi family group control most of the listed 
companies...this control gives them political power that enables 
them to bargain with the government...when they were accused 
by the Court of Illegal Trading, they instructed all of the 
companies that own an influential portfolio to stop trading on 
the Stock Exchange...which led all traders to press the 
government to interfere.”         
This is consistent with a statement by Morck et al. (2005), that controlling shareholders can 
divert and direct corporate resources for private interests as a pyramidal group and, at the 
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economic level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts the capital 
allocation. Morck et al. (2005) suggest that political influence is further related to what one 
controls rather than what one owns, and they further state that the controlling owners of 
pyramids thus have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. 
 
In general, it is clear from both the respondents‘ views and the current practices reported by 
them regarding the lack of board committees, CEO selection based on the chairman‘s 
preferences, and CEO duality, that Kuwaiti companies are far from voluntarily adopting 
corporate governance, and that those procedures that have been applied have been 
implemented as a result of external pressure by the major shareholders, as many listed 
companies have a family ownership structure and keep control of their companies. Merchant 
families benefit from maintaining the current situation. If a corporate governance code was 
issued, their power over listed companies would diminish and the independent board members 
would become more dominant. CEO duality would be reduced and board committees would 
have authority to monitor, select and manage the company effectively. The degree of 
disclosure and equal treatment for all shareholders would be improved. Such measures would 
deter the manipulative transactions of the merchant families and prevent them from 
maximising their self-interest. R2 was one of five interviewees to indicate that the major 
shareholders‘ self-interest prevented voluntary adoption: 
R2: “The self-interest associated with family owners ... prevents 
companies from voluntarily adopting the corporate governance 
code.” 
 
R3 explained that the opposition from the merchant families was due to their pursuit of self-
interest; in particular, the control of merchant families over the board and management of 
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listed companies led to prioritising their own self interests even if it is against laws and 
regulations:  
 
R3: “Board members violate the company‟s statute by shifting 
60% of the company‟s main real estate operation to speculate on 
the stock exchange...not because they want to raise the 
company‟s profit... they just want to raise other companies‟ 
shares which they invest in to pursue their self-interest.”  
 
It is clear that all of the above examples result from the major shareholders‘ control over listed 
companies in order to maintain their self-interest, showing that the current practices contradict 
corporate governance principles. Such practices might disappear, thus affecting the interests of 
the merchant families, if a corporate governance code was introduced, so they exert pressure 
on the decision-makers to prevent the issuance of the act: 
 
I2: “Merchant families know very well that, if corporate 
governance were to be issued...their illegal practices would not 
be permitted ... since they build their fortunes on illegal 
transactions ... they will keep putting pressure on the decision-
makers not to issue the code.”   
 
Also, 16 interviewees (legislator, all regulators, four executives, two board members, and 5 
investors) considered that the merchant families would oppose the issuance of a corporate 
governance code. For example, BM2 suggested that: 
 
BM2: “All of the merchant families would oppose the issuance 
of corporate governance as they would lose their control and 
power over the companies‟ management; even if they are not 
corrupt, they want to keep their power.”     
 
BM5, E5, and I4, who represent the merchant families‘ view, disagreed with the above 
majority‘s criticism of these families: 
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BM5: “The beneficiaries oppose corporate governance 
issuance, not the merchant families, as the beneficiaries do not 
represent the merchant families.”       
BM5 and I4 who represent merchant families and E5 who was appointed by a merchant family 
as CEO, tried to defend themselves against the accusation over them that the other groups refer 
to the merchant families by opposing the issuance of Kuwaiti corporate governance code.    
 
Respondents who were in favour of issuing a corporate governance code concluded that it 
would discourage the abuse of power and manipulative transactions by the merchant families, 
and also reduce their control over the companies; as a result, its introduction would face strong 
resistance; as L1 noted: 
  
L1: “Changing from the current murky culture to a new 
environment governed by the corporate governance code is 
expected to face strong resistance...from a group of merchant 
families...who usually make their fortune in the existing corrupt 
environment by spreading rumours and using inside information 
on daily trading.”      
6.3.6 Voluntary adoption of corporate governance  
 
Thus, the majority of interviewees (14) identified the merchant families oppose the voluntary 
adoption of corporate governance in listed companies by applying coercive pressure on 
company management to reject the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices:  
 
BM5: “In my view, the current act is fair enough and covers the 
companies‟ and market needs...no serious modification is 
needed.”  
 
L1 noted that voluntary adoption was meaningless since power lay in the hands of the board 
members: 
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L1: “Voluntary adoption would not suit board members who are 
looking to maximise their self-interest.” 
 
I1 agreed with the statement of L1, that the power of those merchant families over the listed 
companies hinders the application of a code that would contradict their interests: 
 
I1: “Since the merchant families are against corporate 
governance...the companies will not adopt it voluntarily.” 
 
The majority of the interviewees (16 of the 23) asserted that coercive pressure was therefore 
needed in order to force companies to apply corporate governance principles, because of the 
resistance of the merchant families to any modification of current practices, which served their 
interests. Voluntary adoption (normative pressure) would prove ineffective since the 
management of the companies was dominated by the merchant families, who placed their own 
interests above those of the other stakeholders.   
The responses confirmed that corporate governance should be mandatory rather than voluntary 
as merchant families prevented voluntary adoption: 
 
I3: “Merchant families exercise an external pressure on the 
companies‟ management not to adopt corporate governance 
voluntarily...this pressure is exercised by direct intervention 
through their presence on the executive management or through 
indirect intervention through their representative.”       
 
I1 stated that the current practices were a result of the merchant families‘ power and control 
that enabled them to influence the regulative and monitoring role of the government to 
prioritise the merchant families‘ interests over those of the minority shareholders due to the 
mutual interests between the government and the merchant families: 
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I1: “The current practices of the listed companies is due to the 
merchant families‟ power and control...the role of government in 
protecting the minority shareholders is missing due to the 
mutual interest of the two groups”.      
 
Therefore, the dominant logics within the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies 
represent the logics of the actors inside the field, who are the merchant families. Lepoutre and 
Valente (2012) state that organisational logics consist of symbolic and material carriers and the 
material carriers in this study, represented by current practices, appear to contradict the 
principles of corporate governance, as a result of the symbolic carriers (beliefs) within the 
merchant families that any change will threaten their self-interest and control. Hence, the 
actors inside the organisational field will resist change, thus the material caariers (current 
practices and network of actors) are set to maintain the merchant families‘ beliefs of 
controlling listed companies and protect their interests (symbolic carriers): 
 
I1: “The merchant families‟ logic is to keep the current 
practices without change…the aim is to maintain their control 
and protect their self-interest.” 
 
According to the above practices, it is clear that the community of practices inside the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies contradicts the international practices 
recommended by the OECD principles of corporate governance and the UK combined code. 
Sixteen interviewees accused the merchant families that that would oppose the issuance of a 
new Kuwaiti code of corporate governance as they regarded this as contradicting their self-
interests. Table 6.2 shows all of the interviewees‘ views about the current practices. Investors 
accuse the merchant families of being behind the current community of practices whereby the 
merchant families refer to current practices as a result of the regulations that exist and they just 
follow them. 
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Table 6.2 Interviewees’ view of the current practices 
Question Regulators Legislators Investors Board members Executive 
management 
Total 
Independent board 
members do not exist  
Agree 
4/4 
Agree 
1/1 
Agree (except 
I4) 
5/6 
Agree (except 
BM5) 
4/5 
Agree (except 
E5) 
6/7 
20 out of 23 
Agree 
 
Board committees do 
not exist 
Agree Audit 
committee in 
banks and 
investment 
companies 
4/4 
Agree Audit 
committee in 
banks and 
investment 
companies 
1/1 
Agree 
 
4/6 
Agree  
 
4/5 
Agree  
 
4/7 
12 out of 23 
state 
committees 
do not exist 
CEO + chair not 
separated 
Agree 
3/4 
Agree 
1/1 
Agree  
4/6 
Agree  
4/5 
Agree  
3/7 
15 out of 23 
Disclosure and 
transparency is weak 
Agree 
4/4 
Agree 
1/1 
Agree 
5/6 
Agree 
1/5 
Agree 
1/7 
12 out of 23  
Agree 
Most listed companies 
are Family owned 
Agree  
4/4 
Agree 
1/1 
Agree 
5/6 
Agree 
4/5 
Agree 
6/7 
20 out of 23 
Agree 
Merchant families 
oppose issuance of a 
Kuwaiti corporate 
governance code 
Agree 
4/4 
Agree 
1/1 
Agree 
5/6 
Agree 
2/5 
Agree 
4 /7 
16 out of 23 
Agree 
Note: this Table shows the view of the interviewees about the current practices gathered from the above sections. 
 
One symbolic carrier (Companies‘ Act 1960, Article 15) is examined in the next section. This 
raises questions about why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait, why the 
regulators and legislators do enforce one, whether the regulators and legislators demonstrate a 
weak knowledge and understanding of corporate governance principles, and whether the 
existing regulations, especially the 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), are adequate or should 
be replaced with a new corporate governance code.  
 
6.4 The legal and regulatory system 
 
Before discussing the legal and regulatory system‘s weaknesses and the level of similarity 
between the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) and corporate governance principles, the level of 
understanding and knowledge of the corporate governance principles among all groups will be 
illustrated to determine whether their comments on corporate governance are based on 
experience and knowledge. 
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The majority of the interviewees (17 of the 23, 74%) possessed good or excellent knowledge 
and understanding of corporate governance. The majority of these were regulators, legislators 
and investors, and their knowledge was fairly broad, as R4 demonstrated: 
 
R4: “Corporate governance can be observed from two different 
views...the narrow view, which is defined according to the 
shareholder‟s interest...or beyond to include all stakeholders‟ 
interests.”       
 
The knowledge and understanding of corporate governance among the remaining six 
interviewees (26%) was weak. These included two group board members and four executive 
managers, for instance, E5:  
E5: “Corporate governance is a system enforced by companies 
to constitute the audit committees and other required 
committees.”     
 
According to the above, the regulators and legislators, since they showed a good to excellent 
understanding of the corporate governance principles, should issue a Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance and coerce listed companies within the organisational field to apply it. 
However, to date, no code of corporate governance has been issued. Hence, the question arises 
of whether the current Companies‘ Act (Article 15) is enough and incorporates corporate 
governance principles, and whether there are barriers in the legal and regulatory system in the 
country. 
6.4.1 Companies’ Act (Article 15) 1960   
 
When questioned about their view of the 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), two interviewees, 
(BM5 and I4) who represent merchant families, believed it to be adequate and that there was 
no need to issue another code, but the majority (21, 91%) regarded it as outdated and in need 
of review as for example BM2:  
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BM2:  ―... the 1960 Act is outdated and needs to be replaced 
with a new code that can cater for the economic and market 
needs ....the Act does not protect the minority shareholders‟ 
interests from the major shareholders‟ expropriations.” 
 
R3 insisted on change process rather than modification or updating since he states that: 
 
R3: “The current act should be replaced by a new act which 
includes all of the corporate governance codes and other ethical 
and moral codes.”   
 
E3 added that the KSE should be a more developed market in terms of regulation and the 
applied system of trading between the MENA countries: 
 
E3: “... our market is classified as the oldest market among 
MENA countries after Cairo‟s market... and is still monitored 
and governed by the old Act published in 1960...this shows that 
the country‟s economic situation is stuck in the 1960s.‖   
 
L1 further commented that the operation and management, not only of the market but of the 
country as a whole, was based on laws from the 1960s: 
 
L1: “Kuwait is still managed and operated by laws, acts and a 
constitution from the 1960s; since that time, the country really 
needs to radically change, and all of the acts should be 
amended, including the Companies‟ Act and laws that were 
published before.” 
 
This assertion was confirmed by R2, who commented that the continued use of Indian Rupees
6
 
instead of Kuwaiti Dinars as the currency for sanctions and fines provided evidence that the 
current Act (Article 15) had not been reviewed since its publication in 1960 
                                                          
6
 The Indian Rupee was traded and accepted in Kuwait before 1960, after which the Kuwaiti Dinar became the 
main currency of the country 
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R2: “The sanctions included in the 1960 Companies‟ Act are in 
Rupees...this indicates that the act has not been reviewed at 
all...whereas, if it is reviewed, the first amendment is to move to 
Kuwaiti Dinars rather than keep Indian Rupees.”  
 
L1 further stated that a stipulation in Companies‘ Act (Article 15), that all board members 
should hold a number of shares in the company, made it impossible to include independent 
board members; this would be contrary to normal corporate governance principles:      
L1: “The concept of the independent board member gives a 
more credible picture of the company‟s operation...but the 
problem is with the current act, that prevents any non-
shareholder from being a board member.” 
    
In addition, all of the interviewees agreed with the concept of independent directors sitting on 
the board, yet the stipulation of the Company‘s Act (Article 15) that all board members should 
hold a number of shares makes it impossible to include independent board members. The 
majority of the interviewees (with the exception of the merchant families group) therefore 
called for the modification of the existing outdated Act (Article 15) in order to create greater 
transparency for all stakeholders. This would be achieved if independent board members, with 
no benefits or interest within the company, could make decisions based on the interests of all 
stakeholders:      
L1: “The concept of the independent board member gives a 
more credible picture of the company‟s operation...but the 
problem with the current act is that it prevents any non-
shareholder being a board member.” 
 
It is clear that the absence of an effective regulatory framework, as represented by an outdated 
Companies‘ Act (Article 15) 1960, led to the majority of interviewees (21) feeling dissatisfied 
with the current, outdated Act (Article 15). Thus, the lack of regulatory pressure has led to the 
absence of any corporate governance practices, and there has not been any coercive pressure 
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on listed companies to apply a corporate governance. Whether any barriers exist within the 
legal and regulatory system of the country will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
6.4.2 Barriers in the country’s legal and regulatory system 
 
In an attempt to identify the factors hindering the issue of corporate governance code, the 
interviewees were asked if they considered there were any contradictions between the current 
Companies‘ Act (Article 15) and a corporate governance code. All but the two merchant 
family interviewees (BM5 and I4) stated that there was no such contradiction. E1 commented 
that any corporate governance code would be complementary to the current Act (Article 15): 
 
E1: “Corporate governance is complementary to, not in conflict 
with, the current Companies‟ Act...as it requires more disclosure 
and transparency.”  
The view of the group merchant families differed as BM5 stated that: 
BM5: ―how listed companies can appoint independent board 
member and the Act require all members should hold a number 
of share percentage.‖ 
    
Before discussing legal factors it is useful to explain the relationship between the regulatory 
and monitoring bodies in Kuwait. Diagram 6.1 shows that the government is represented in 
both the finance and commerce ministries, as the minister in both ministries are appointed by 
the prime minister, these ministers then appoint the executives in the regulatory bodies. The 
political parties in parliament (merchant families‘ party) usually lobby the prime minister and 
ministers to appoint their representatives in the regulatory bodies to act in their interests.    
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Diagram 6.1 The relationship between regulatory bodies in Kuwait 
 
 
 
                                      appoint appoint 
 
 
 
                appoint     appoint 
 
 
 
 regulates regulates 
 
 
 
 
Notes: the diagram shows how the government and regulatory bodies are connected.  
 
One of the main barriers in the country‘s legal and regulatory system is that the legal system in 
the country is weak and lacks enforcement and effectiveness. For example, the concept of 
equal treatment for all shareholders exists in the current Companies‘ Act (Article 15), but the 
regulators and monitoring bodies have failed to activate it and force the listed companies to 
apply it. In many cases, listed companies pay more attention to their major shareholders: 
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R1: “What happens in practice is different from what should be 
done...the companies‟ management pays more attention to the 
major shareholders, since the regulator does not force 
companies to effectively apply the Act.” 
 
Five of the seven executives acknowledged that, although the 1960‘s Act (Article 15) insists 
on equal treatment for all shareholders, it was ignored and most listed companies did not apply 
the Act (Article 15), since the major shareholders have made a considerable investment in the 
company, so the executives have to pay more attention to their views and requirements: 
 
E5: “In practice, it is difficult to satisfy all investors...so at least 
they would give more consideration to the major investors as 
they make a considerable investment in the company.” 
 
The representatives of the merchant families (I4 and BM5) stated that it is not a matter of 
activation and enforcement of act, it is a matter of prioritising major shareholders‘ preferences:  
 
I4: “Equal treatment for all shareholders should be limited to 
share returns...other than that, it is impossible to treat someone 
who owns 20% of the total shares equally to someone who has 
1% ... the preferences of major shareholders always should 
become first.”     
  
The above indicates that the current Act (Article 15) has not been activated nor the law and 
regulations enforced; also, the executives and board members do not apply the Act based on 
their view that equality of treatment means that the major shareholders‘ preferences should be 
priorised. The civil law system that the country applies is characterised by weakness and a lack 
of enforcement, since the Company‘s Act (Article 15) mentions the equality of treatment of all 
shareholders. The major shareholders comply with the Act (Article 15) and ignore the minority 
shareholders‘ interests and rights, while at the same time the regulators and monitoring bodies 
are weak in enforcing the Act (Article 15) over those companies: 
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I1: “The legal system is weak in the country...the regulators and 
monitoring bodies are weak in activating the existing code since 
the major shareholders are ignoring the minority shareholders‟ 
rights.”     
 
Thus, the issue of corporate governance is impeded by the lack of an effective regulatory 
framework (i.e. the lack of coercive pressure) to force companies to practise the requirement of 
the 1960 Act (Article 15) such as the equal treatment of shareholders. 
 
Another barrier in the country‘s legal and regulatory system is the weakness level of minority 
protection provided. La Porta et al. (1997) and Mallin (2004) both argue that the legal system 
of any country has an important impact on the level of protection of the minority shareholders‘ 
interests and the effectiveness and enforcement of the law. This is consistent with the comment 
of R2 that this is one of the weaknesses of the 1960 Act (Article 15), which fails to protect the 
rights of minority shareholders and lacks activation: 
 
R2: “The current Act is weak in the way it protects minority 
shareholders‟ rights...and the level of activation is very weak.”   
The legal system of the country is weak at protecting minority interests since the companies‘ 
management ignores minority interests and does not apply the current Act (Article 15). Five of 
the seven executives such as E1 asserted that: 
E1: “I just want to clarify that, despite the Company‟s Act being 
mandatory, some companies are manipulating it and failing to 
apply it.” 
 
Three of the five board members supported the view expressed by E1 and other executives 
regarding the act and the extent of protecting minority interests as BM1 stated: 
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BM1: “Not all companies apply the Companies‟ Act...since it 
can be overcome as there are many gaps ... the level of 
protection of the minority interests is weak since the Act is 
ignored” 
 
Five out of the six investors noted that the level of protection of minority interests was 
negatively affected by the mutual interests between government and merchant families: 
 
I6: “The current act is not activated...the government usually 
disables the act, especially for the group of merchant families 
who usually bargain with the government in parliament.” 
  
Another barrier in the country‘s legal and regulatory system is the weak level of disclosure and 
transparency. For example, I1 clarified that, in the case of companies who did not disclose 
their major shareholders holding more than 20%, those shareholders would be charged and 
their percentage of ownership withheld from trading for two years; yet 126 companies were 
accused of this practice, and the law was not activated against them: 
I1: “Offending companies who fail to disclose their major 
shareholders owning more than 20% should be punished by 
stopping their shares from trading for two years ...however, the 
law was not activated against 126 listed companies who did not 
disclose.”   
 
The merchant families avoid disclosing their percentage of ownership as major shareholders 
because they were unwilling to reveal to the public their dominance over the companies; at the 
same time, they could secure control of the board membership through distributing their 
ownership to different companies. They held almost 100% ownership in some companies, and 
were influential in others. The merchant families could thus select a group which comprised of 
themselves and their representatives to vote in the elections for board membership. Each 
company would vote for one person so, by securing a high number of votes, the merchant 
families could achieve domination over the board membership: 
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I2: “The voting method that the major shareholders used is to 
diversify their ownership percentage among different 
companies...each company votes for itself and its 
representatives, so they will get the highest numbers of votes and 
dominate the board membership.”       
L1: “Four merchant families own almost 100% of Americana 
listed companies ... by direct and indirect investment.” 
 
    
All the above weaknesses of activating codes and law, protecting minority interests, and lack 
of disclosure and transparency can be traced back to the weak role of the regulators. The 
investors, including I4 (merchant family), blamed the regulators, I1 stated that the appointed 
executives on the monitoring bodies lack education, and the companies‘ team was superior to 
the regulatory and monitoring bodies in terms of both their educational attainment and their 
talent:  
 
I1: “In fact, companies are better educated and their staff can 
compete with the regulators, as the latter lack both experience 
and knowledge.” 
 
Three regulators referred to the weak role of the regulators with regard to parliament, since 
MPs do not show any signs of accepting a change to the current Act (Article 15): 
 
R1: “The superiority of the private sector over the government 
sector...is a result of the current act is outdated and the role of 
the parliament is missing...” 
 
The unsatisfactory level of knowledge among the regulators was also criticised by executives, 
and E3 suggested that they were ill-equipped to issue the most important acts that organised 
the companies‘ practices:  
E3: ―Regulators...have insufficient education and knowledge to 
issue a company‟s code.” 
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Also board members criticised the regulators rather than the current Act (Article 15) 1960. 
BM2 provided an example of the weakness of the monitoring bodies, especially those related 
to the Ministry of Commerce, who had no experience of organising and running AGMs, due to 
their lack of specialism: 
 
 BM2: “The government regulators lack specialism...and they 
don‟t know what codes the market requires to be 
issued...imagine that, at the AGM, the representatives of the 
Ministry of Commerce have graduated from social sciences 
courses.‖  
 
All of these statements indicate that the lack of education and specialism among the regulators, 
compared with the more talented private sector, had led to a decline in the authority and 
prestige of groups of regulators, including those representing the Central Bank, the Stock 
Exchange and the Ministry of Commerce:    
 
R2: “Both groups of regulator are unaware of the codes‟ 
advantages as a result of their limited knowledge and 
education... this leads to an absence of authority and prestige for 
the Central Bank, the Stock Exchange and Ministry of 
Commerce.” 
 
I1 further commented that the lack of specialisation among the decision-makers on the Stock 
Exchange meant that inadequate attention was paid to the quality of the acts that aimed to 
improve and regulate the companies‘ transactions with their stakeholders: 
 
I1: “In Kuwait, because of the absence of specialisation among 
the management of the KSE...the output of acts were not those 
that were recommended and desired, and they underestimated 
how to regulate companies in the proper manner.”  
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These selection processes for the executives of the monitoring bodies will be discussed later in 
the political and cultural sections. 
 
It is clear that the investors, executive management, and board members agree that the 
regulators‘ level of education and specialism are weak, whereas the regulators refer the 
weaknesses to the law packages offered for specialists where private companies offer an 
attractive package and to the failure of parliament to issue a new act.       
   
According to the above, the main barriers are the legal system of the country, as the regulators 
lack effectiveness and experience, and fail to activate the code. This is identical to La Porta et 
al.‘s (1998) classification of the characteristics of the civil law system, concentrated ownership 
and weak legal system, that lack the activation of the codes. Hence, a symbolic carrier within 
the dominant logics of the organisational field, which is the legal system, is weak and 
ineffective, thus representing an obstacle in the process of corporate governance code issuance 
in Kuwait. 
 
Since the legal and regulatory system is weak in the country and the regulators have failed to 
issue a corporate governance code to date, hence, the question arises of why the latter is the 
case, since the regulators have the power to issue legislation in the country. Specifically, L1 
demonstrates an excellent understanding and knowledge of corporate governance. The next 
section discusses further the role of political factors in the issuance of corporate governance.   
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6.5 Political factors 
 
This section illustrates the role of political factors and the reason behind parliament‘s failure to 
issue a corporate governance act. Also, examples are provided by the interviewees of how the 
presence of the merchant families in parliament has negatively impacted on the legislation‘s 
role in issuing a corporate governance code, as a result of the self- and mutual interests of the 
merchant families‘ party in parliament and the government.   
6.5.1 The Kuwaiti Parliament and the merchant families  
   
As stated previously, the legislative system is represented by parliament as the sole body in 
Kuwait empowered to issue laws. The merchant families have sought to maintain their 
presence in parliament since it was established in order to protect their interests and bargaining 
power: 
R2: “Merchant families have been present in parliament since it 
was constituted...their presence keeps them in power so that they 
can bargain with the government to gain benefits.”     
 
It is vital for the merchant families to preserve their dominance over the monetary and 
financial committee of parliament. Fourteen interviewees confirmed that, since it was 
established, the merchant families‘ party in parliament had maintained its control and 
dominance over the monetary and financial committee. To achieve this, deals were made 
whereby the merchant families voted for parties to be elected onto other committees in return 
for votes for their own party at the elections for the monetary and financial committee. Also, 
the government voted for the merchant families to dominate the monetary and financial 
committee: 
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E7: “The merchant families‟ party fights to dominate the 
monetary and financial committee in parliament...this is 
achieved through their deals with both the government and with 
other parties who vote for them at the committee elections...in 
turn, the merchant families will vote for those parties at the 
elections for other committees.” 
 
E1 justified the government support and votes for merchant families as stated that: 
 
E1: “The government always votes for the merchant families for 
the monetary and financial committee seats...both groups try to 
protect their interests...those interests are political and 
economic.” 
 
The majority of the respondents (14), representing the legislators, investors and regulators, 
identified this pressure to dominate the monetary and financial committee, as R3 noted:      
 
R3: “The aim behind the merchant families‟ party‟s domination 
over the monetary and financial committee in parliament...is to 
ensure that no act can be issued that threatens their control and 
dominance over companies.” 
An example of protecting their control and interests is the Capital Market Authority Act. This 
includes a code of corporate governance, and had been considered by the monetary and 
financial committee in parliament since 2000; it was finally released in late 2010, but did not 
include the corporate governance code. Throughout this period, the merchant families had 
demanded that it should be held back but, after the financial crisis of 2008, investors exerted 
pressure on the legislators to issue the act: 
I1: “The monetary committee in parliament, representing the 
majority of the merchant families, was pressurised into 
withholding the Market Authority Act and corporate governance 
code...since the financial crisis of 2008, investors pressed MPs 
to issue the act and it was issued in late 2010.”  
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Acts that serve the merchant families interests, such as the Debt Difficulties Act, are agreed on 
and approved by the monetary and financial committee. This act was issued to protect the 
merchant families from the bankruptcy resulting from the manipulation of Al-Manakh market 
that led to the banks‘ financial crisis: 
 
I6: “The government, instead of punishing the manipulative 
merchant families, introduced the Debit Act to protected 300 
members of the merchant families due to Al-Manakh crisis by 
paying out 5.5 billion Kuwaiti Dinars...this amount was paid 
from the Future Generation portfolio.” 
Similarly, E1 justified the merchant families‘ existence in the parliament to that:   
E1: “The presence of the merchant families in parliament is to 
protect their interests by constantly bargaining with the 
government when they need support.” 
 
When questioning the interviewees about how the presence of the merchant families in 
parliament can lead to bargaining with the government, 17 (a regulators, a legislator, five 
investors, five executives and two board members) stated that the bargaining process involves 
supporting the government when the government is questioned by the opposition. In return, the 
government grants concessions to the merchant families‘ party through strengthening their 
connection with the government and decision makers in the country and appointing their 
representatives in the area of regulation:  
 
I2: “The mutual interests of the merchant families‟ party and the 
government is dominant in the political life of the country ... the 
government aims to maintain the political support of the 
merchant families‟ party ... and the merchant families maintain 
their interests by obtaining government contracts and appointing 
their representatives to the monitoring bodies.”   
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All of the regulators, the legislator, five investors and four executives stated that the merchant 
families‘ party in parliament influence the government and decision making process in the 
country, that strengthens their power and control over the issuance process of the code and 
law: 
I5: “The merchant families are widely represented in parliament 
through their party...in the government and on the monitoring 
bodies.” 
 
Similarly I6 asserted that: 
I6: “As a result of the merchant families dominating the 
decision- makers...they became more influential over issuing 
acts that conflict with their interests, especially the corporate 
governance act.” 
 
This influential role of the merchant families on the issuance of the acts and codes in the 
country is confirmed by 19 interviewees, who state that the merchant families oppose 
corporate governance by exerting pressure and forming connections with the decision-makers:  
R2: ―The merchant families, through their presence in 
parliament, build good connections with the decision-
makers...especially the government and monitoring side, to stop 
them issuing corporate governance, as it would threaten their 
interests.”  
 
The opposition of the merchant families to the issuance of corporate governance through their 
presence in parliament and their wide connection with the regulators is because the corporate 
governance code might threaten their control, interest and current practices: 
R2: “The merchant families used their connections with the 
government and MPs to secure themselves as they engaged in 
suspicious transactions in the companies that they headed...for 
instance, the board members of Al-Daar and the Global 
Investment companies used to buy shares and land and re-sell 
them to the company to make a fortune, until they bankrupted 
those companies... Kuwait Finance House used its influence on 
MPs by giving them financial benefits just to put pressure on the 
government and regulators to treat the bank as lying outside the 
umbrella of the Central Bank‟s law and regulation.” 
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The above examples provide evidence to contradictory practices to the notion of corporate 
governance principles, that explains why the merchant families oppose the issuance of 
corporate governance either through their presence in parliament or by pressing the decision 
makers in the country.  
 
Also, another form of merchant families‘ bargaining with the government is through 
appointing their representatives to the regulative bodies to maintain their control over the 
regulators: 
 
I2: “The appointed regulators in Kuwait are always nominated 
by the merchant families‟ party as they have the upper hand over 
the government and decision makers in the country.”    
    
Fifteen of the interviewees (the legislator, three regulator, four investors, five executives, and 
two board members) confirmed that the appointed regulator is usually nominated by the 
merchant families‘ party in parliament when they bargain with the government: 
 
L1: “The merchant families‟ party exploits the clash between the 
opposition and the government to appoint their representatives 
to the regulators bodies to protect their interests and control.” 
   
On the other hand, BM5 and I4, who represent the merchant families‘ group, argued that the 
merchant families use their presence in parliament to serve society: 
 
I4: “Despite the merchant families being well connected with 
the decision makers...any act that serves the whole economy and 
society, no one can prevent being issued.” 
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In defence of the merchant families, BM5 and I4 also argued that responsibility should be 
attributed to the regulators and legislators, who had the authority to issue acts, rather than to 
the merchant families:  
BM5: “The responsibility for issuing act lies in the hands of the 
regulators or legislators...and it is untrue that the merchant 
families are responsible for delaying the issuance of a corporate 
governance act.”  
 
Appearing to favour their views, E5 ruled out the impact of the merchant families on the 
issuance of corporate governance, attributing the main reason for the absence of corporate 
governance to the plurality of regulators and lack of specialisation: 
 
E5: “... the plurality of regulators and the absence of 
specialisation are the main reasons behind the absence of 
corporate governance...”  
 
The defence of E5 for the favour of merchant families may be noted that E5 was appointed by 
the chairman of the company, who represented a group of merchant families: 
 
E5: “I have been selected as CEO for the company as a result of 
the major shareholders‟ preference with regard to those 
nominated for this position.”  
 
Interviewees also mentioned that the government, as a regulator and major shareholder, also 
influence on the issuance of corporate governance code besides merchant families, the next 
section further illustrates their criticism.  
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6.5.2 The role of the government   
 
It has been observed that the government also influences the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance, as 18 interviewees noted that: 
 
I1: “The government together with the merchant families ... both 
have mutual interests ... the government influence over the 
issuance of corporate governance comes from both sides as a 
major shareholders of the listed companies ... and their 
dominance over the regulative bodies in the country.”   
 
All of the interviewees confirmed that the government is a major shareholder in most of the 
listed companies in the KSE: 
 
E3: “The government owns an influential ownership percentage 
of most of the listed companies.”  
 
These influential ownership percentages are managed through their sovereign funds (pension 
funds and KIA), and the staff who manage the KIA and pension funds are appointed by the 
government: 
E1: “The government, has their investment arms ... the KIA and 
pension funds ... the managers and staff are all appointed by the 
government that manage these percentages.”  
  
The OECD reported a highly concentrated ownership structure in listed companies in Kuwait, 
represented by the major shareholders (institutional investors), such as the Pension Funds, the 
Kuwait Investment Authority (owned and managed by the government) and the merchant 
family companies (OECD, 2002).  
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Fifteen of the interviewees (the majority being investors, legislators and regulators) stated that, 
although the government had an influential ownership percentage of most of the listed 
companies, they delegated the board membership to the merchant families to control the 
companies they invest in or in which they have only one appointed member, despite their 
ownership percentages allowing them to appoint more than one representative:           
I1: “The government owns more than 26% of Zain listed 
company and the law allows to them to appoint two 
representatives ... whereas they appoint just one member and 
support Al-Khurafi merchant family by giving them 5 seats on 
the board ... the government also owns more than 30% of other 
listed companies and they don‟t have any representatives among 
the board membership.” 
 
L1 justifies the reason behind the delegation of the government to the board members to the 
political factors and mutual interests between the government and merchant families. This 
view was supported by the majority of investors, regulators, three executive and one board 
member: 
 
L1: “The merchant families support the government politically 
... and the government delegates the board to them, as a 
courtesy.”  
 
R2 criticised the government by stating that the courtesy of the government for the merchant 
families continue to invest in other listed and unlisted companies: 
 
R2: “The government through their investment arms invest in 
merchant families‟ companies ... whether these companies are 
listed or unlisted ... and whether these companies profitable or 
collapsed ... just to satisfy the merchant families‟ party.”  
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Fourteen of the interviewees (the majority being investors, legislators and regulators) stated 
that, although the government had influential ownership percentages, none of the invested 
companies show any signs of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance: 
I1: “The government through their ownership does not exert 
pressure on the companies‟ board and management voluntarily 
to adopt corporate governance principles ... this leads to the 
government supporting the merchant families‟ view.”    
 
On the contrary the government was satisfied with these actions on the part of the merchant 
families since the merchant families‘ party supports them politically, which satisfies both 
groups‘ interests. BM3 gives an example of the manipulation of KIA investments and the 
government taking no action against the merchant families:    
 
BM3: “The Minister of Finance who is a member of a merchant 
family in Kuwait...sold the BMW franchise to a relative...and 
other government investments to a group of merchant families, 
but no action was taken against him about a conflict of interest; 
at the same time, the government is satisfied, as it supports 
them.” 
 
The Kuwait Gulf Bank is another example where the government shows support for the 
merchant families‘ manipulative practices, which contradicts the principles of corporate 
governance, as illustrated by I3:  
I3: “Kuwait Gulf Bank is the famous case of when bargaining 
occurred between the merchant families and the 
government...since one of the board members made losses on his 
portfolio and refused to pay ... the government paid instead of 
accusing him, as he headed a political party in parliament.” 
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The government‘s role as a major investor in most listed companies has impacted negatively 
on the issuance of corporate governance, since they retained their investments in most listed 
companies in order to support the merchant families; hence, the aim is not to invest but rather 
to gain political support, since current practices, as mentioned by the interviewees, contradict 
the corporate governance principles. Hence, the government as a major investor is blocking the 
issuance of a corporate governance code: 
 
I3: “The government through their ownership of almost all 
listed companies oppose corporate governance...because the 
principles contradict their political interests which influence 
their mutual interests with the merchant families‟ party in 
parliament.” 
 
 
L1 observed that the Kuwait government was the ―last bastion of communism"7, not because 
the country demonstrated the basic principles of communism but because the government 
sought to extend its influence over the legislators in parliament. This might be achievable via 
the investment arm of government, namely, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), a major 
shareholder of most listed companies. Such extensive and diverse ownership gave it the power 
to maintain the mutual interests with parliamentary groups by providing political support when 
government ministers or the Prime Minister faced questions from the opposition group. 
Ownership also empowered it to provide economic support to those who represented the 
merchant families in parliament. In this situation, the government would not be free from 
―communist‖ influences nor would corporate governance codes be issued: 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The interviewee meant the Fascist regime rather than the Communist regime. 
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L1: ―Kuwait is the last bastion of communism...the government 
dominates 80% of economic activity influenced by political 
issues which are used to bargain with parliamentary groups in 
the national assembly who are usually from the merchant 
families. This is done by the merchant families‟ group 
supporting the government when it is faced with challenges from 
other oppositionist groups who question any encroachment on 
the economic support for the merchant families and 
beneficiaries groups through government ownership of listed 
companies - an example of this is that the government voted in 
the Zain company (against the shareholders‟ interests by 
supporting one of the merchant families who headed the 
company‟s board) to amend the status of the company by 
providing loans for other companies, which violates the basic 
statute as it operates in the telecommunication sector, not in the 
bank sector.‖ 
 
Hence, the actors, merchant families and the government, of the organisational field of the 
listed companies who represent the major shareholders, are sharing the same logic of 
maintaining the current practices, as these serve both actors‘ interests. This dominant logic 
contradicts the corporate governance principles.  
 
Another influence of the government over the process of the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance is through their regulative role in the country.  
I6 identified the monitoring and regulatory bodies in the country as the Ministry of Commerce, 
the Central Bank, the Kuwait Stock Exchange and the Capital Market Authority; assemblies 
who monitored the stock market: 
 
I6: “The government dominates and controls all of the 
assemblies that monitor the Stock Exchange and 
companies...such as KSE, CMA, Ministry of Commerce, and the 
Central Bank.”   
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Eleven respondents (the majority being investors and executives) noted the weakness of the 
regulatory and monitoring bodies in activating the laws and regulations or issuing a new code 
of corporate governance: 
 
BM3: “The monitoring bodies in the country are weak ... and 
lack the power to activate or issue codes that they responsible 
of.” 
 
The interviewees referred to the weakness of the regulatory and monitoring bodies to two main 
reasons: government influence and the process of appointing and selecting the persons in those 
regulatory bodies. 
 
Fifteen of the interviewees (the majority being investors, regulators, and executives) noted the 
weakness of the regulatory role to the government‘s influence, usually to foster their own 
political interests:  
 
I3: “The merchant families in parliament press the government 
to deactivate the law for violating boards in return for the 
merchant families‟ support in parliament.” 
 
R2 gives an example of the 1960 Act (Article 15) stated that the board was fully responsible 
for the company‘s shareholders; since 1960, however, no board members had been convicted 
of manipulating the shareholders‘ wealth, since the government influences the regulatory 
bodies‘ decision-making process in order to maintain their mutual interests with the merchant 
families‘ party: 
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R2: “The government used to disable the current Act for their 
political interests ... in particular, there is the clear 
manipulation of companies‟ transactions, such as AL-Daar 
Investment and Global Investment House ... the board of both 
companies are well presented in the merchant families‟ party in 
parliament ...and the government does not activate the Act 
against them since there is mutual interest between them.” 
 
On the contrary, the government presses the regulatory bodies to apply the Act against the 
merchant family who oppose the government politically:  
I1: “Al-sultan Merchant Family took land from the government 
to make a free zone...they started selling the land for investment 
instead of building the free zone...the government didn‟t activate 
the law against them since they supported the government 
politically in parliament...after opposing the government...they 
activated the law against them...not because they had violated 
the main activity for the project...but because they opposed the 
government and in turn the government punished them.” 
 
Therefore, the regulative bodies have no power or authority to issue a corporate governance 
code since the government is influencing their decision making process; I2 and another 13 
interviewees stated that issuing an act would certainly affect the group of merchant families 
who support the government in parliament: 
I2: “The government would not wish to issue the act of 
corporate governance ... since this act will definitely have a 
negative impact on the practices of the merchant families who 
support the government in parliament.”        
 
The other reason of the weaknesses of regulative bodies refers to the process of selection and 
appointing the executives in those regulative and monitoring bodies. 
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Twelve of the interviewees (the majority being investors and executive management) stated 
that the process of the selecting and appointing those executives to the regulative and 
monitoring bodies lies in the hands of the government, who appoint executives to the 
monitoring bodies based on their loyalty to the government and disregard their qualifications. 
The result is that the executives themselves are underqualified to monitor companies and 
unaware of the current code of listed companies: 
R1: “The monitoring bodies are insufficiently qualified to 
monitor companies...as regards to their qualification and 
experience level.”  
 
13 respondents (the majority of investors, legislator, regulators and executives) stated that 
some regulators might feel obliged to follow the interests of the merchant families who had 
appointed them to the monitoring bodies and act in their favour: 
 
R2: “The merchant families have forced the government to 
appoint nominated persons to the monitoring bodies...therefore 
those persons will follow the interests of the merchant families.”   
 
I3 confirmed R2‘s statement and the other 12 respondents that the merchant families forced the 
government to appoint executives to the monitoring bodies not because they were well-
educated but because they could rely on them to represent and protect their interests: 
 
I3: “Most of executives on the monitoring bodies are appointed 
by the merchant families ... as a result of the merchant families‟ 
influence over the government.”  
 
The issue of corporate governance was therefore impeded by the executives who represented 
the interests of the merchant families: 
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I2: “...Therefore those executives have a negative impact on 
corporate governance since it contradicts the interests of the 
merchant families who appoint them.”  
 
Since the actors in the field, the merchant families and the government, both have political 
influence and mutual interests, these mutual interests of the two groups oppose the issuance of 
corporate governance since corporate governance principles contradict with their practices. 
Therefore, the political factor represented by the role and influence of the merchant families in 
parliament and the government role as a major investors or as regulator both represent a barrier 
to the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code. This presence of the merchant 
families in parliament enhances their power over the decision making in the country and they 
have become a dominant factor in the legislative role in the country, with government support.    
 
Also, the interviewees confirmed that the merchant families‘ representation in parliament 
facilitates their relationship with the decision-makers in the country, who protect the merchant 
families‘ interests rather than the public interests. This relationship is, as the interviewees 
noted, from the country‘s culture that the merchant families became above the law. The next 
section further illustrates this dominant culture and how it impacts on the issuance of a 
corporate governance code in Kuwait. 
6.6 Cultural factors 
 
The interviewees were asked which cultural factors influence the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance. Eighteen of the interviewees identified different factors that influence 
the issuance of a corporate governance code, such as cultural differences, prestige, favouritism, 
and the social and personal relationships between merchant families with the government and 
regulators. 
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The first factor, cultural differences, was repeated by 15 interviewees (the majority being 
investors and regulators). The merchant families, in their resistance to any code that threatens 
their interests, usually refers to differences in culture, arguing that as the codes issued in other 
countries do not fit their culture, without justifying why, simply because they wish to resist the 
issuance of the code since it contradicts their interests: 
 
R3: “The cultural factor is the regular justification of the 
merchant families ... when they fear codes that threaten their 
interests ... different regulations have been banned under this 
justification, such as franchising contracts and monopolies ... 
they resist these changes due to the culture differences between 
our culture and US culture.” 
 
Another main obstacle lies within Kuwaiti society: supported by their social and personal 
relationships with the regulators, government and decision-makers, the merchant families and 
the government are either close friends or relatives, so both a social and personal relationship 
sets the culture in society, as every merchant family that has a social or personal relationship 
with the government should be treated differently from the other citizens, even with regard to 
the application of the laws and code, as they are above the law. Thus the network of actors is 
very strong supporting one community of practice. Also, six interviewees, including R1, 
confirmed that, since social and personal relationships, seen as a cultural factor, were dominant 
in traditional Kuwaiti culture, they were taken into account when issuing any ethical or 
corporate governance codes; it was recognised that no code would be issued that would affect 
the social and personal relationship between the regulators, the government and decision-
makers within the merchant families:  
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R1: “All of the traditions in Kuwaiti culture are opposed to 
applying corporate governance...it affects the good relationship 
and social alliance between regulators and the merchant 
families because the main principle of corporate governance is 
to limit the owners‟ intervention in the company‟s business.‖ 
 
The case of AL-Daar Investment Company is the best example to illustrate how the merchant 
families are treated differently and they are above the law as regard to their personal 
relationship with the government. The chairman had been convicted by the court three times in 
favour of one of the commercial banks in Kuwait, and was instructed to return a bank loan, yet 
the code was not activated against him, nor was any ban on travelling imposed as a result of 
his personal relationship:  
 
 
R2: “The chairman of AL-Daar Investment ... who is one of the 
merchant family has been convicted three times by the court and 
nobody dared to ban him from travelling outside the country ... 
as he well connected and have personal relationship with the 
prim-minister.” 
 
These social and personal relationships between the merchant families and the government 
give the former prestige in society, enabling them to be above the law as a result of the 
merchant families‘ contribution pre the crude oil discovery: 
I6: “The prestige of the merchant families of being above the 
law came from the government ... since those merchant families 
were supporting the government economically prior to the 
discovery of oil.”  
 
The courtesy towards the merchant families in society refers to the government‘s favouritism 
towards those families. Nine of the respondents (the majority being investors and regulators) 
asserted that, due to the government‘s favouritism towards the merchant families, this 
favouritism has become part of the national culture as, when the interests of those families 
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conflicted with the interests of other citizens, the government will side with the merchant 
families: 
L1: “The government always sides with the merchant families‟ 
interests ... against any other group‟s interests ... and it has 
become a cultural factor that, when the citizens recognise that 
their interests will contradict the merchant families‟ interests ... 
they well know that the government will support the merchant 
families.”  
 
Another cultural obstruction, identified by twelve interviewees (4 investors, 3 regulators, 3 
executives, legislator, and one board member), to the issuance of corporate governance is that 
corruption has become part of the country‘s culture, encouraged by a group of merchant 
families to maintain their interests. The decision makes are subjected to bribes with regard to 
passing, opposing, or deactivating laws, and the group of merchant families, specifically, who 
own pyramid ownership and have political power, are satisfied since they can build a fortune 
through this corruption. The government fails to take any action against this corruption, since 
they also receive political support: 
 
BM3: ―The absence of corporate governance codes in Kuwait is 
related to the current status of corruption in the country...the 
law of transparency and integrity have been present in 
parliament since 2004...and until now, this has not been 
issued...as a result of the powerful merchant families making a 
fortune and the government getting political support.‖    
 
R3 confirmed the above and stated that it is often the case in some societies that the 
beneficiaries of corrupt practices were those who built their fortunes by opposing corporate 
governance and other codes, since these might obstruct their illegal practices. Although 
Kuwait had been recognised as experiencing widespread corruption, those who benefitted from 
this situation were likely to resist any codes that aimed to amend their practices: 
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R3: ―The corporate governance code does not exist because the 
owners are opposed to any commitment to other investors...and 
nobody supports issuing the code, whether the government, the 
regulators or any other stakeholders.‖   
 
Another dominant cultural obstacle in the private sector that hinder the issuance of corporate 
governance is represented by traditional thinking; R4 and other seven respondents (2 investors, 
3 executives, and 2 regulators) observed that the board members preferred to manage 
companies using their own established practices, rather than to adopt western styles of 
management by separating the management from ownership, hence the cultural obstacle 
presented in that merchant families fight to control board and executive management of 
companies will hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance:   
 
R4: “The companies‟ board members come from the classic 
school, as they want to manage companies under the old system 
rather than let new blood get involved in managing companies 
in the western way of thinking.” 
 
The dominant cultural obstacle that represents the traditional thinking is a result of the 
selection method applied in the country as a whole and to the monitoring bodies specifically. 
The standard for appointing executives to the monitoring bodies is subject to age, disregarding 
their level of qualification, knowledge and experience: 
 
R2: “The selection process when appointing executives to the 
monitoring bodies lacks a  basic standard of qualification ... 
such as the level of knowledge and experience ... it is always 
based on the age scale ... the older they are, the more chance of 
being selected for an executive position.”  
 
The dominant cultural stance represented by personal and social relationships are based on 
courtesies and favouritism of government to the merchant families together with the corruption 
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and traditional thinking that impede the process of change within the organisational field of 
Kuwaiti listed companies, and actors in the field promote these cultural factors in order to 
maintain their interests.    
 
6.7 Summary  
 
The representatives of the merchant families‘ group from the sample of the interviewees 
showed a weak understanding of corporate governance principles. Despite this, they insist on 
raising obstacles in the process of issuing a corporate governance code, as result of the current 
practices inside the organisational field satisfying their interests. 
 
Based on interviewees‘ views of current practices, it appears that there is a single community 
of practice as a result of the dominant logics inside the organisational field that reflect the 
logics of the actors, the merchant families and the government. Legal, political and cultural 
factors restrain any effort to introduce organisational change as a result of both the merchant 
families and the government‘s domination over the political and legal system of the country. 
This domination of both groups is to protect their self- and mutual interests. 
 
The coercive pressure is weak since the regulators did not practice their roles and activate 
codes against the merchant families‘ illegal practices. The normative pressure represented in 
government-owned companies‘ practices, such as the CBK, that contradict with the 
international governance practices. Besides that, the merchant families are mimicking the 
government-owned companies‘ practices, since it maintains their control and power over listed 
companies. Also, the lack of coercive pressure is a result of the network of actors between 
merchant families and the government, and the weak level of specialisation and qualification 
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of executives within the regulatory bodies with regard to the normative practices of corporate 
governance. Hence, the endogenous forces for the process of change in the organisational field 
of Kuwait corporate governance is (represented by coercive pressure from regulators) 
ineffective.  
 
The next chapter presents the results of the questionnaire survey, which seeks to explore the 
impact of the actors, the merchant families, on both the community of practices inside the 
organisational field and their role in opposing the issuance of a corporate governance code in 
the country, and whether those legal, political, and cultural factors and a result of the merchant 
families and government interference to protect their self- and mutual interests, mentioned 
above, represent the main obstacle to the issuance of the code. 
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Chapter 7 
Questionnaire analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the findings from the interviews. This chapter presents the 
results gathered from the second research method that was applied in this thesis, which is a 
questionnaire survey. The questionnaire survey explores the respondents‘ views about the 
main reasons behind the absence of a corporate governance code, the adequacy of the current 
1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), and their views of whether or not the current practices of 
listed companies are in line with corporate governance principles. Also, this chapter aims to 
confirm the findings of the previous chapter that the actors in the organisational field of 
Kuwaiti listed companies, the merchant families and the government, their personal 
connections with the regulators and legislators, and their self and mutual interests are the main 
reasons for the absence of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. This chapter is organised 
as follows, section 7.2 outlines the topics the questionnaire and identifies the respondent 
groups. Section 7.3 outlines the respondents' views about the main factors that influence the 
practice of corporate governance and the factors that hinder the issuance of a corporate 
governance code in Kuwait. Section 7.4 teases out the method of selection of board members 
and executive management in listed companies and the extent of minority interest protection. 
Section 7.5 explores the existence of board committees, the method and the main factors that 
influence the selection process of committees‘ board members. Section 7.6 focuses on 
respondents‘ views on the impact of merchant families on the Government; regulators; 
legislators; and companies‘ management and practices. Section 7.7 summaries the chapter.      
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The questionnaire survey prepared in accordance with the three main research question, the 
first research question was why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait was covered 
in questionnaire survey in part B question 5 that was ask about the adequacy and convergence 
of international corporate governance code with the current Companies‘ Act 1960 (Article 15). 
The second research question was what factors prevent the issuance of corporate governance 
code in Kuwait were covered in questionnaire survey in part B question 6, 7, 9, 10, and 14. 
The last research question which is whether is there a single community of practices were 
covered in questionnaire survey part B questions 8, 11, 12, and 13. 
 
The main findings from the interviews are that the Companies‘ Act (Article 15) is old that; 
companies‘ practices contradict corporate governance principles; and that merchant families 
influence corporate governance practice. These main findings are linked with the questionnaire 
survey in questions 5, 8, 9, 13, and 14 (see appendix 3) in order to confirm the findings of the 
interviews. 
7.2 Questionnaire Topics and Respondent Groups 
 
The majority of the questions in this questionnaire were about the adequacy of the current 
Kuwaiti 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), the current practices of companies and the absence 
of a corporate governance code in Kuwait. Questions were prepared, along with the research 
objectives, from a review of the corporate governance literature, the related literature in 
developing countries, Kuwait codes and regulation, and from the interview findings. 
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The questionnaire contained two sections. Section A contains personal information and the 
general understanding of the respondents about the Kuwait 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), 
OECD principles of corporate governance and the UK‘s combined code, as well as their 
perceptions about companies‘ ownership structures. Section B is designed to elicit 
respondents‘ perceptions of the adequacy of the Kuwaiti 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), 
listed companies‘ current practices, and factors that influence: (i) governance practices; (ii) 
selecting the chairman, board members and CEO; (iii) protection of minority interests (iv) the 
existence of board committees and the process of selection of committees‘ board members (v) 
the separation of the chairman from the CEO; (vi) factors that hinder the issuance of corporate 
governance code in Kuwait; (vii) and the extent to which merchant families affect decision 
makers in Kuwait. All questions were on a 5-point Likert scale.  
 
The process of questionnaire distribution started at the beginning of April 2012 to 
Parliament (legislators), government and regulators (KSE, CMA, MOCI, CBK), board 
members and executives (listed companies), and investors.  
 
All the listed companies to be included in the sample were organised using Excel. First, All of 
the listed companies on the KSE were set out in the same order as the KSE (the total is 216 
listed companies), then arranged in alphabetical order via Excel. The sample was selected by 
taking the first company that appeared, after arranging them in alphabetical order, and then 
alternate numbers (3, 5, 7…) until the sample reached 100 companies (from number 1 to 
number 199).  
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The selection of the samples for this study is based on the fact that they are involved with 
listed companies in Kuwait. There are four samples: regulators and legislators; investors; 
board members; and executive management. These groups were selected to share their views 
and institutional logics about the factors preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of 
corporate governance, and affecting current practices. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the respondents for each group by percentage. The first group the 
Government (G) includes three categories which includes: the Ministry of Commerce; the 
regulators (R) including the Central Bank, the Capital Market Authority, and Kuwait Stock 
Exchange; and the legislators (L) who are Members of Parliament. For this group 
Questionnaires were given by hand to 50 persons in each group, except the members of 
parliament where 19 were handed questionnaires. Two hundred and nineteen questionnaires 
were personally delivered by hand to encourage them to participate and because the post is not 
reliable in the country.  
 
For this sample group the selection process for the legislators was, three parliamentary 
committees, the monitory committee (7 members), the legislation committee (7), and the 
protection of investment and public money committee (5 members). These committees were 
selected due to their involvement in financial regulation and laws. All of the committees 
included and combined the merchant families‘ party and the opposition party8. The total 
number of questionnaires delivered to MPs was 19.  
 
The government, represented by MOCI, was included in the sample as it supervises and 
                                                          
8
 See page 159 
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monitors all listed companies. The questionnaires were delivered by hand to the following: the 
minister, the assistant minister, the assistant minister for public companies, the general manger 
for public companies, the assistant manager for public companies, and another 45 staff 
members from the public companies department, selected according to their experience of the 
public companies department, on which the departmental general manager advised
9
. The total 
number of questionnaires delivered was 50.  
The first regulator (CBK) was delivered 50 questionnaires, distributed as follows: the CBK 
board members (8 people), the bank governor, the deputy bank governor, the manager and 
assistant manager of the supervision, banking operation, and legal departments, respectively, 
plus other staff from these three departments (34 people). These departments were selected due 
to their direct role in monitoring the banks and investment companies‘ operations and 
compliance with the regulations and law. The staff members were also selected based on their 
experience in each department, with each managers recommending the most experienced staff 
to participate in the sample who had knowledge of, and experience with, codes and laws. 
For the second regulator (CMA), the same quantity (50 questionnaires) were distributed and 
delivered by hand to the following: the commissioner of the CMA (6 people), plus eleven to 
the managers and most experienced staff in each of the four sectors (research, monitoring, 
legal, and market regulation), according to the suggestions of the manger of each sector.  
The KSE sample also included regulators where a total of 50 questionnaires were distributed 
there, as follows: board members of KSE (11 people); the General Manager and Assistant 
General Manager of the KSE; and the manager, assistant manager and 35 other staff members 
from the listed companies department, based on their experience, as suggested by the 
department manager. 
                                                          
9
 See page 159 
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The second sample group is that of the board members (BM), to whom 200 questionnaires 
were distributed. The board members group included in the sample were board members of 
Kuwaiti listed companies, some of whom represented the major shareholders. The Board 
Members' selection were generated by a random numbers for each name on the list by 
applying the formula (―rand = ( )‖), then arranging the board members' names in alphabetical 
order and including the smallest number generated by the formula. This process was applied to 
all 100 companies that had been selected earlier. The total number of questionnaires delivered 
to the BMs group was 200. Board members were included to trace their understanding of 
corporate governance principles, their companies‘ current practices, and the factors preventing 
the voluntary adoption corporate governance principles and also the issuance of a Kuwaiti 
code of corporate governance. 
 
The third group was executive management (EM) where 200 questionnaires were distributed, 
who were chosen from the same companies. As the board members, this group included 
General Managers (GMs), Chief Executive Officers (CEO), and the deputy of Chief Legal 
affairs Officers (CLO). CLOs are more involved with the regulations and law and were 
expected to have a good knowledge of the corporate governance principles. Also, they were 
included to trace their views about the factors preventing the voluntary adoption of corporate 
governance within their companies and also the factors preventing the issuance of a Kuwaiti 
code of corporate governance. The last group is investors (I), and for this group 200 
questionnaires were delivered, this group was included in the sample to trace the major 
shareholders and minority investors‘ views and understandings of the concept of corporate 
governance, as well as to identify the role of the merchant families as the main external factor 
influencing the issuance of a corporate governance code. For the investor group, the 
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questionnaire was handed to investors who arrived at the KSE between 11.30am and 12.30pm 
(after trading had closed) throughout the second week of April. This time was chosen because 
most traders arrive during this time to settle their transactions after trading closes. The group 
of investors in the KSE was a mix of major and minority investors, and the aim was to hand 
out 200 questionnaires during that week. The researcher was present in the settlement 
department with the manager between 11.30am until 12.30pm from the 8
th
 to the 12
th
 of April 
2012 to prompt traders to participate.       
The total number of questionnaires distributed for all groups including the government group 
between April and June 2012 was 819, the total respondents was 192 (23.4%), as shown in 
Table 7, which outlines the profile of the respondents. Most of the questionnaires were 
distributed and collected by hand. Although this was costly and time consuming, it was very 
thorough and led to a good response rate of 23.4%. Table 7 shows the number of 
questionnaires distributed and returned, the response rate for each group, and the overall 
response rate. As can be seen from Table 7, 819 questionnaires were distributed to the 
different groups between April and June 2012. One hundred and ninety two (192) 
questionnaires were returned, although not all of them were complete. Consequently, the 
number of useable questionnaires for the MOCI, Regulators, Legislators, BMs, EMs, and 
Investors were 15, 35, 11, 19, 31, and 81 respectively. 
 
In most cases, the respondents were contacted personally through the researcher‘s personal 
and social contacts, which helped to access the group samples, especially board members 
and executive management, who were very helpful about completing the questionnaires 
and in helping to contact other board members who had been selected and executive 
management as well.  
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Table 7 questionnaires’ respondents group 
Main group Sub group Total 
delivered 
Total 
received 
Response rate for each 
group 
Percentage of 
total responses 
Government      
 Ministry of 
Commerce 
50 15 
 
(30%) 
 
8% 
 
 Regulators 150 35 
 
(23%) 
 
18%  
 Legislators 19 11 
 
(58%) 
 
6%  
  219 61   
Board members  200 19 
 
(10%) 
 
10% 
Executive 
management 
 200 31 
 
(16%) 
 
16% 
  400 50   
Investors      
 Minority 
investors 
100 75 
 
(75%) 
 
39% 
 Merchant 
families 
100 6 (6%) 3% 
Total  819 192  100% 
Note: this Table shows the respondents group, each group with the total number sent and received, the response rate shows the number of each 
group‘s respondents compared with total questionnaires received 192.  
 
Table 7.1 shows that the majority of respondent from investors group are the minority 
investors (75%) and they are the highest response rate, followed by the legislators (58%), then 
MOCI (30%). The BMs and EMs, if it is assumed that listed companies are dominated by 
merchant families, and the merchant families themselves as major shareholders, represent the 
lowest response rate. The merchant families‘ response rate was low compared with the 
minority investors‘ response rate. The low response rate of merchant families‘ participation 
may refer to their sensitive of discussing their practices that may accuse them. 
 
However, some BMs were very busy and their questionnaires were delivered to them by the 
general manager or secretary. Thus not all board members responded to the questionnaire, as 
Table 7.1 shows. 
Moreover, during the  distribution process, two MPs were very helpful in helping to contact 
the other MPs on the selected committees, and facilitated the process of questionnaire 
distribution. Many of t h e  respondents expressed a n  interest in the research topic and 
completed the questionnaire.  
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Also, for the regulators, who regulate the extent of listed companies‘ compliance with the 
Companies Act, the CBK and KSE were eager to participate, especially three colleagues, who 
encouraged their staff and mangers to participate and respond. The MOCI gave a different 
response compared with the request for interviews; during the first phase of the data 
collection (interviews), the department refused to participate, whereas in the second data 
collection phase they participated to some extent. This was a result of the researchers‘ social 
relationship with the assistant minister of public companies who, in turn, encouraged those in 
the department to participate. 
 
However, it was surprising that the CMA, who participated in the interviews, refused to 
participate in the questionnaire. This was because the contact person (board member) at the 
CMA had resigned and the new person instructed all staff and managers not to participate 
justifying that refusing as the CMA is not one of their tasks to participate in studies. 
After coding the responses to the questionnaire data according to respondents‘ type, the data 
was analysed using SPSS. For this purpose, the mean is reported to compare the views of 
respondents about the main factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code and the adequacy of 1960‘s Companies‘ Act (Article 15). The standard deviation was 
also used to reveal the variance of the responses. However, the questionnaire data responses 
did not have a normal distribution, which is a requirement for using the mean and standard 
deviation. The median is a more appropriate measure, but the median on a 5-point Likert scale 
would not give any useful information when comparing the views of respondents on current 
companies‘ practices and factors hindering the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code. Thus, although non-parametric tests were carried out to examine the differences between 
different groups, the means are reported to convey more information about the data.  
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Two non-parametric tests were used to examine the differences between the independent 
groups; the Kruskal-Wallis test and the Mann-Whitney test. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
to test whether there were any significant differences amongst the different groups‘ views. The 
Mann-Whitney test was used to identify which particular pairs of groups were significantly 
different from each other. Principle Components Analysis test (PCA) was also used for some 
of the questions (7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 14) to reduce the numbers of factors and distil them down. 
All tests were conducted throughout using a conventional 95% confidence level. The next 
sections discuss the findings from the questionnaire.             
 
The factors of self interest (M), favouritism (N), courtesies (O), and prestige (P), are derived 
from the interviewees in chapter 6 (see pages 164, 167, 169, 172, 194, 204, 210, 211, 212, 213, 
and 214), and to confirm these findings they were included in the questionnaire and translated 
into English for the purpose of this thesis. For instance, self interest was repeated by 
interviewees as one of the main factor influences the current practice and the issuance of 
Kuwaiti corporate governance code. To confirm this finding, a question 7 of the survey asked 
respondents: ―To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence good governance 
practices‖, self interest was included as a factor which might contradict governance practices. 
For instance, interviewee 2 refer the contradiction of current listed companies practices to the 
international corporate governance practices to the self interests associated with merchant 
families as he stated that: ―The resistance of the merchant families to the establishment of 
those committees ... is a result of protecting their interests ... by giving their power and control 
to those committees to manage and control companies ... they prefer to control them directly 
through board membership.‖ Also in question 10 (appendix 3) that asks respondents: ―To what 
extent do you agree that the following factors hinder the issuance of a corporate governance code in 
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Kuwait‖, self interest was listed as a factor to show how the self interests of the actors in the 
field might hinder the issuance of a corporate governance code.     
7.3 Corporate Governance Practices in Kuwaiti Listed Companies and 
Factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti Code of Corporate Governance 
 
Before asking respondents their views on listed companies‘ current practices and the main 
factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti Code for Corporate Governance, it was important 
to investigate their familiarity with the Kuwaiti 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15), the OECD 
principles of corporate governance, and the UK‘s combined code since the knowledge and 
understanding of any regulations might be one of the factors that influences governance 
practices in listed companies and hinders the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate 
governance. Table 7.1 shows the respondents‘ knowledge and understanding of regulations 
and codes. The understanding of Kuwaiti 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15) (3a) was ranked 
the highest (mean 2.34). This shows that most respondents had some knowledge and 
understanding of corporate governance. However, respondents were unfamiliar with the 
OECD principles (3b) and even less so of the UK's combined code (3c). 
Table 7.1: Knowledge and Understanding of Codes and Regulation 
Q Statement N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness  Kurtosis Rank 
3a Understanding of Kuwait 1960 Companies’ 
Act (Article 15) 
192 2.34*** 
 
0.936 
 
0.579 
 
-0.052 
 
1 
 
3b 
 
Understating of OECD principles of 
corporate governance 
192 
 
3.36*** 
 
1.050 
 
0.021 
 
-1.027 
 
2 
 
3c 
 
Understanding of the UK’s combined code 
 
192 
 
4.04*** 
 
0.891 
 
-0.576 
 
-0.518 
 
3 
 
Note:  A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, it ranged from 1= “very familiar” to 5 = “unfamiliar”. The ranking column is 
based in the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
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This result is in line with the interview findings reported in chapter 6, which indicated that 
some interviewees were unfamiliar with corporate governance codes. The difference here is 
that in chapter 6 the interview findings showed that regulators (R) were familiar with the 
OECD principles of corporate governance and the UK combined code, whereas the findings 
here show that they are not. In this phase of the study, the CMA refused to participate, unlike 
in the interview phase, at which time they showed a familiarity with both the OECD principles 
of corporate governance and the UK‘s combined code. Therefore for the regulators group, the 
non-participation of the CMA may have negatively influenced the whole group‘s response 
regarding familiarity with the OECD principles of corporate governance and the UK combined 
code. Table 7.2 shows the results by stakeholders group. In line with the interview findings 
reported in chapter 6 the BM, E, and I groups have a more limited knowledge and 
understanding of the 1960 Companies‘ Act (Article 15). This result raises some doubt of those 
groups‘ ability to criticise the regulations in the country and hence hinder the issuance of a 
Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Code. Table 7.2 also shows that all groups are neutral or have 
no knowledge about the OECD principles of corporate governance or the UK combined codes.        
Table 7.2: Knowledge and Understanding of Codes and Regulation: Difference between Groups 
 
 
 
Q 
  
 
 
Group Means 
K-W 
p-values 
 
M-Whitney P-Values 
 
 
Total of 
M-
Whitney 
difference 
 
R  
 
BM 
 
E 
  
I 
 
R, BM 
 
R, E 
 
R, I 
 
BM, E 
 
BM, I 
 
I, E 
 
3a 
 
2.03 
 
2.56 
 
2.42 
 
2.49 
 
.01*** 
 
0.00*** 
 
0.02*** 
 
0.00*** 
 
0.52 
 
0.62 
 
0.85 
 
3 
 
3b 
 
3.34 
 
3.12 
 
3.26 
 
3.51 
 
0.37 
 
0.35 
 
0.78 
 
0.36 
 
0.67 
 
0.07** 
 
0.35 
 
1 
 
3c 
 
3.98 
 
3.96 
 
4.16 
 
4.07 
 
0.72 
 
0.88 
 
0.33 
 
0.69 
 
0.29 
 
0.65 
 
0.44 
 
0 
 
Total differences  
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
Note: This table shows group means, p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows whether there are any differences amongst 
different groups, and p-values for Mann-Whitney tests, which shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from 
each other.                   
An *** indicates that there is significant differences between groups at 1% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
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Thus the knowledge and understanding of regulations are different between groups on the 
1960 Act (Article 15) it that shows that regulators understand more than the other groups. 
After identifying each group‘s knowledge and understanding of the current Companies‘ Act 
(Article 15), OECD principles of corporate governance, and UK‘s combined code, the 
respondents were asked which factors influenced governance practices in listed companies. 
Table 7.3 summarises the respondents‘ views about the factors influencing governance. The 
results in Table 7.3 indicate that all factors are influential (mean less than 3.00) and the most 
influential factors are the self-interest of board members (mean 2.09) and that of controlling 
shareholders (mean 2.17), whereas the least influential factor is the prestige of board members 
(mean 2.80) . 
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Table 7.3 Factors that influence governance practice  
Q Statement N* Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Rank 
7a 1960 Companies’ Law requirement  189 2.61*** 1.079 0.203 -0.615 11 
7b KSE regulation 189 2.47*** 1.003 0.367 -0.360 8 
7c Government monitoring and regulators 189 2.52*** 1.040 0.151 -0.721 9 
7d Annual general meeting of shareholders 189 2.55*** 1.162 0.294 -0.867 10 
7e Government ownership 189 2.45*** 1.028 0.404 -0.350 7 
7f Merchant families ownership 189 2.65*** 1.065 0.108 -0.746 13 
7g Mutual interest between major shareholders 189 2.36*** 1.170 0.534 -0.714 6 
7h Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government 
189 2.36*** 1.175 0.580 -0.641 6 
7i Controlling shareholder (s) 189 2.17*** 1.125 0.844 -0.145 2 
7j Executive management 189 2.27*** 0.983 0.332 -0.598 4 
7k Experience and qualification of appointees 189 2.36*** 1.016 0.350 -0.720 6 
7l Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
189 2.35*** 1.119 0.601 -0.436 5 
7m Self interest of board members 189 2.09*** 1.228 1.116 0.171 1 
7n Favouritism of board members 190 2.66*** 1.166 0.230 -0.748 14 
7o Courtesies 189 2.63*** 1.153 0.236 -0.781 12 
7p Prestige of board members 188 2.80* 1.074 0.217 -0.527 15 
7q Cultural influences 188 2.24*** 1.163 0.646 -0.507 3 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, it ranged from 1= “very familiar” to 5 = “unfamiliar”. The ranking column is 
based on the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement.  
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer all the questions 
These results are in line with the interview findings in chapter 6 where interviewees identified 
the obstacles behind not adopting corporate governance practices as political and government 
lethargy, social and cultural factors such as the network of actors presented in personal 
relationships and between merchant families and regulators, and their self and mutual interests. 
The interviewees in chapter 6 stated that some governance practices, such as appointing 
independent board members, are not applied in Kuwaiti listed companies as the 1960 
companies‘ Act (Article 15) states that board members should be shareholders. Thus, Table 
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7.3 confirms that cultural and legal factors affect Kuwaiti governance practice. The differences 
amongst each group‘s response were analysed next as shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 Factors influencing governance practice: differences between groups 
The number of 
agreement/ 
disagreement of 
groups 
 
Q 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values Total 
numbers of 
M-N 
differences 
Group R  BM E I   R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E  
 7a 2.53 2.48 2.37 2.82 0.11 0.51 0.319 0.07** 0.67 0.13 0.06** 2 
2 V 2 7b 2.52 2.20 2.17 2.64 0.05** 0.06** 0.03** 0.70 0.74 0.07** 0.03*** 4 
 7c 2.63 2.40 2.43 2.50 0.64 0.31 0.36 0.30 0.95 0.72 0.79 0 
 7d 2.63 2.32 2.59 2.55 0.75 0.26 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.45 0.94 0 
2 V 2  7e 2.37 3.04 2.70 2.22 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.09** 0.31 0.22 0.00*** 0.02*** 4 
2 V 2 7f 2.57 3.24 3.10 2.32 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 0.19 0.75 0.00*** 0.00*** 4 
2 + 2 7g 2.33 3.32 2.66 1.95 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.23 0.02*** 0.05** 0.00*** 0.01*** 5 
1 + 3 7h 2.35 3.24 2.59 1.99 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.36 0.05** 0.06** 0.00*** 0.02*** 5 
1 V 3 7i 1.98 3.20 2.52 1.84 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.07** 0.51 0.05** 0.00*** 0.02*** 5 
1 V 3 7j 2.28 2.48 2.69 1.89 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.04** 0.01*** 0.56 0.00*** 0.00*** 5 
 7k 2.42 2.36 2.28 2.34 0.92 0.77 0.58 0.54 0.81 0.81 0.91 0 
1 V 3 7l 2.45 3.04 2.45 2.01 0.00*** 0.02** 0.94 0.00*** 0.07** 0.00*** 0.08** 5 
1 V 3 7m 2.05 2.88 2.31 1.77 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.53 0.14 0.13 0.00*** 0.09** 3 
1 V 3 7n 2.70 3.32 2.63 2.41 0.01*** 0.03** 0.65 0.08** 0.06** 0.00*** 0.49 4 
1 v 3 7o 2.65 3.24 2.67 2.39 0.01*** 0.02** 0.80 0.12 0.111 0.00*** 0.41 2 
 7p 2.77 3.12 2.86 2.70 0.387 0.11 0.75 0.81 0.447 0.09** 0.57 1 
2 V 1 V 1 7q 2.07 3.24 2.59 1.92 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 0.27 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 5 
Total 
differences 
 2.40 2.90 2.56 2.25  12 6 6 6 13 11 54 
Note:  Group means, p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis test, shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, and p-
value for Mann-Whitney test, shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
The total group mean is the sum of factors means divided on the total number of the factors 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives. 
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E.  
 
 Table 7.4 shows that, according to the total average means for each group, the I, R and E 
group‘s average means (2.25, 2.40, 2.56) converge whereas the BM total average group‘s 
mean (2.90) is for more neutral. This suggests that the I, E and R groups agree more on the 
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influence of these factors on the governance practices (the means are less than 3), whereas the 
BM is less so on the level of influence of the factors except for the regulations and 
government, on which they agree.  
  
However, Table 7.4 shows that groups held significantly different views from each other on 
individual factors. For factors such as KSE regulations (b), government ownership (e), 
merchant families‘ ownership (f), and mutual interests between major shareholders (g) the 
views of the I and R groups were significantly different from those of the BM and E. These 
factors represent ownership structures and regulations. This finding is identical to that in the 
interview chapter, when the merchant families blamed the regulations and investors blamed 
the merchant families (board members and executive management) behind the current 
practices that contradict corporate governance.  
 
Regarding regulation, the Board Members and Executives might be trying to shift criticism 
from themselves as they are responsible for voluntarily adopting governance, and can blame 
the regulations for hindering the adoption of good practice. On the other hand, the Regulators 
and Investors may blame Board Members and executives for not improving the governance of 
their companies. Ownership structure was blamed by I and R as influential factors whereas 
BM and E were more neutral, in line with the interview findings where investors and 
regulators blamed government ownership and merchant families ownership behind the reason 
for companies not voluntary adopting good governance, and promoted their own self interest.  
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Another finding is that for eight factors
10
 the BM group‘s view was different from the other 
groups. This is not surprising since the other groups blamed the BM for advancing their own 
self interest and networking with the government. Hence, the E group, although they agree on 
factors that influence governance practices with the BM group may be trying to move criticism 
away from themselves and put responsibility on the BM. For instance, regarding (i) controlling 
shareholders and (j) the executive group, the E group and Board Members group have more 
similar views. 
 
According to Table 7.4, the I group is very different in terms of their views from the BM 
group with regard to 13 factors and also very different with regard to 11 factors from the E 
group‘s views. This may be because the I group think both the E and BM groups influence the 
governance practices of listed companies. 
 
It concludes that two different logics are identified here, BM and E groups refer their practices 
(material carriers) to the set of symbolic carriers of the organisational logics (Comapnies‘ Act 
1960, Articl 15), whereas I and R refer the existing practices to the set of material carriers that 
the actors of the field (merchant families and the government) have established.  
 
To distil the influential across all 17 factors a Principles Component Analysis (PCA) was 
conducted as displayed in Table 7.5. 
                                                          
10
 Mutual interest between shareholders and government (h), controlling shareholders (i), personal relationships between 
merchant families and regulators (l), self interest of board members (m), favouritism of board members (n), courtesies (o), 
prestige of board members (p), and cultural influences (q) 
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Table 7.5 Principal Components Analysis for factors affecting Governance Practices 
Factor Actor networks Coercive 
pressures  
Ownership Experience Executive management 
1960 Companies’ Law requirement  0.174 0.759 -0.038 -0.127 -0.303 
KSE regulation 0.095 0.836 -0.311 -0.217 -0.103 
Government monitoring and regulators 0.254 0.806 -0.126 -0.247 -0.060 
Annual general meeting of shareholders 0.108 0.436 0.210 0.458 0.646 
Government ownership 0.418 0.478 0.404 -0.048 0.392 
Merchant families ownership 0.596 0.129 0.434 -0.358 0.077 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
0.819 -0.099 0.386 -0.150 -0.061 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
0.840 -0.099 0.301 -0.129 -0.101 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.819 -0.013 0.126 0.170 -0.119 
Executive management 0.541 0.001 0.157 0.396 -0.482 
Experience and qualification of appointees 0.161 0.518 -0.032 0.654 -0.198 
Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
0.816 -0.143 -0.132 0.153 -0.040 
Self interest of board members 0.781 -0.261 -0.093 0.032 0.058 
Favouritism of board members 0.791 -0.135 -0.433 -0.095 0.134 
Courtesies 0.840 -0.068 -0.422 -0.018 0.112 
Prestige of board members 0.680 -0.046 -0.473 0.031 0.267 
Cultural influences 0.736 -0.181 0.086 -0.024 -0.099 
Eigen value 6.620 2.793 1.414 1.141 1.098 
Proportion of Variance 38.943 16.429 8.318 6.709 6.462 
Cumulative  38.943 55.372 63.690 70.399 76.861 
Note: This table show the highest selected factors in response to the question of voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices 
in the listed companies.  
 
According to Table 7.5, the first column shows the first factor labeled actor networks 
representing personal relationships and mutual interests with major shareholders and the 
government. Thus the role of the merchant families, through their strong interconnected 
networks throughout society, has a major impact on the way companies are run. Thus, social 
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ties are the most influential factor (material carriers). The law and regulations (the symbolic 
carriers of the organisational logics) are the second major factor that influences governance 
practices in Kuwaiti listed companies. Thus, the legal framework, as a coercive isomorphic 
force is important.  
 
This is in line with the interview findings where interviewees criticized the current 
Companies‘ Act as being outdated and contradicts principles of corporate governance. The 
third factor in Table 7.5 shows government and merchant families ownership versus board 
members‘ courtesies; prestige; and favoritism, the more ownership of government and 
merchant families, the less courtesies, favoritism, and prestige as they might want to control 
and manage the company by themselves; this practice contradicts principles of corporate 
governance that calls for the separation of ownership from management. The fourth factor is 
the experience and qualifications of appointees. In the respondents‘ view, and as for the 
interviewees in chapter 6 executive management are appointed and selected by the merchant 
families who control the board membership, and not from their experience, thus they follow 
the orders and interests of the merchant families. Thus, it might be coercive pressure, exercised 
by merchant families over executive management that influences the governance practices.  
 
The last factor and column shows that executive management is also a factor in how 
companies are run, and the more active the role of shareholders at the AGM that exercise 
coercive pressure over executives possibly the better the practices of the executives, as 
shareholders through the AGM can force executive management to voluntarily adopt good 
practices; if shareholders do not participate or monitor executive management the latter may 
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be able to advance themselves at the expense of the company. Further, normative pressure 
between executive management in listed companies is missing since they lack the professional 
qualifications and experience, as shown in column 4.  
 
Table 7.6 reports the factors that hinder the issuance a Kuwaiti corporate governance code. 
Table 7.6 shows that for regulation, monitoring, government ownership, and prestige, the 
means are close to neutral. 
 
However, Table 7.6 shows that the most influential factors that hinder the issuance of a 
corporate governance code are the lack of experience and qualifications of the legislators 
(mean 1.91), followed by the self interest of board members (mean 1.93), and controlling 
shareholders (2.02). The main hindrance is the lack of experience and qualifications of the 
legislators. Various parties are represented in parliament, such as the brotherhood, liberal, and 
opposition parties as, although they have the power to issue a code, this is opposed by the 
merchant families‘ party in parliament and the government, and they are unfamiliar with the 
corporate governance practices in other countries, and are not mindful of bringing about any 
change. Hence, there is a lack of normative isomorphic pressure that hinders the issuance of 
corporate governance code. 
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Table 7.6 Factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance 
Q Statement N* Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Rank  
10a 1960 Companies’ Law requirement  188 2.97 1.195 0.147 -0.915 13 
10b KSE regulation 188 3.11 1.234 -0.042 -0.970 15 
10c Government monitoring and regulators 188 2.93 1.138 -0.061 -0.665 12 
10d Government ownership 188 3.02 1.062 0.076 -0.369 14 
10e Merchant families ownership 188 2.62*** 1.139 0.070 -0.927 9 
10f Mutual interest between major shareholders 188 2.06*** 1.122 0.931 -0.117 4 
10g Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government 
188 2.06*** 1.100 1.101 0.625 4 
10h Controlling shareholder (s) 188 2.02*** 1.177 1.024 0.024 3 
10i Executive management 188 2.38*** 1.166 0.358 -0.862 7 
10j Experience and qualification of legislators 188 1.91*** 1.167 1.310 0.930 1 
10k Experience and qualification of regulators 188 2.06*** 1.162 0.940 0.020 4 
10l Personal relationships between merchant families 
and regulators 
188 2.31*** 1.212 0.762 -0.388 6 
10m Self interest of board members 188 1.93*** 1.133 1.229 0.655 2 
10n Favouritism of board members 188 2.71*** 1.204 0.209 -0.877 10 
10o Courtesies 188 2.61*** 1.247 0.454 -0.845 8 
10p Prestige of board members 188 2.91 1.146 0.157 -0.899 11 
10q Cultural influences 187 2.27*** 1.189 0.814 -0.308 5 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, it ranged from 1= “very familiar” to 5 = “unfamiliar”. The ranking column is 
based on the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
This in line with the findings reported in the interview chapter, as the interviewees criticised 
the lack of qualification and experience of legislators who are those with the responsibility for 
issuing a code; they further stated that the merchant families were a party in parliament and 
their representatives dominated the financial and economic committee in parliament and they 
stood against any attempts to update the current Companies‘ Act (Article 15) as it would go 
against their own self interest.  
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Table 7.7 displays the difference between the groups regarding the factors that hinder issuing a 
Kuwaiti Code of Corporate Governance and shows that the results are only slightly different 
from those in Table 7.4, whereby There is a split between the I and R groups‘ views versus 
that of the BM and E groups. According to Table 7.7, the I and R groups are nearly the same 
regarding their view of the factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate 
governance, except for three factors, which are executive management (i), personal 
relationships (l) and favouritism (n), and these differences may be related to the I group 
thinking that there is actor network between merchant families and the regulators which hinder 
the issuance of Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. The same harmonisation occurs 
between the BM and E groups, except for the controlling shareholders (h), courtesies (o), and 
culture influences (q) factors. These differences may relate to the E group‘s thoughts that the 
symbolic carrier of merchant families is the prevailing organisational logics, and the thoughts 
and beliefs of merchant families contradict corporate governance principles and this justifies 
their opposition. Overall, there were strong differences between the views of the I group and 
both the BM group (12 factors) and E group (10 factors), and between the R group and the BM 
group (11 factors). It is evident that the I group thought that the merchant families and 
executives hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance since they benefit 
from the current situation, and in turn these groups deny this charge and referring it back to the 
current companies‘ Act (Article 15), and the regulators as blocking the issuance of a Kuwaiti 
code of corporate governance. The interesting difference between the views of the R and BM 
groups is that the R group consider the BM group (merchant families) of hindering the 
issuance of a code since their control and interests will be affected if such a new code were 
introduced, such as a code of corporate governance, as the interviewees stated earlier in 
chapter 6. 
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Table 7.7 Factors that hinder issuing a Kuwaiti Code of corporate governance: differences 
between groups 
 
 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
Q Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values  
 
No. Of 
significant 
differences 
  
 
Groups  
 
R 
 
BM 
 
E 
 
I 
  
R, BM 
 
R, E 
 
R, I 
 
BM, E 
 
BM, I 
 
I, E 
 10a 3.00 2.96 3.10 2.90 0.91 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.94 0.48 0 
 *10b 3.21 3.04 3.17 3.03 0.85 0.36 0.96 0.54 0.78 0.91 0.58 0 
 10c 2.80 3.12 2.87 3.00 0.56 0.30 0.81 0.17 0.50 0.72 0.67 0 
2v2 10d 2.85 3.64 3.33 2.81 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.96 0.23 0.00*** 0.02*** 4 
2v2 10e 2.51 3.12 2.83 2.44 0.05** 0.02*** 0.23 0.75 0.35 0.01*** 0.15 2 
2v2 10f 1.97 2.80 2.30 1.79 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.31 0.24 0.15 0.00*** 0.07** 3 
2v2 10g 1.85 2.92 2.57 1.72 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.32 0.29 0.00*** 0.00*** 4 
2v1v1 10h 1.77 3.04 2.43 1.69 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.72 0.07** 0.00*** 0.00*** 5 
2v2 10i 2.39 2.96 2.67 2.06 0.00*** 0.04*** 0.36 0.06** 0.32 0.00*** 0.02*** 4 
2v2 10j 1.74 2.48 2.60 1.58 0.00*** 0.05** 0.00*** 0.12 0.63 0.00*** 0.00*** 4 
2v2 10k 1.80 2.60 2.87 1.75 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.47 0.48 0.00*** 0.00*** 4 
2v2 10l 2.34 3.04 2.63 1.90 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.38 0.00*** 0.22 0.00*** 0.00*** 4 
 10m 1.90 2.56 2.07 1.68 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.42 0.27 0.11 0.00*** 0.07** 3 
 *10n 2.85 3.00 2.57 2.54 0.26 0.64 0.26 0.10* 0.24 0.14 0.84 1 
 10o 2.69 3.12 2.47 2.43 0.12 0.19 0.30 0.18 0.08** 0.00*** 0.94 2 
 10p 2.82 3.24 2.70 2.96 0.31 0.13 0.56 0.40 0.13 0.27 0.28 0 
2v1v1 10q 2.18 3,04 2.50 1.99 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.20 0.38 0.10* 0.00*** 0.03*** 4 
Total 
differences  
 2.40 3.00 2.70 2.25  11 5 3 3 12 10 44 
Note: This table shows group means, p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows whether there are any differences amongst 
different groups, and p-value for Mann-Whitney test, which shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each 
other.          
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E.  
 
 
Again, a PCA (Principal Components Analysis) was used to narrow down the influential 
factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code, as shown in Table 
7.8. 
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Table 7.8 PCA for factors that hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code 
Factor  Actor networks  Coercive pressures 
Experience and 
qualifications 
Material and 
symbolic carriers 
1960 Companies’ Law requirement 0.302 0.817 0.114 0.343 
KSE regulation 0.275 0.790 0.092 0.377 
Government monitoring and regulators  0.330 0.715 0.308 -0.201 
Government ownership 0.561 0.491 0.236 -0.233 
Merchant families ownership 0.666 0.021 0.330 -0.379 
Mutual interest between major shareholders 0.785 -0.097 0.127 -0.388 
Mutual interest between major shareholders and government 0.804 0.001 0.023 -0.320 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.841 -0.160 -0.225 -0.231 
Executive management 0.689 0.148 -0.194 -0.070 
Experience and qualification of legislators 0.679 0.126 -0.555 -0.039 
Experience and qualification of regulators 0.603 0.229 -0.644 0.040 
Personal relationships between merchant families and regulators 0.737 -0.185 -0.111 0.227 
Self interest of board members 0.720 -0.232 -0.126 0.252 
Favouritism of board members 0.677 -0.369 0.433 0.165 
Courtesies 0.695 -0.429 0.303 0.225 
Prestige of board members 0.597 -0.184 0.481 0.320 
Cultural influences 0.736 -0.195 -0.220 0.328 
Eigenvalues  6.752 2.650 1.703 1.193 
Proportion of Variance 39.719 15.587 10.019 7.019 
Cumulative  39.719 55.305 65.324 72.343 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents that hinder issuance of Kuwaiti corporate 
governance code. 
 
According to Table 7.8, the first factor is that of the actor network between controlling 
shareholders, or major shareholders and their personal influences as part of the culture of 
Kuwait. This can be explained through referring to the findings of the interviews in Chapter 6, 
where the interviewees stated that, for example, the merchant families treated listed companies 
as their own personal fiefdoms and they thought that their companies should not operate 
without their control. It is expected that they would refuse to accept any code that would 
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diminish their control over their companies or challenge their practices because they dominate 
companies‘ boards and have power over the country‘s economy.  
The second factor is identical to that in Table 7.5, where coercive pressure through regulation 
and regulators are important. The third major factor is the lack of experience and knowledge of 
the regulators and legislators as a major influence on the lack of a code. 
The last column shows that the prevailing organisational logic are drive by material carriers as 
negative influences and symbolic carriers as a positive influence result of the actor networks 
between merchant families and the government (material carriers), have a negative impact 
contrary to the regulations (symbolic carriers).  
The reason why board members, who are often members of the merchant families, influence 
and hinder the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance is referred to by their 
current practices, as will be shown in the next section.  
7.4 Board members and executive management selection processes and 
minority interests 
 
The next question was concerned with respondents‘ views on the factors that influence the 
selection of Chairmen, Board Members and CEOs, the protection of minority interests, and the 
separation of the position of Chairman from the position of CEO.  
7.4.1 Factors that influence the Selection of Chairmen 
 
Table 7.9 shows that most factors influence the selection of chairmen, and only two factors are 
not influential (means above 3): executive management and the qualification and experience of 
the chairman. 
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The most influential factors again reflect the influence of merchant families and their actor 
networks as controlling shareholders (mean 1.74), merchant families ownership (mean 1.90), 
and self interest (mean 2.06) are the most important factors. 
Table 7.9 Factors Influencing the Selection of Chairmen 
Factor Statement N* Mean Std Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Rank  
Q8ia 1960 Companies’ Law requirement 188 2.29*** 1.062 0.448 -0.378 7 
Q8ib KSE regulation 188 2.31*** 1.139 0.721 -0.248 9 
Q8ic Government monitoring and regulators 187 2.96 1.163 -0.144 -0.531 14 
Q8id Annual general meeting of shareholders 189 2.30*** 1.228 0.811 -0.239 8 
Q8ie Government ownership 188 2.17*** 1.101 0.970 0.403 5 
Q8if Merchant families ownership 189 1.90*** 1.008 1.148 0.935 2 
Q8ig Mutual interest between major shareholders 189 2.14*** 1.186 0.910 0.012 4 
Q8ih Mutual interest between major shareholders 
and government 
189 2.29*** 1.200 0.684 -0.352 7 
Q8ii Controlling shareholder (s) 188 1.74*** 1.023 1.530 1.891 1 
Q8ij Executive management 188 3.09 1.134 -0.146 -0.591 15 
Q8ik Experience and qualification of appointees 189 3.23*** 1.032 -0.442 -0.010 16 
Q8il Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
190 2.35*** 1.128 0.884 0.074 10 
Q8im Self interest of board members 188 2.06*** 1.128 1.004 0.213 3 
Q8in Favouritism of board members 188 2.41*** 1.165 0.516 -0.467 11 
Q8io Courtesies 188 2.52*** 1.102 0.444 -0.356 12 
Q8ip Prestige of board members 189 2.31*** 1.097 0.808 0.059 9 
Q8iq Cultural influences 188 2.35*** 1.144 0.794 -0.139 10 
Q8ir Current Chairman’s preferences 188 2.88 1.143 -0.018 -0.540 13 
Q8is Existing board member preferences 189 2.19*** 1.078 0.628 -0.173 6 
Note: A  5-point Likert scale was used in this question, it ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The ranking 
column is based on the mean of all participants.                                                         
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
These results are in line with the findings from the interviews that actor networks are highly 
influential in the process of selection of chairmen in listed companies, where interviewees 
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stated that chairmen positions would always go to merchant families, specifically the family 
that owns the highest percentage of shares and usually the government votes for them whether 
through courtesies or their mutual interests such as getting favours for their votes in 
parliament. The interviewees also stated that, in agreement with questionnaire respondents 
experience and qualifications were not an influential factor in the process of selecting of 
chairmen.  
 
For further illustration, Table 7.10 shows each group's view of the most influential factors. The 
table shows that for the merchant families' ownership (f) as a factor, investors (I) and 
regulators (R) strongly agreed (means 1.75 and 1.82 respectively), whereas the Board 
Members (BM) and executives (E) agreed less strongly (means of 2.20 and 2.16 respectively). 
Regarding the factor of controlling shareholders (i), regulators, executives, and investor groups 
agreed that this was influential (means of 1.64, 1.77 and 1.71 respectively) but Board 
Members agreed less strongly (with a mean of 2.09). Thus, the prevailing organisational logic 
for selecting chairman is driven by symbolic carriers (beliefs).      
 
The I and R group had similar views together versus the BM and E group. This finding is 
consistent with what interviewees stated earlier, that the chairman position is usually for the 
family who owns the highest share percentage; investors in Chapter 6 stated that it was usually 
through government support, voting for the merchant families through their shareholdings, 
whereas regulators (chapter 6) stated that chairman positions are usually for the merchant 
families who own the highest percentage and this is coordinated by other merchant families. 
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Table 7.10 Factors influencing the selection of Chairmen: differences between groups 
 
 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Q 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values  
 
No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E 
 Q8ia 2.28 2.20 2.23 2.37 0.91 0.67 0.98 0.68 0.82 0.48 0.72 0 
 Q8ib 2.38 2.32 2.42 2.21 0.74 0.46 0.93 0.31 0.62 0.84 0.54 0 
 Q8ic 2.92 2.88 2.97 3.01 0.94 0.73 0.61 0.56 0.97 0.90 0.99 0 
 Q8id 2.38 2.32 2.13 2.29 0.88 0.75 0.42 0.65 0.71 0.99 0.63 0 
2v2 Q8ie 2.11 2.52 2.47 1.97 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.91 0.10 0.04 2 
2v2 Q8if 1.82 2.20 2.16 1.75 0.30 0.18 0.30 0.82 0.82 0.10 0.20 1 
 Q8ig 2.10 2.84 2.13 1.93 0.02*** 0.02 0.81 0.32 0.05 0.00 0.32 3 
1v3 Q8ih 2.23 3.00 2.48 2.00 0.00*** 0.01 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.00 0.02 3 
1v3 Q8ii 1.64 2.08 1.77 1.71 0.45 0.17 0.48 0.85 0.49 0.15 0.45 0 
 Q8ij 3.03 3.24 2.71 3.24 0.10* 0.29 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.74 0.03 1 
 Q8ik 3.03 3.00 3.23 3.48 0.06** 0.73 0.27 0.00 0.71 0.23 0.31 1 
1v3 Q8il 2.21 2.88 2.48 2.24 0.07** 0.02 0.21 0.53 0.24 0.03 0.16 2 
2v1v1 Q8im 1.85 3.04 2.39 1.75 0.00*** 0.00 0.03 0.61 0.06 0.00 0.00 5 
 Q8in 2.36 3.12 2.61 2.13 0.00*** 0.01 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.04 3 
2v2 Q8io 2.46 2.96 2.81 2.28 0.01*** 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.54 0.01 0.01 4 
2v2 Q8ip 2.18 2.84 2.77 2.03 0.00*** 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.82 0.00 0.00 4 
1v3 Q8iq 2.25 2.72 2.42 2.28 0.14 0.03 0.45 0.96 0.24 0.04 0.49 2 
 Q8ir 2.98 2.84 2.32 3.04 0.01*** 0.73 0.00 0.52 0.11 0.52 0.00 2 
 Q8is 2.44 2.56 2.42 1.74 0.00*** 0.86 0.72 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 3 
Total 
differences 
 2.35 2.42 2.47 2.29  8 4 2 2 11 9 36 
Note: The Kruskal-Wallis test,  shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, and the Mann-Whitney test, shows 
which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                                                                                                       
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
The total average of each group‘s mean show more agreement between I and R groups versus 
BM and E groups‘ view about the level of factors‘ influences in selecting the chairmen. Table 
7.10 shows that most differences on the factors influencing the selection of chairmen is 
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between the BM group and I group (11 factors). The I group think that the major shareholders 
in listed companies (the merchant families and the government) and the mutual interests 
between them and cultural factors such as personal relationships courtesies and preferences 
influence selection chairmen (material carriers), whereas merchant families (BM group) 
agreed less strongly.     
 
The second difference in Table 7.10 is between the I and E groups, where the E group agree on 
the influence of merchant families on selecting chairmen and disagree on the influence of 
government in selecting chairmen, this is possibly because the E group involvement with what 
usually happened in listed companies. The third difference in views are between the R and BM 
groups, the R group thought that the mutual interests between merchant families and 
government and cultural influences such as personal relationships, courtesies and favouritism 
were behind the selection of chairmen whereas merchant families disagreed with the R views. 
Thus, actor networks and material carriers are influences in selecting chairmen. 
 
The BM group does not agree with the others groups on actor networks and factors reflecting 
the merchant families‘ interests, thus the BM who are often from merchant families have far 
less strong views than those of the other groups on their own influence in appointing chairmen. 
The E group thought they had more of an influence than any of the other groups thought, they 
thought that chairman themselves exerted more influence from the other groups did. The I 
group thought that BMs had more influence than other groups. Table 7.11 distils down all the 
factors into four influences.  
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Table 7.11 PCA for Factors that influence selection of chairmen 
Factors  Actor networks  
Coercive pressures 
V material carriers 
Executive managements V 
Merchant families 
  Experience and 
qualifications  
1960 Companies’ Law requirement 0.377 0.604 -0.128 -0.361 
KSE regulation 0.419 0.232 -0.231 -0.106 
Government monitoring and 
regulators 
0.436 0.587 0.146 -0.095 
Annual general meeting of 
shareholders 
0.362 0.659 -0.068 -0.171 
Government ownership 0.649 0.277 -0.476 0.106 
Merchant families ownership 0.467 0.218 -0.610 0.290 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
0.639 -0.534 -0.194 0.027 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
0.664 -0.512 -0.222 -0.026 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.646 0.074 -0.394 0.270 
Executive management 0.259 0.092 0.578 0.526 
Experience and qualification of 
appointees 
0.198 0.357 0.360 0.619 
Personal relationships between 
merchant families and regulators 
0.816 -0.028 0.191 0.056 
Self interest of board members 0.770 -0.268 0.103 0.014 
Favouritism of board members 0.761 -0.320 0.179 0.047 
Courtesies 0.817 -0.222 0.257 -0.108 
Prestige of board members 0.836 -0.182 0.212 -0.155 
Cultural influences 0.700 0.011 0.363 -0.438 
Current Chairman’s preferences 0.315 0.524 0.390 -0.043 
Existing board member preferences 0.509 0.142 -0.256 0.182 
Eigenvalues  6.700 2.564 1.939 1.278 
Proportion of Variance  35.261 13.496 10.203 6.724 
Cumulative  35.261 48.756 58.960 65.684 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents that influence selecting chairmen 
 
The first factor reflects board members, owners, and merchant families have their own 
personal relationships and networks which lie at the heart of everything they do, in line with 
the culture of Kuwaiti business. This was confirmed by the interviewees when they stated that 
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one aspect of Kuwaiti culture is the social and personal relationships between the merchant 
families and the government to protect their own self interests. The second factor is the tension 
between, the influence of regulations and the mutual interests of the merchant families in 
selecting chairmen. Again, it matches the interviewees‘ statements that the merchant families, 
with their actor network with the government and regulators, weakens any coercive pressure 
from laws and regulations to establish their own practices that maintain their interests. The 
third factor shows the tension between merchant families who may even ignore executive 
management that run their companies, in choosing a chairman that will act in their interests. 
As found in the interview chapter; one of the interviewees (a general manager) stated that the 
power lay completely in the hands of the company‘s chairman, and that executive management 
just follow orders. The fourth factor shows that the qualifications and experience of appointees 
and executive management may have same bearing on the process of selection chairmen, but 
this is a weak, for the influence with an eigenvalues of just 1.278 compared to that of actor 
networks of 6.700. 
7.4.2 Factors that influence the selection of Board Members 
 
The next question is concerned with the factors affecting the selection of board members in 
listed companies rather than just chairmen. Table 7.12 shows that the experience and 
qualifications of appointees (k) do not influence the selection of board members, but all other 
factors may have some influence. A part from j and s which are neutral, the findings here are 
in line with the responses to the appointment of chairmen (Table 7.9) as the most influential 
factors are the controlling shareholders (mean 1.75) merchant families ownership (mean 1.93), 
and their own self interests (mean 2.01). It is noticed that experience and qualifications are not 
important, despite governance codes around the world which call for the diversity of boards.    
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Table 7.12 Factors influencing selecting Board Members 
Factor Statement N* Mean Std 
Deviation 
Rank  Rank for 
chairmen 
Mean for 
chairmen 
Q8iia 1960 Companies’ Law requirement 188 2.29*** 1.092 8 7 2.29*** 
Q8iib KSE regulation 188 2.27*** 1.144 7 9 2.31*** 
Q8iic Government monitoring and regulators 187 2.89 1.128 13 14 2.96 
Q8iid Annual general meeting of shareholders 189 2.20*** 1.198 5 8 2.30*** 
Q8iie Government ownership 188 2.22*** 1.086 6 5 2.17*** 
Q8iif Merchant families ownership 189 1.93*** 1.024 2 2 1.90*** 
Q8iig Mutual interest between major shareholders 189 2.12*** 1.176 4 4 2.14*** 
Q8iih Mutual interest between major shareholders and government 189 2.30*** 1.202 9 7 2.29*** 
Q8iii Controlling shareholder (s) 188 1.75*** 1.022 1 1 1.74*** 
Q8iij Executive management 188 3.09 1.150 16 15 3.09 
Q8iik Experience and qualification of appointees 188 3.28*** 1.012 17 16 3.23*** 
Q8iil Personal relationships between merchant families and regulators 189 2.33*** 1.031 10 10 2.35*** 
Q8iim Self interest of board members  190 2.01*** 1.103 3 3 2.06*** 
Q8iin Favouritism of board members 188 2.38*** 1.161 12 11 2.41*** 
Q8iio Courtesies 188 2.47*** 1.125 12 12 2.52*** 
Q8iip Prestige of board members 189 2.29*** 1.151 8 9 2.31*** 
Q8iiq Cultural influences 188 2.36*** 1.159 11 10 2.35*** 
Q8iir Chairman’s preferences 188 2.99 1.075 14 13 2.88 
Q8iis Existing board member preferences 188 3.07 1.152 15 6 2.19*** 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, it ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The ranking 
column is based on the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions. 
 
Table 7.13 shows the four groups‘ views on the factors influencing Board Member selection. 
The results are similar to those presented in Table 7.10 in that all groups agree on 6 factors that 
include, controlling shareholders and merchant families‘ ownership that influence the selection 
of board members. Thus there is no difference in the view that actor networks and the 
merchant families dominate board members.  
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Table 7.13 Factors Influencing Board Member Selection: differences between groups 
 
The number of agreement 
and disagreement between 
groups 
 
Q 
Group Means M-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E  
 Q8iia 2.23 2.36 2.23 2.35 0.94 0.84 0.81 0.54 0.84 0.86 0.76 0 
 Q8iib 2.28 2.36 2.42 2.15 0.82 0.85 0.71 0.47 0.73 0.81 0.38 0 
 Q8iic 2.79 2.92 2.97 2.93 0.70 0.34 0.31 0.45 0.92 0.73 0.72 0 
 Q8iid 2.21 2.24 2.13 2.19 0.99 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.97 0.92 0 
2v2 Q8iie 2.13 2.64 2.57 2.01 0.03*** 0.14 0.03 0.41 0.95 0.05 0.01 3 
2v2 Q8iif 1.85 2.20 2.19 1.78 0.33 0.22 0.31 0.71 0.91 0.13 0.18 0 
1v3 Q8iig 2.10 2.84 2.10 1.90 0.02*** 0.02 0.92 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.34 3 
1v3 Q8iih 2.23 3.04 2.52 2.00 0.00*** 0.01 0.13 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.01 3 
 Q8iii 1.66 2.08 1.77 1.71 0.48 0.20 0.55 0.74 0.49 0.15 0.45 0 
E Q8iij 3.05 3.28 2.65 3.25 0.05** 0.29 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.01 2 
 Q8iik 3.07 3.08 3.26 3.54 0.03*** 0.48 0.23 0.00 0.91 0.28 0.21 1 
2v2 Q8iil 2.20 2.92 2.55 2.15 0.01*** 0.01 0.09 0.52 0.25 0.00 0.05 4 
 Q8iim 1.79 3.04 2.39 1.68 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.64 0.06 0.00 0.00 5 
2v2 Q8iin 2.30 3.12 2.61 2.08 0.00*** 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.02 3 
2v2 Q8iio 2.41 2.96 2.81 2.20 0.00*** 0.05 0.07 0.18 0.54 0.00 0.00 4 
2v2 Q8iip 2.18 2.84 2.77 1.99 0.00*** 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.82 0.00 0.00 4 
1v3 Q8iiq 2.26 2.72 2.42 2.30 0.20 0.04 0.48 0.91 0.24 0.05 0.54 2 
 Q8iir 2.93 3.24 2.42 3.20 0.00*** 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.77 0.00 4 
 Q8iis 3.00 3.28 2.68 2.23 0.09** 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.66 0.03 2 
Total differences   2.21 2.51 2.50 2.30  8 6 2 5 9 10 40 
Note: The Kruskal-Wallis test, shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, the Mann-Whitney test, shows 
which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
The BM and E groups agreed on 14 factors and disagreed on 5 factors, reflecting actor 
networks (g, j, m, r, and s factors). For 2 factors h and m the BM group were neutral whereas 
the other groups strongly agree that merchant families selected board members. For one factor 
(s) the I group were alone as they disagreed that qualifications and experience influenced 
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board members appointments but the other agreed, possibly not wishing to acknowledge that 
qualification are not taking into account. Interviewees stated earlier in chapter 6 that board 
members were usually selected based on their ownership percentage in companies with a 
disregard to their level of experience and qualifications.  
 
Table 7.13 also shows that the I and R group agreed on 6 factors that influenced the selection 
of board members, whereas the BMs and Es groups disagreed. The I and R groups agreed on 
almost all factors that influence the selection process of board members, except 3 factors (j, k, 
r)where the I and R groups were more neutral on the influence of executive management, the 
experience and qualification of appointees and chairmen preferences. Another 2 factors (a, b) 
all groups agreed that regulations and law, it is common sense as the 1960 companies‘ Act 
(Article 15) identified that board members should be shareholders. Again the total average 
means of each group‘s view in table 7.13 shows that I and R group versus the BM and E 
groups view about factors influencing board members selection. Thus, both coercive and 
normative pressures affect the practice of selecting board members. Coercive pressure is 
applied through specifying that board members should be shareholders, and normative 
pressure is based on the actor networks between the merchant families and the government.  
 
Table 7.14 shows the principal components analysis of the factors distributed into 4 factors. 
The first factor, actor networks is almost identical to Table 7.11, thus these are the most 
important for appointing chairmen and board members. 
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Table 7.14 PCA for Factors that Influence the Selection of Board Members 
Factor  Actor networks 
Coercive pressures & 
Government ownership 
Board members 
preferences Merchant families Ownership 
1960 Companies’ Law requirement 0.374 0.657 0.186 -0.383 
KSE regulation 0.347 0.373 -0.083 -0.147 
Government monitoring and regulators 0.342 0.482 0.324 -0.298 
Annual general meeting of 
shareholders 
0.210 0.731 0.279 -0.062 
Government ownership 0.639 0.553 -0.033 0.207 
Merchant families ownership 0.460 0.495 -0.055 0.546 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
0.659 -0.172 -0.469 0.178 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
0.697 -0.088 -0.498 0.118 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.660 0.292 -0.034 0.411 
Executive management 0.269 -0.370 0.558 0.235 
Experience and qualification of 
appointees 
0.164 -0.012 0.642 0.346 
Personal relationships between 
merchant families and regulators 
0.820 -0.102 0.136 -0.098 
Self interest of board members  0.787 -0.205 -0.118 -0.071 
Favouritism of board members 0.772 -0.310 -0.135 -0.019 
Courtesies 0.817 -0.293 -0.113 -0.105 
Prestige of board members 0.842 -0.244 -0.067 -0.140 
Cultural influences 0.685 -0.119 0.057 -0.459 
Chairman’s preferences 0.293 -0.375 0.693 0.124 
Existing board member preferences 0.352 -0.197 0.715 -0.092 
Eigenvalues 6.444 2.636 2.483 1.272 
Proportion of Variance 33.913 13.872 13.069 6.693 
Cumulative 33.913 47.785 60.854 67.547 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents selecting board members 
 
The second column of Table 7.14 shows that the law and government ownership are the next 
most influential factors in selecting board members, as the government can coerce listed 
companies by law and set requirements for board membership, and by their ownership 
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percentage as being major shareholders can exercise normative pressure in appointing board 
members; this pressure was clarified earlier in chapter 6, where the government always votes 
for the merchant families for board membership. The third factor for appointing board 
members is the tension between board members preferences, including that of chairman and 
the executive management with the experience and qualification of appointees in. Merchant 
families ownership is the fourth influential factor in selecting board members, and this 
identical with interviewees statement in chapter 6 that merchant families control the majority 
of listed companies. Thus, the mutual interests between merchant families and government, 
through their personal relationships and actor networks play an important role in selecting 
chairmen and board members. Hence, the process of selecting board members is dominated by 
symbolic carriers in the organisational logics that have been established by the merchant 
families‘ thoughts and beliefs besides that Comapnies‘ Act; the material carriers in the process 
of selecting chairmen and board members is based on normative pressure and actor networks 
between merchant families and the government, which serves the symbolic carriers of 
merchant families and the government to maintain both of their self interests.  
 
7.4.3 Factors that influence the selection of CEO 
 
The last part of question 8 was concerned with the factors influencing the selection of 
companies‘ CEOs. Table 7.15 shows that most of the factors mentioned influence the selection 
of companies‘ CEOs except government monitoring (c) and executive management themselves 
(j). Respondents disagreed that the experience and qualification of appointees (k) affected 
CEO selection, thus, CEOs, and executive management are not appointed on merit and being 
fit for the job, but on other factors such as the merchant families and government preferences. 
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Table 7.15 Factors Factors influencing CEOs selection 
Factor Statement N* Mean Std Deviation Rank Rank for BMs Rank for 
Chairman 
Q8iiia 1960 Companies’ Law requirement 188 2.48*** 1.144 13 8 7 
Q8iiib KSE regulation 188 2.43*** 1.215 10 7 9 
Q8iiic Government monitoring and regulators  187 2.94 1.146  13 14 
Q8iiid Annual general meeting of shareholders 189 2.47*** 1.295 12 5 8 
Q8iiie Government ownership 188 2.31*** 1.175 7 6 5 
Q8iiif Merchant families ownership 189 1.97*** 1.069 3 2 2 
Q8iiig Mutual interest between major shareholders 189 2.22*** 1.221 6 4 4 
Q8iiih Mutual interest between major shareholders and government 189 2.31*** 1.204 7 9 7 
Q8iiii Controlling shareholder (s) 188 1.78*** 1.045 1 1 1 
Q8iiij Executive management 187 2.94 1.105  16 15 
Q8iiik Experience and qualification of appointees 188 3.13** 1.007  17 16 
Q8iiil Personal relationships between merchant families and regulators 189 2.33*** 1.051 8 10 10 
Q8iiim Self interest of board members 190 2.04*** 1.163 4 3 3 
Q8iiin Favouritism of board members 188 2.35*** 1.158 9 12 11 
Q8iiio Courtesies 188 2.44*** 1.095 11 12 12 
Q8iiip Prestige of board members 189 2.31*** 1.098 7 8 9 
Q8iiiq Cultural influences 188 2.35*** 1.121 9 11 10 
Q8iiir Chairman’s preferences 188 2.10*** 1.100 5 14 13 
Q8iiis Existing board member preferences 189 1.90*** 1.001 2 15 6 
Note:  A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The 
ranking column is based on the mean of all participants. Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the 
relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
 
Further, existing board members‘ preferences were the second highest factor followed by 
merchant families‘ ownership compared to table 7.9 and 7.12. Each of the four group‘s views 
about the influential factors on selecting companies‘ CEOs, is shown in Table 7.16.  
 
256 
 
Table 7.16 factors influencing CEOs selection: differences between groups 
The number of 
agreement and 
disagreement 
between groups 
 
Q 
Group Means K-W p-values M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E 
 Q8iiia 2.62 2.20 2.48 2.45 0.53 0.17 0.87 0.37 0.30 0.42 0.61 0 
 Q8iiib 2.57 2.36 2.55 2.28 0.41 0.31 0.89 0.11 0.48 0.85 0.32 0 
 Q8iiic 2.90 2.88 2.97 2.99 0.90 0.56 0.48 0.61 0.97 0.91 0.82 0 
 Q8iiid 2.59 2.60 2.48 2.32 0.58 0.99 0.86 0.18 0.86 0.38 0.43 0 
2v2 Q8iiie 2.23 2.64 2.70 2.10 0.07** 0.32 0.06 0.34 0.72 0.11 0.02 2 
2v2 Q8iiif 1.89 2.28 2.29 1.81 0.33 0.24 0.33 0.61 0.94 0.13 0.18 0 
1v3 Q8iiig 2.21 2.88 2.23 1.99 0.02*** 0.03 0.78 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.21 3 
2v2 Q8iiih 2.28 3.00 2.52 2.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.01 3 
1v3 Q8iiii 1.70 2.20 1.80 1.69 0.39 0.21 0.71 0.51 0.40 0.10 0.41 1 
 Q8iiij 2.70 3.24 2.74 3.11 0.04*** 0.03 0.96 0.01 0.15 0.50 0.13 2 
 Q8iiik 2.82 2.96 3.29 3.39 0.00*** 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.26 0.94 2 
2v2 Q8iiil 2.13 2.88 2.58 2.19 0.01*** 0.01 0.02 0.80 0.36 0.02 0.03 4 
2v2 Q8iiim 1.80 3.00 2.42 1.75 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.62 0.10 0.00 0.00 5 
1v3 Q8iiin 2.25 3.08 2.65 2.06 0.00*** 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.01 4 
2v2 Q8iiio 2.33 2.96 2.84 2.18 0.00*** 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.58 0.00 0.00 4 
1v3 Q8iiip 2.15 2.88 2.87 2.01 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.93 0.00 0.00 4 
1v3 Q8iiiq 2.23 2.72 2.45 2.28 0.16 0.03 0.34 0.87 0.28 0.05 0.42 2 
1v3 Q8iiir 1.84 2.60 2.10 2.14 0.06** 0.00 0.30 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.87 2 
2v2 Q8iiis 1.85 2.32 2.26 1.65 0.00*** 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.93 0.01 0.00 4 
Total differences   2.26 2.72 2.54 2.23  11 8 2 2 11 8 42 
Note:  The Kruskal-Wallis test, shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups.  
For The Mann-Whitney test, shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives 
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views , 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E.  
 
 Again Table 7.16 shows agreement between the I and R groups (average means 2.23, 2.26) 
versus the BM and E groups‘ views (average mean 2.72, 2.54) about the level of influences of 
each factors in the process of selecting CEOs. 
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Table 7.16 shows that all groups agreed (BM and E) to strongly agreed (I and R) about the 
influence of existing board members‘ preferences for selecting CEOs whereas regarding the 
chairmen and board members‘ selections, only the I and E groups agreed on the influence of 
board members‘ preferences. The change in the R and BM‘s views here may refer to the fact 
that there is no coercive pressure that sets requirements for CEO appointments. The interesting 
finding from Table 7.16 is that, for the first time, the BM and I groups agree that one factor, 
executive management influencing CEO selection, has no influence.  
 
The BM group disagree with the R and I groups over 11 factors and suggests that the BM 
group do not want to agree that networks of actor between merchant families (self-interests, 
personal relationships) and symbolic carriers (cultural influences and courtesies) are the main 
factors that influence CEO selection. This is identical to the interviewees‘ statements that the 
CEO is selected by the chairmen or board members to look after the interests of the merchant 
families who hire them, with no regard to their level of qualifications and experience.  
 
Only BM group regards the mutual interests between major shareholders (g) and self-interest 
(m), as not important. The agreement of the E group was identified in chapter 6 by executives 
themselves when they stated that there were selected based on their personal relationship and 
network with merchant families. The following Table (7.17) presents the 5 most frequently 
selected factors by all groups. 
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Table 7.17 PCA for Factors that influence selecting of CEO 
Factor  Actor networks     Coercive pressures Experience and qualifications Ownership    
Chairman’s 
preferences 
1960 Companies’ Law 
requirement 
0.491 0.588 -0.007 -0.437 0.060 
KSE regulation 0.437 0.466 -0.220 -0.135 0.189 
Government monitoring and 
regulators  
0.286 0.397 0.464 -0.251 -0.314 
Annual general meeting of 
shareholders 
0.402 0.716 -0.077 -0.126 0.129 
Government ownership 0.699 0.393 -0.078 0.258 -0.185 
Merchant families 
ownership 
0.517 0.344 -0.067 0.575 -0.276 
Mutual interest between 
major shareholders 
0.653 -0.372 -0.398 0.085 -0.033 
Mutual interest between 
major shareholders and 
government 
0.653 -0.350 -0.365 0.061 -0.148 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.684 0.095 0.127 0.351 -0.148 
Executive management 0.225 -0.286 0.686 0.100 0.309 
Experience and qualification 
of appointees 
0.107 0.055 0.787 0.225 -0.091 
Personal relationships 
between merchant families 
and regulators 
0.769 -0.116 0.151 -0.082 -0.161 
Self interest of board 
members 
0.793 -0.304 -0.059 -0.050 -0.050 
Favouritism of board 
members 
0.736 -0.340 0.118 -0.052 -0.136 
Courtesies 0.784 -0.305 0.082 -0.187 0.137 
Prestige of board members 0.845 -0.154 0.063 -0.163 -0.029 
Cultural influences 0.679 -0.095 0.043 -0.528 -0.060 
Chairman’s preferences 0.559 0.012 0.078 0.148 0.651 
Existing board member 
preferences 
0.654 0.194 -0.134 0.363 0.329 
Eigenvalues 7.105 2.246 1.754 1.385 1.015 
Proportion of Variance 37.393 11.821 9.231 7.287 5.341 
Cumulative 37.393 49.214 58.445 65.732 71.073 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents selecting CEOs 
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The most influential factor is actor networks for selection CEOs, as it is for selecting chairmen 
in Table 7.11 and board members in Table 7.14. Thus personal relationships between the 
merchant families, government, and regulators that represent the network of actors play an 
important role in the process of selection.  
 
The second most frequently selected factor in Table 7.17 refers to the law and AGMs, as 
coercive pressure is delegated to controlling shareholders to select CEOs and these controlling 
shareholders usually dominate the AGM. The third factor is experience and qualifications with 
the merchant families‘ is the fourth factor followed by chairmen‘s preferences, as stated 
earlier, chairmen are usually a family members that owns the highest percentage of shares, and 
control the selection and appointment of CEOs. 
In summary the major influence in selecting chairmen, Board Members, and CEOs is the actor 
networks of merchant families and the government (material carriers), and the merchant 
families can maintain their prestige and be dominant in the country‘s economy (symbolic 
carriers); these material and symbolic carriers of the merchant families‘ logics has established 
just one community of practice.    
7.4.4 Factors that affect the Protection of Minority Interests 
 
Question 9i elicited respondents‘ views on about the most influential factors that protect 
minorities ‘interests; and question 9ii also tries to identify the factors affecting whether there is 
a separation of the role of chairman and CEO. 
Table 7.18 shows that the most influential factors affect the level of protection of minority 
interests are self-interest (m) associated with controlling shareholders (i), often merchant 
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families. This occurs since the government supports them as a result of the mutual interests of 
the merchant families and the government (h) factor that represents the second highest factor 
selected by all groups.  
Table 7.18 Factors influencing the protection of minority interests 
Factor Statement No Mean Std 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Rank  
Q9ia 1960 companies’ law requirement 189 2.88 1.245 -0.011 -0.954 12 
Q9ib KSE regulation 189 2.72*** 1.125 0.277 -0.687 9 
Q9ic Government monitoring and regulators 188 2.67*** 1.187 0.237 -0.873 7 
Q9id Annual general meeting of shareholders 189 2.71*** 1.294 0.293 -1.053 8 
Q9ie Government ownership 189 2.76*** 1.098 0.180 -0.710 10 
Q9if Merchant families ownership 189 2.72*** 1.172 0.081 -1.134 9 
Q9ig Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
189 2.31*** 1.181 0.696 -0.472 3 
Q9ih Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
189 2.28*** 1.139 0.666 -0.405 2 
Q9ii Controlling shareholder (s) 190 2.28*** 1.270 0.674 -0.833 2 
Q9ij Executive management 190 2.47*** 1.130 0.513 -0.445 4 
Q9ik Experience and qualification of 
appointees 
189 2.98 1.141 -0.077 -0.592 13 
Q9il Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
190 2.57*** 1.114 0.383 -0.524 6 
Q9im Self interest of board members 190 2.17*** 1.161 0.939 0.153 1 
Q9in Favouritism of board members 189 2.72*** 1.190 0.137 -0.915 9 
Q9io Courtesies 189 2.86* 1.179 -0.015 -0.924 11 
Q9ip Prestige of board members 189 3.08 1.127 -0.168 -0.660 14 
Q9iq Cultural influences 190 2.54*** 1.283 0.494 -0.791 5 
Note:  A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The 
ranking column is based on the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
 
These results are similar to the previous findings. Table 7.19 shows each group‘s views about 
the most and least influential factors regarding the protection of minority interests.  
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Table 7.19 Factors influencing minority interests: differences between groups 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Factor 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E  
 Q9ia 3.11 2.92 2.13 3.00 0.00*** 0.56 0.00 0.64 0.03 0.81 0.00 3 
 Q9ib 2.79 2.92 2.55 2.67 0.49 0.74 0.18 0.46 0.26 0.43 0.37 0 
2v2 Q9ic 2.85 2.84 2.47 2.54 0.26 0.93 0.12 0.09 0.29 0.36 0.66 1 
 Q9id 2.84 2.68 2.58 2.68 0.78 0.57 0.35 0.43 0.80 0.94 0.72 0 
2v2 Q9ie 2.74 3.20 2.90 2.56 0.05** 0.06 0.33 0.42 0.22 0.01 0.10 3 
1v3 Q9if 2.69 3.48 2.74 2.47 0.00*** 0.00 0.82 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.31 3 
1v3 Q9ig 2.28 3.56 2.32 1.89 0.00*** 0.00 0.56 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 5 
1v3 Q9ih 2.23 3.48 2.39 1.85 0.00*** 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 
1v3 Q9ii 2.10 3.48 2.52 1.93 0.00*** 0.00 0.08 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.01 5 
1v3 Q9ij 2.56 2.96 2.19 2.34 0.08** 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.01 0.02 0.70 2 
Iv3 Q9ik 2.90 2.84 2.55 3.29 0.00*** 0.93 0.17 0.02 0.35 0.12 0.00 2 
1v3 Q9il 2.52 3.28 2.52 2.38 0.00*** 0.00 0.99 0.39 0.01 0.00 0.50 3 
1v3 Q9im 2.05 2.84 2.48 1.90 0.00*** 0.00 0.02 0.48 0.32 0.00 0.00 4 
2v2 Q9in 2.84 3.08 2.42 2.63 0.15 0.33 0.12 0.30 0.03 0.10 0.51 2 
1v3 Q9io 2.80 3.28 2.87 2.75 0.22 0.06 0.61 0.85 0.11 0.06 0.63 2 
 Q9ip 2.90 3.32 2.84 3.26 0.07** 0.07 0.82 0.04 0.10 0.62 0.08 4 
1v3 Q9iq 2.41 3.28 3.10 2.15 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.39 0.00 0.00 4 
Total 
differences  
 2.62 3.14 2.56 2.49  10 4 5 9 11 9 48 
Note: this table shows group means, p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows whether there are any differences amongst 
different groups, and p-value for Mann-Whitney test, which shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from 
each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
Table 7.19 again shows the similarity of the average mean of I, E, and R groups (2.49, 2.56, 
2.62) versus BM group (average mean 3.14), which means that all the three groups agree to 
some extent on the influence of merchant families and their mutual interests between them and 
the government. Also, the Table 7.19 shows that less than the BM group the R and I groups 
over many factors. Table 7.20 shows 4 factors from a factor analysis that affect the protection 
of minority interests. 
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Table 7.20 Principle Components Analysis for factors that influence the level of minority interests protection 
Factor  Actor networks  Coercive pressures 
Executive management V 
Prestige  
Regulations V Experience and 
qualification 
1960 companies’ law 
requirement 
0.566 0.576 0.145 0.158 
KSE regulation 0.518 0.542 0.094 0.499 
Government monitoring 
and regulators 
0.619 0.568 0.220 0.229 
Annual general meeting 
of shareholders 
0.545 0.570 0.030 -0.160 
Government ownership 0.838 0.046 -0.021 0.064 
Merchant families 
ownership 
0.761 -0.133 0.180 0.190 
Mutual interest between 
major shareholders 
0.746 -0.506 0.178 0.012 
Mutual interest between 
major shareholders and 
government 
0.766 -0.484 0.144 0.047 
Controlling shareholder 
(s) 
0.330 -0.381 0.037 0.476 
Executive management 0.588 -0.072 0.530 -0.368 
Experience and 
qualification of 
appointees 
0.396 0.450 0.202 -0.520 
Personal relationships 
between merchant 
families and regulators 
0.742 -0.242 -0.019 -0.041 
Self interest of board 
members 
0.725 -0.403 0.066 -0.075 
Favouritism of board 
members 
0.779 -0.022 -0.432 0.006 
Courtesies 0.779 0.022 -0.479 -0.100 
Prestige of board 
members 
0.646 0.184 -0.581 -0.146 
Cultural influences 0.717 -0.160 0.003 -0.178 
Eigenvalues  7.526 2.419 1.246 1.097 
Proportion of Variance 44.270 14.229 7.331 6.452 
Cumulative  44.270 58.499 65.831 72.282 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents affect minorities’ interest. 
 
These results are very similar to the previous ones with actors network dominating.  
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7.4.5 Factors that affect the separation of the chairman and CEO 
 
The perception of the factors that affect the separation of the role of chairman and CEO are 
shown in Table 7.21.  
 
Table 7.21 Factors influencing the separation of the chairman and CEO 
Factor Statement No Mean Std 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Rank  Rank 
for 9i 
Q9iia 1960 companies’ law requirement 189 2.89 1.180 0.031 -0.744 15 12 
Q9iib KSE regulation 189 2.86* 1.188 0.280 -0.800 14 9 
Q9iic Government monitoring and regulators 188 2.79*** 1.204 0.333 -0.813 13 7 
Q9iid Annual General Meeting of shareholders 189 2.57*** 1.318 0.574 -0.836 7 8 
Q9iie Government ownership 189 2.71*** 1.093 0.243 -0.724 9 10 
Q9iif Merchant families ownership 189 2.61*** 1.141 0.237 -0.927 8 9 
Q9iig Mutual interest between major shareholders 189 2.30*** 1.194 0.783 -0.270 4 3 
Q9iih Mutual interest between major shareholders 
and government 
189 2.27*** 1.147 0.696 -0.339 3 2 
Q9iii Controlling shareholder (s) 190 2.18*** 1.231 0.812 -0.535 1 2 
Q9iij Executive management 190 2.73*** 1.185 0.149 -0.861 11 4 
Q9iik Experience and qualification of appointees 189 3.12 1.061 -0.208 -0.382 16 13 
Q9iil Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
190 2.54*** 1.111 0.396 -0.632 6 6 
Q9iim Self interest of board members 190 2.23*** 1.171 0.788 -0.266 2 1 
Q9iin Favouritism of board members 189 2.72*** 1.175 0.133 -0.990 10 9 
Q9iio Courtesies 189 2.76*** 1.212 0.105 -1.071 12 11 
Q9iip Prestige of board members 189 2.72*** 1.171 0.290 -0.812 10 14 
Q9iiq Cultural influences 190 2.48*** 1.233 0.545 -0.660 5 5 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The ranking 
column is based in the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
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Table 7.21 shows controlling shareholders as the top influence in line with the findings in the 
interview chapter and the previous sections. The aim behind this CEO duality is to maximise 
the merchant families self-interests and remain involved and aware of the companies' day to 
day operations. Table 7.22 shows that the pairs of groups are significantly different from each 
other and the R, I and E groups agree for more strongly than the BM group. 
Table 7.22 Factors Influencing Separation of the Chairman and CEO: differences between 
groups 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Factor 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E 
2v2 Q9iia 3.21 2.60 2.19 3.03 0.00*** 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.30 0.09 0.00 4 
 Q9iib 3.15 2.80 2.58 2.75 0.08** 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.44 0.99 0.30 2 
 Q9iic 3.15 2.80 2.53 2.60 0.02*** 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.87 2 
2v2 Q9iid 2.79 2.20 2.29 2.63 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.44 0,78 0.14 0.23 2 
1v3 Q9iie 2.72 3.24 2.68 2.54 0.04*** 0.04 0.98 0.38 0.03 0.00 0.47 3 
1v3 Q9iif 2.57 3.40 2.52 2.42 0.00*** 0.00 0.77 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.79 3 
1v3 Q9iig 2.20 3.68 2.26 1.93 0.00*** 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.23 3 
1v3 Q9iih 2.18 3.40 2.29 1.94 0.00*** 0.00 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.09 4 
1v3 Q9iii 1.98 2.88 2.45 2.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.09 0.84 0.27 0.00 0.10 4 
1v3 Q9iij 2.89 3.12 2.32 2.64 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.27 0.01 0.09 0.18 3 
 Q9iik 2.97 3.20 2.81 3.35 0.28 0.28 0.55 0.01 0.16 0.67 0.01 2 
1v3 Q9iil 2.52 3.28 2.65 2.26 0.00*** 0.00 0.59 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.11 3 
1v3 Q9iim 2.05 3.24 2.42 1.95 0.00*** 0.00 0.05 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.01 5 
1v3 Q9iin 2.75 3.08 2.48 2.68 0.21 0.21 0.32 0.76 0.06 0.15 0.44 1 
1v3 Q9iio 2.62 3.20 2.81 2.71 0.04*** 0.04 0.35 0.65 0.19 0.09 0.75 2 
1v3 Q9iip 2.59 3.28 2.84 2.60 0.01*** 0.01 0.33 0.78 0.17 0.01 0.40 2 
2v2 Q9iiq 2.38 3.08 3.00 2.14 0.01*** 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.65 0.00 0.00 4 
Total 
differences  
 2.63 3.08 2.53 2.48  12 8 3 8 12 6 49 
Note: The Kruskal-Wallis test,  shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, the Mann-Whitney test shows 
which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
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Tables 7.22 shows a tension between BM group with other groups in most of factors, R, I and 
E groups stated that factors representing actor networks (material carriers) and symbolic 
carriers representing board members‘ preferences are influential in the separation if the 
chairman and CEO.    
 
BM and E groups are agreed that the 1960 companies‘ Act (Article 15) and the AGM factors 
are influential in the separation of the chairman and CEOs, whereas as R and I groups stayed 
neutralise. In opposite, the symbolic carriers (thoughts and beliefs) where seen influential by I 
and R groups, where BM and E groups stayed neutral.   
   
Table 7.23 shows 4 factors distilled from the principal component analysis that affect the 
separation of the chairman and CEOs positions.  
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Table 7.23 Principle Components analysis for factors that influence the separation of the 
chairman and CEO 
Factor Actor networks Coercive pressures Symbolic  
Executive management & 
Experience and qualification 
q9iia 0.373 0.755 0.201 -0.019 
q9iib 0.472 0.637 0.349 -0.164 
q9iic 0.517 0.643 0.380 -0.091 
q9iid 0.422 0.667 -0.145 -0.028 
q9iie 0.823 0.015 -0.030 -0.009 
q9iif 0.710 -0.237 0.166 0.205 
q9iig 0.738 -0.482 0.197 0.062 
q9iih 0.788 -0.432 0.174 -0.017 
q9iii 0.596 -0.309 0.424 0.140 
q9iij 0.595 0.090 -0.050 0.546 
q9iik 0.459 0.316 -0.372 0.646 
q9iil 0.795 -0.171 -0.011 -0.087 
q9iim 0.796 -0.254 0.161 -0.175 
q9iin 0.729 -0.035 -0.304 -0.257 
q9iio 0.740 -0.001 -0.454 -0.210 
q9iip 0.713 0.060 -0.506 -0.218 
q9iiq 0.732 -0.050 -0.005 -0.034 
Eigenvalues 7.463 2.615 1.325 1.014 
Proportion 
of Variance 
43.903 15.380 7.796 5.964 
Cumulative 43.903 59.283 67.079 73.044 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents affect minorities’ interest. 
 
Again the actor networks is the most influential factor affecting the separation between the 
chairman and CEO positions. Coercive pressure (regulations and regulators) is shown in the 
second column of most influential factors in the separation of the chairmen and CEO, followed 
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by symbolic carriers and then the experience and qualification of the appointees. According to 
the eigenvalues, the most important factor is related back to actor networks (7.463). 
 
7.5 Board Committees’ membership and the factors that influence their 
appointment  
 
Under this section, respondents were asked their views regarding board committees and their 
membership. Question 13 was split into two parts, the first part 13i teased out factors that 
influenced listed companies to have board committees, and the second part was about the 
factors that influenced the appointment of board committee members.  
 
7.5.1 Factors that influence Listed Companies having Board Committees 
 
Table 7.24 shows that the most influential factors that respondents identify are again 
controlling shareholders (mean 1.84), existing board member preferences (mean 1.87), and 
chairman preferences (mean 1.90). It is clear that controlling shareholders, often merchant 
families, and their preferences have the most influence over board committees‘ existence in 
listed companies. This finding is consistent with interview findings as interviewees refer to the 
absence of those committees as caused by coercive pressure of major shareholders over listed 
companies.  
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Table 7.24 Factors influencing having Board Committees 
Factor Statement No Mean Std 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Rank 
Q13ia 1960 companies’ law requirement 187 3.03 1.121 -0.133 -0.656 18 
Q13ib KSE regulation 187 2.83** 1.177 -0.153 -0.906 15 
Q13ic Government monitoring and regulators 187 2.72*** 1.149 0.261 -0.723 14 
Q13id Annual General Meeting of shareholders 187 2.14*** 1.134 1.032 0.396 5 
Q13ie Government ownership 187 2.59*** 1.105 0.352 -0.673 12 
Q13if Merchant families ownership 187 2.49*** 1.133 0.356 -0.735 7 
Q13ig Mutual interest between major shareholders 187 2.54*** 1.250 0.342 -0.974 9 
Q13ih Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government 
187 2.57*** 1.187 0.366 -0.734 11 
Q13ii Controlling shareholder (s) 187 1.84*** 0.942 1.106 0.764 1 
Q13ij Executive management 187 2.11*** 0.989 0.795 0.244 4 
Q13ik Experience and qualification of appointees 187 2.51*** 1.054 0.243 -0.565 8 
Q13il Personal relationships between merchant families 
and regulators 
187 2.65*** 1.197 0.236 -0.940 13 
Q13im Self interest of board members 187 2.29*** 1.166 0.683 -0.314 6 
Q13in Favouritism of board members 187 2.96 1.126 -0.075 -0.717 16 
Q13io Courtesies 187 3.02 1.075 -0.190 -0.449 17 
Q13ip Cultural influences 187 2.56*** 1.150 0.384 -0.689 10 
Q13iq Chairman’s preferences 187 1.90*** 1.048 1.243 1.131 3 
Q13ir Existing board member preferences 186 1.87*** 0.985 1.507 2.454 2 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The ranking 
column is based in the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
 
To trace each of the four groups‘ views about the most and less influential factors influencing 
having board committees, Table 7.25 shows each group separately.  
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Table 7.25 Factors influencing having Board Committees: differences between groups 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Factor  
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E  
 Q13ia 2.93 2.76 3.10 3.18 0.25 0.39 0.46 0.14 0,18 0.10 0.53 1 
 Q13ib 2.75 2.65 2.80 3.01 0.27 0.42 0.88 0.15 0.40 0.09 0.31 1 
 Q13ic 2.57 2.84 2.97 2.70 0.50 0.51 0.12 0.59 0.55 0.75 0.27 0 
 Q13id 2.20 2.60 2.40 1.83 0.01*** 0.11 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.00 0.04 3 
2v2 Q13ie 2.28 3.40 2.97 2.42 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.21 0.00 0.04 4 
1v 3 Q13if 2.31 3.24 2.57 2.35 0.00*** 0.00 0.27 0.58 0.04 0.00 0.39 3 
1v 3 Q13ig 2.34 3.24 2.73 2.38 0.02*** 0.00 0.21 0.71 0.19 0.00 0.26 2 
2v2 Q13ih 2.31 3.32 2.93 2.37 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.67 0.24 0.00 0.02 4 
2v2 Q13ii 1.69 2.32 2.00 1.73 0.07** 0.02 0.11 0.56 0.46 0.04 0.17 2 
2v2 Q13ij 2.08 2.56 2.37 1.86 0.01*** 0.03 0.20 0.25 0.56 0.00 0.03 3 
2v2 Q13ik 2.36 2.84 2.93 2.35 0.03*** 0.08 0.02 0.98 0.74 0.06 0.01 4 
2v2 Q13il 2.61 3.12 2.87 2.42 0.08** 0.09 0.32 0.35 0.47 0.02 0.10 3 
2v2 Q13im 2.07 2.96 2.83 2.03 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.72 0.00 0.00 4 
 Q13in 2.80 3.20 3.10 2.94 0.41 0.14 0.24 0.42 0.76 0.30 0.50 0 
 Q13io 2.90 3.20 3.13 3.00 0.59 0.24 0.31 0.58 0.79 0.41 0.57 0 
2v2 Q13ip 2.46 3.12 2.80 2.35 0.01*** 0.01 0.13 0.69 0.33 0.00 0.06 3 
1v3 Q13iq 1.84 2.40 1.97 1.76 0.04*** 0.01 0.30 0.90 0.21 0.00 0.20 2 
2v2 Q13ir 1.84 2.20 2.03 1.70 0.15 0.12 0.37 0.49 0.63 0.03 0.15 1 
Total 
differences  
 2.35 2.94 2.69 2.35  11 4 1 1 15 8 40 
Note:  the Kruskal-Wallis test, shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, the Mann-Whitney test shows 
which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.                  
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
Again there is a split between BM and the I and R groups, with 11 and 15 differences 
respectively in Table (7.25). Also actor networks are highly agreed by I and R groups whereas 
BM and E groups stayed neutral. In order to distil the factors across all 18 factors a PCA was 
conducted as displayed in table 7.26. 
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Table 7.26 PCA for factors that influence having Board Committees 
Factor 
Actor networks & 
symbolic carriers 
Coercive 
pressures Major shareholders Merchant families  
Government and 
merchant families 
ownership 
1960 companies’ law 
requirement 
0.445 0.649 0.332 -0.143 -0.335 
KSE regulation 0.460 0.693 0.290 -0.231 -0.070 
Government monitoring and 
regulators 
0.523 0.599 0.212 -0.024 0.286 
Annual General Meeting of 
shareholders 
0.476 0.526 -0.365 .0255 -0.041 
Government ownership 0.601 0.180 -0.429 -.0195 0.435 
Merchant families ownership 0.642 -0.016 -0.484 -0.218 0.337 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
0.764 -0.181 -0.241 -0.231 -0.424 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
0.716 -0.114 -0.175 -0.202 -0.418 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.532 -0.134 -0.398 0.135 0.015 
Executive management 0.669 0.165 -0.268 0.245 -0.120 
Experience and qualification of 
appointees 
0.659 0.178 0.001 0.326 0.161 
Personal relationships between 
merchant families and 
regulators 
0.812 -0.214 0.172 -0.215 0.048 
Self interest of board members 0.796 -0.290 0.048 0.124 -0.241 
Favouritism of board members 0.689 -0.335 0.369 -0.326 0.250 
Courtesies 0.722 -0.298 0.318 -0.303 0.247 
Cultural influences 0.804 -0.193 0.131 0.067 -0.183 
Chairman’s preferences 0.647 -0.240 0.113 0.531 0.059 
Existing board member 
preferences 
0.533 -0.084 0.393 0.585 0.138 
Eigenvalues  7.584 2.125 1.565 1.393 1.139 
Proportion of Variance 42.133 11.804 8.692 7.738 6.329 
Cumulative  42.133 53.937 62.629 70.367 76.696 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents affect minorities’ interest. 
 
Table 7.26 shows that the most frequently selected factors for influencing having 
boardcommittees are actor networks between the merchant families and regulators, and the 
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symbolic carriers within the organisational logics. The second most frequently selected factor 
refers to the existing regulations and monitoring bodies. As noted in chapter 6, the 
interviewees mentioned that the coercive pressure are missing; besides, the regulators have 
relationships and networks with the merchant families and they also lack the knowledge and 
qualifications to update the current Act (Article 15) to include the enforcement of establishing 
a board committee.  
 
The third most frequently selected factor again refers to the merchant families and government 
ownership in the listed companies, which is in line with the interviewees‘ statement that the 
major shareholders in Kuwaiti listed companies control both the board members and executive 
management and oppose any amendment that minimises their power and control. The fourth 
most frequently selected factor refers to the preferences of the chairman and board members, 
often the merchant families. This usually conflicts with their preferences since they are willing 
to maintain their control over the listed companies; hence, their preferences usually affect the 
existence of such committees. The least frequently selected factor is the merchant families, 
government ownership and their mutual interests. The existence of the merchant families and 
government as major shareholders usually arises, according to the interviewees‘ statements 
outlined in chapter 6, due to the mutual interests between those major shareholders, which can 
negatively influence the existence or otherwise of board committees. In general the actor 
network between merchant families with the government and regulators; besides, the weak 
coercive pressure from regulator side are the main influential factors of having board 
committees.   
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7.5.2 Factors that influence appointing of Board Committee Members 
 
Under this section, respondents show their views about the factors that influence selecting 
Board Committee members. Table 7.27 shows the same results as Table 7.24 about the factors 
that have no influence, little influence and much influence. In the case of Table 7.24 however, 
the most influential factor is controlling shareholders and in this case it is board members‘ 
preferences.   
Table 7.27 Factors influencing appointing Board Committee Members 
Factor Statement No Mean Std Deviation Rank of 13ii Rank of 13i 
Q13iia 1960 companies’ law requirement 187 3.06 1.105 16 18 
Q13iib KSE regulation 187 2.86** 1.180 13 15 
Q13iic Government monitoring and regulators 187 2.75*** 1.138 12 14 
Q13iid Annual General Meeting of shareholders 187 2.17*** 1.136 5 5 
Q13iie Government ownership 187 2.58*** 1.096 11 12 
Q13iif Merchant families ownership 187 2.49*** 1.133 6 7 
Q13iig Mutual interest between major shareholders 187 2.51*** 1.272 8 9 
Q13iih Mutual interest between major shareholders 
and government 
187 2.53*** 1.206 9 11 
Q13iii Controlling shareholder (s) 186 1.88*** 0.970 3 1 
Q13iij Executive management 186 2.15*** 1.006 4 4 
Q13iik Experience and qualification of appointees 186 2.50*** 1.062 7 8 
Q13iil Personal relationships between merchant 
families and regulators 
186 2.55*** 1.148 10 13 
Q13iim Self interest of board members 186 2.22*** 1.104 6 6 
Q13iin Favouritism of board members 186 2.92 1.112 14 16 
Q13iio Courtesies 186 2.95 1.084 15 17 
Q13iip Cultural influences 186 2.49*** 1.111 6 10 
Q13iiq Chairman’s preferences 186 1.82*** 0.904 2 3 
Q13iir Existing board member preferences 185 1.77*** 0.804 1 2 
Note:  A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The 
ranking column is based on the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
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The differences between Tables 7.24, and 7.27 may refer to whether the controlling 
shareholders and merchant families agree on having board committees; the process of selecting 
the board committees‘ members may refer to the existing board members and chairmen.  
 
Table 7.28 shows each group‘s views about the influence of the 18 factors over the 
appointment of board committee members and all groups agree about the influence of 
regulations, regulators and courtesies factors over appointment of board committees‘ members, 
as regulations and courtesies have neutral influence over appointing board committee 
members.  
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Table 7.28 Factors that influence the appointment of Board Committee members: 
differences between groups 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Factor 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, 
E 
BM, 
I 
I, E  
 Q13iia 2.93 2.96 3.07 3.21 0.41 0.96 0.57 0.11 0.62 0.35 0.36 0 
 Q13iib 2.75 2.68 2.77 3.04 0.33 0.82 0.98 0.12 0.86 0.21 0.19 0 
 Q13iic 2.61 2.92 2.93 2.75 0.57 0.36 0.18 0.58 0.85 0.59 0.39 0 
 Q13iid 2.23 2.64 2.40 1.85 0.01*** 0.10 0.71 0.05 0.37 0.00 0.08 4 
2v2 Q13iie 2.26 3.28 2.90 2.46 0.00*** 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.25 0.00 0.11 3 
1v3 Q13iif 2.33 3.16 2.47 2.39 0.03*** 0.00 0.53 0.52 0.04 0.00 0.82 3 
1v3 Q13iig 2.31 3.24 2.63 2.38 0.03*** 0.00 0.38 0.60 0.13 0.00 0.56 2 
2v2 Q13iih 2.28 3.32 2.80 2.35 0.00*** 0.00 0.06 0.60 0.14 0,00 0.10 4 
1v3 Q13iii 1.69 2.36 1.97 1.83 0.11 0.02 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.10 0.56 2 
 Q13iij 2.13 2.60 2.31 1.93 0.05** 0.07 0.48 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.14 2 
2v2 Q13iik 2.38 2.60 2.90 2.41 0.22 0.55 0.04 0.83 0.32 0.63 0.05 2 
2v2 Q13iil 2.48 3.04 2.83 2.34 0.07** 0.07 0.21 0.44 0.56 0.02 0.08 3 
2v2 Q13iim 1.97 2.92 2.72 1.97 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.58 0.00 0.00 4 
2v2 Q13iin 2.75 3.20 3.10 2.90 0.32 0.10 0.22 0.39 0.78 0.24 0.46 1 
 Q13iio 2.80 3.16 3.07 2.94 0.51 0.19 0.31 0.36 0.77 0.41 0.68 0 
1v3 Q13iip 2.39 3.04 2.66 2.32 0.04*** 0.01 0.29 0.78 0.25 0.00 0.20 2 
1v3 Q13iiq 1.67 2.32 1.97 1.72 0.02*** 0.00 0.14 0.65 0.27 0.01 0.22 2 
2v2 Q13iir 1.67 2.16 2.04 1.61 0.07** 0.04 0.20 0.71 0.63 0.01 0.11 2 
Total 
differences 
 2.31 2.86 2.64 2.35  13 4 1 1 12 5 36 
Note:  The Kruskal-Wallis test shows whether there are any differences amongst different groups, the Mann-Whitney test shows 
which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from each other.            
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
However, again The BM and E groups views do not accord with those of the I and R groups. 
The highest differences in views is between the BM and R groups (13 factors) and between 
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BM and I group (12 factors) as noted in the previous sections. In order to condense the factor 
from 18 a factor was conducted as displayed in Table 7.29. 
Table 7.29 PCA for factors that influence the appointment of Board Committee Members 
 
Note: this table shows the most influential factors have been selected by respondents affect minorities’ interest. 
 
Factor  Actor networks  Coercive pressures Symbolic carriers 
Merchant families & 
Government V Board 
members‘ preferences Government  
1960 companies’ law requirement 0.370 0.723 -0.336 -0.134 -0.262 
KSE regulation 0.397 0.750 -0.312 -0.041 0.012 
Government monitoring and 
regulators 
0.460 0.637 0.037 0.211 0.318 
Annual General Meeting of 
shareholders 
0.400 0.523 0.379 -0.234 -0.079 
Government ownership 0.295 0.001 0.340 -0.076 0.725 
Merchant families ownership 0.675 -0.136 0.166 -0.177 0.301 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders 
0.769 -0.205 -0.070 -0.499 -0.112 
Mutual interest between major 
shareholders and government 
0.709 -0.127 -0.064 -0.413 -0.073 
Controlling shareholder (s) 0.557 -0.167 0.397 -0.123 -0.072 
Executive management 0.701 0.199 0.274 0.083 -0.080 
Experience and qualification of 
appointees 
0.608 0.214 0.272 0.294 0.082 
Personal relationships between 
merchant families and regulators 
0.800 -0.134 -0.276 0.043 0.058 
Self interest of board members 0.801 -0.249 0.015 -0.104 -0.113 
Favouritism of board members 0.688 -0.247 -0.479 0.290 0.215 
Courtesies 0.697 -0.260 -0.473 0.253 0.134 
Cultural influences 0.792 -0.139 -0.157 -0.005 -0.176 
Chairman’s preferences 0.627 -0.212 0.402 0.197 -0.254 
Existing board member preferences 0.469 -0.008 0.273 0.571 -0.325 
Eigenvalues 6.955 2.228 1.604 1.209 1.109 
Proportion of Variance 38.637 12.377 8.913 6.719 6.160 
Cumulative  38.637 51.014 59.927 66.646 72.806 
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Table 7.29 shows almost similar results with the findings in Table 7.26 considering the 
previous findings.  
7.6 The impact of merchant families on the Government; regulators; 
legislators; and companies’ management and practices 
 
The final part of the questionnaire covered the respondents‘ views about the merchant 
families‘ power and authority over the government, regulators, legislators, and companies‘ 
management. Table 7.30 shows that merchant families have a strong influence over all of these 
they have and that they permeate the whole of society in decision making and power.  
 
Table 7.30 Merchant families’ influence 
Q Statement N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Rank  
14a Government 187 1.75*** 0.913 1.248 1.221 2 
14b Legislators 186 2.37*** 1.254 0.541 -0.864 6 
14c Regulators 185 2.45*** 1.098 0.282 -0.707 7 
14d Board members 187 1.73*** 0.832 1.330 2.203 1 
14e Executive management 186 1.77*** 0.848 1.268 1.902 3 
14f Applying codes and law 184 2.57*** 1.186 0.261 -0.756 8 
14g The process of board committee membership 
selection 
184 1.92*** 0.983 1.200 1.267 5 
14h Current company practices 184 1.86*** 1.002 1.101 0.582 4 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used in this question, values ranged from 1= “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree”. The ranking 
column is based in the mean of all participants.                                                          
Although the data is not normally distributed, the mean is shown to show the relative strength of agreement/disagreement. 
An * indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 10% level. 
An ** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 5% level. 
An *** indicates that the mean is significantly different from the neutral response of 3.00 at 1% level. 
N* in the table is less than 192 as there is some respondents did not answer the whole questions 
 
This positive influence for all the above factors supports the assumption that merchant families 
are the main actors in the organisational field and that they are well connected with the 
government and regulators by establishing networks with the decision makers in the country, 
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thus through their political represent often in parliament and by normative pressures as board 
members in listed companies there is a single community of practice over corporate 
governance. Thus, the influence of merchant families showing that they are competing 
organisational logics by not making any head way in changing these dominant logics. 
 
The question that arises is whether all the groups‘ views were the same. Table 7.31 shows each 
group‘s view in regard to the merchant families influence. 
 
Table 7.31 merchant families’ influence: differences between groups 
The number 
of agreement 
and 
disagreement 
between 
groups 
 
Factor 
Group Means K-W 
p-values 
M-Whitney P-Values No. Of 
significant 
differences 
R BM E I  R, BM R, E R, I BM, E BM, I I, E 
1v3 Q14a 1.66 2.60 1.77 1.52 0.00*** 0.00 0.43 0.34 0.01 0.00 0.09 4 
1v3 Q14b 2.07 3.24 2.50 2.25 0.00*** 0.00 0.52 0.38 0.03 0.00 0.21 3 
1v3 Q14c 2.17 3.24 2.60 2.34 0.00*** 0.00 0.06 0.46 0.02 0.00 0.20 4 
2 v 2 Q14d 1.57 2.12 2.17 1.56 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.86 0.00 0.00 4 
2 v 2 Q14e 1.58 2.32 2.23 1.54 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.77 0.00 0.00 4 
2 v 2 Q14f 2.24 3.12 2.93 2.49 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.54 0.02 0.09 4 
2 v 2 Q14g 1.73 2.36 2.37 1.74 0.00*** 0.00 0.01 0.86 0.69 0.00 0.01 4 
2 v 2 Q14h 1.63 2.76 2.30 1.56 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.15 0.00 0.00 4 
Total 
differences  
 1.83 2.72 2.35 1.87  8 6 0 3 8 6 31 
Note: this table shows group means, p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis test, which shows whether there are any differences amongst 
different groups, and p-value for Mann-Whitney test, which shows which particular pairs of groups are significantly different from 
each other.                                                                                                        
An * indicated that there is significant differences between groups at 5% level. 
R= regulators, BM= board members, I= investors, E= executives  
The first column shows the agreement and disagreement between the group’s views, 2v2 = BM+E  V  I+R, 1v3 = BM  v I+R+E. 
 
Table 7.31 shows that the R and I groups agree with each other but the BM and E groups agree 
much less strongly than the I and R groups about the influence.  
278 
 
7.7 Summary  
 
This chapter shows that there seems to be a general agreement that networks of actor involving 
the merchant families and the government are the most influential factor affecting corporate 
governance and the fact that there is no corporate governance code. Table 7.32 summaries the 
factors with the highest means from all the proceeding tables in this chapter that influence 
governance practices in Kuwait. 
Table 7.32 The most influential factors in all the above questions  
Table   
Question 
The highest means  
1 2 3 
7.3 Factors influencing governance 
practices 
Self interest of 
board members  
Controlling 
shareholders 
Cultural influences 
7.6 Factors hindering the issuance of a 
Kuwaiti corporate governance code 
Lack of experience 
and qualifications 
of legislators 
Self interest of 
board members  
Controlling shareholders 
7.9 Factors influence selecting chairman Controlling 
shareholders 
Merchant families 
ownership 
Self interest of board 
members 
7.12 Factors influence selecting BMs Controlling 
shareholders 
Merchant families Self interest of board 
members 
7.15 Factors influence selecting CEO Controlling 
shareholders 
Merchant families 
ownership 
Self interests of board 
members 
7.18 Factors affecting the protection of 
minority interests 
Self interests of 
Board members 
Controlling 
shareholders 
Mutual interest between 
merchant families and the 
government 
7.21 Factors affect the separation of the 
chairman and CEO 
Self interest of 
board members 
Controlling 
shareholders 
Mutual interest between 
merchant families and the 
government 
7.24 Factors influence having board 
committees 
Controlling 
shareholders 
Existing board 
members 
preferences 
Chairman‘s preferences 
7.27 Factors influencing appointing board 
committees‘ members 
Board members‘ 
preferences 
Chairman‘s 
preferences 
Controlling shareholders 
7.30 Merchant families influence  Board members Government Executive management 
Note: this table shows the three most influential factors in each section. 
In Table 7.32 the two most frequent factors are controlling shareholders and the self interest of 
board members, those factors are highly influential on the current governance practices of 
listed companies and has hindered the issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. 
According to the four different group‘s views, there is some convergence between them, as 
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Table 7.33 shows; convergence is often between the I, R, and E groups versus the BM group, 
or between the I and R groups versus the BM and E groups together. The BM group represents 
the merchant families, and clearly their views often contradict those of the regulators and 
individual investors.      
Table 7.33 The convergence of each groups’ views  
 
Table  
I + R     V    BM + E 
2         V          2 
BM    V   I+R+E 
1     V     3 
 
Total differences  
 
Total factors  
7.4 3 5 
8 17 
7.7 7 - 7 17 
7.10 4 4 8 19 
7.13 6 3 9 19 
7.16 7 6 13 19 
7.19 3 10 13 17 
7.22 3 9 12 17 
7.25 9 3 12 18 
7.28 7 5 12 18 
7.31 5 3 8 8 
Total 54 48 102 169 
Notes: this table shows the first column tables 7.4; 7.7; 7.10; 7.13; 7.16; 7.19; 7.22; 7.25; 7.28; 7.31.  
The rest of factor are in some questions are agree, and in other are all different 
 
Table 7.33 shows that in the first four tables (7.4, 7.7, 7.10, 7.13) there is more agreement 
between the groups specifically on the influence of the regulations. In contrast, other tables 
show less agreement between groups, as the I and R groups refer to the influence networks of 
actors on the current corporate governance practices of listed companies, whereas the BM 
group refers to the existing regulations.     
 
Table 7.34 also shows that the main factors from the PCA, are networks of actor (10), coercive 
pressure (9), experience and qualifications (6), and symbolic carriers (4) that reflect corporate 
governance practices in Kuwait.  
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Table 7.34 The summary of PCA tables 
 
Table  
 
Question 
The 5 most highest selected factors 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7.5 
Factors influence 
governance practices 
networks of 
Actor 
 
Coercive 
pressures  
Ownership  Experience and 
qualifications 
Executive 
management 
 
7.8 
Factors hinder the 
issuance of Kuwaiti 
corporate governance 
code 
 
networks of 
Actor 
 
Coercive 
pressures 
 
Experience and 
qualifications 
Material and 
symbolic carriers  
 
 
- 
 
7.11 
Factors influence selecting 
chairman 
Networks of 
Actor 
Coercive 
pressures V 
material 
carriers 
Executive 
management and 
merchant families 
Experiance and 
qualifications  
 
 
- 
7.14 Factors influence selecting 
BMs 
Networks of 
Actor 
Coercive 
pressures and 
government 
 
Board members 
Merchant families  
- 
 
7.17 
 
Factors influence selecting 
CEO 
Networks of 
Actor 
 
Coercive 
pressures 
 
Experience and 
qualifications 
Government and 
merchant families 
ownership 
 
Chairman 
preferences 
 
7.20 
Factors affecting the 
protection of minority 
interests 
networks of 
Actor 
Coercive 
pressures 
Executive 
management and 
prestige 
Regulations and 
experience and 
qualification 
 
- 
 
7.23 
Factors affect the 
separation of the 
chairman and CEO 
Networks of 
Actor 
 
Coercive 
pressures 
 
Symbolic carriers  
Executive 
management and 
experience and 
qualifications 
 
- 
 
 
 
7.26 
 
 
Factors influence having 
board committees 
Networks of 
Actor and 
symbolic 
carriers  
 
 
Coercive 
pressures 
 
 
Major 
shareholders  
 
Merchant families  
 
Government 
and merchant 
families 
ownership 
 
 
7.29 
 
Factors influencing 
appointing board 
committees’ members 
 
Networks of 
Actor 
 
Coercive 
pressures 
 
Symbolic carriers  
Merchant families, 
government, and 
board member 
preferences 
 
 
Government 
Notes: this tables shows the most selected factors in tables 7.5; 7.8; 7.11; 7.14; 7.17; 7.20; 7.23; 7.26; 7.29; 7.32   
 
In column 2 in 7.14, the meaning of coercive pressure and government refers to the 
government either through its regulator role (coercive pressure) or through its role as a major 
shareholder in Kuwaiti listed companies due to their investment arms. 
 
In summary, since the government, as a major shareholder in Kuwaiti listed companies, 
delegates power to the merchant families, they have established a single community of practice 
inside the organisational field of listed companies based on beliefs and thoughts (symbolic 
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carriers) that have become the prevailing logics, as well as the material carriers. The single 
community of practice is a result of coercive, normative, and mimetic practices exercised by 
both the government and merchant families; the government has established a normative 
practice inside the field by exercising bad practices in government owned companies 
mentioned earlier in chapter 6, and merchant families maybe mimic these bad practices who 
then coerce executive management and board members to apply these practices. Other listed 
companies may then also mimic the listed companies controlled by merchant families hence 
embedding these organisational logics more deeply. Thus, any effort to introduce a corporate 
governance code, will raise opposition from both the government and merchant families as it is 
against their interests. Self interests of the actors of the field (government and merchant 
families) that established a network of actors have weakened the endogenous forces for the 
process of change in the current practices of the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed 
companies. 
 
The next chapter summarises the results of this thesis to provide concluding thoughts and 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Summary 
  
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis investigates the reason why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait and 
the role of the merchant families in preventing any change to the companies‘ Act 1960 (Article 
15). In particular, the perceptions of legislators, regulators, executive management and board 
members of listed companies, and investors, who represent the actors in the organisational 
field of listed companies in Kuwait, are used to identify the factors influencing Kuwaiti 
corporate governance practices. This chapter provides a general discussion of the empirical 
findings and ties them into the research questions of the thesis and its theoretical framework.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 provides a summary of the research. 
Section 8.3 discusses the major findings and ties them to the research questions, followed by 
Section 8.4, which highlights the main contributions to our knowledge. Section 8.5 outlines 
the limitations and the problems associated with conducting the research, while Section 8.6 
suggests avenues for future research. The final Section, 8.7, provides the concluding 
thoughts to this thesis.  
. 
8.2 Summary of the Research 
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provided an introduction to  the research 
topic and i t s  focus, questions and structure. Chapter 2 presented an overview of the 
Kuwaiti context including general background about the country and its social, political, 
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legal, and economic environment in two eras: pre and post discovery of crude oil, as well as 
the role and influence of Kuwait‘s merchant families. 
 
Chapter 3 reviewed and outlined the general literature about the development of corporate 
governance and the impact of legal, political, and cultural factors on this. It discusses the 
development of corporate governance in developing and MENA countries and how different 
factors have impacted negatively on the process of development, as well as summarising the 
prior literature about Kuwaiti listed companies‘ practices. Chapter 4 discussed the theoretical 
framework that is adopted to interpret the research findings. This thesis uses a new 
institutional sociology perspective to explore the community of practice and the 
organisational logics and actor network within the organisational field of listed companies 
in Kuwait. 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the research methodology and methods, and justifies the selection of 
the research paradigm, methodology and methods that are adopted in this study. This 
thesis uses an interpretive methodological approach to provide an explanation of the factors 
that prevent the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code. Chapters 6 and 7 analysed 
and presented the findings of two pieces of empirical work, semi-structured interviews and 
a questionnaire survey, respectively. These methods are employed to gather the primary data 
fo r  this thesis. The interviews investigate the perspective and opinions of different groups 
about listed companies‘ practices and why Kuwait has not issued a corporate governance code, 
whether the merchant families are preventing the voluntary application of international 
practices and the issuance of such a code, and whether Companies‘ Act (Article 15) 1960 
covers all aspects of corporate governance. The questionnaire survey is used to develop 
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further the exploration of the current practices of Kuwaiti listed companies and to investigate 
whether the merchant families have prevented the issuance of a Kuwaiti corporate governance 
code. 
 
8.3 Research Findings 
 
This section discusses the major findings and ties them in with the research questions of: 
Why is there no corporate governance code in Kuwait?, Which factors affect corporate 
governance practices in Kuwait?, and is there a single community of practice? The following 
sections discuss and summarise the major findings of the thesis in order to answer these 
questions. 
 
8.3.1 The reasons why there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance  
 
This section discusses the evidence collected from the empirical work to help to answer the 
first research question: ―Why is there no corporate governance code in Kuwait? Group 
perceptions were sought on the issues that have influenced why there has been no issuance 
of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. 
 
First, legal factors have impeded the issuance of a code, as such legislation is in the hands of 
parliament and in the hands of the government. However, there is a strong actor networks 
between the merchant families in the parliament and the government. Hence, the symbolic 
carriers of international practice are absent as the government ―rewards‖ the merchant families 
by not enforcing laws or charging them with illegal transactions and bad practices in payment 
for their support of the government. The merchant thus families exercise coercive pressure 
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over: (i) the government not to exercise its regulative role and issue a corporate governance 
code; and (ii) over legislators in parliament to oppose any changes to the 1960‘s companies‘ 
Act (Article 15). The interviewees and questionnaire respondents suggested that the reason for 
the merchant families‘ opposition to the issuance of corporate governance is to protect their 
own self-interests and maintain their control and power over listed companies.  
 
Another reason why there is no corporate governance code in Kuwait is related to government-
owned companies that have bad governance practices that contradict global corporate 
governance principles and hence the government does not make any effort to bring in a code 
that will change their practices. The merchant families also mimic government owned 
companies‘ practices as it satisfies their own interests and hence they do not lobby for any 
code.  
 
Third, the political and cultural situation of the Kuwait has given the power to the merchant 
families which enables them to oppose the issuance of a corporate governance code and coerce 
the government into not issuing the code. This has neutralises the power of regulators and 
legislators and strengthen of the merchant families‘ political and cultural power and influences 
corporate governance practices in listed companies, as outlined below.     
 
8.3.2 Factors affecting corporate governance practices in Kuwait 
 
The second question is: ―What factors affect corporate governance practices in Kuwait?‖ 
institutional factors such as the cultural, political and legal background all affect Kuwaiti 
corporate governance.  
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Cultural factors are the symbolic carriers of corporate governance practices epitomised by the 
material carriers representing in merchant families networks with the government, resulting in 
close social and personal relationships between the merchant families and the government, 
such that corporate governance practices have become embedded through mimetic and 
normative isomorphic processes. 
     
Moreover, another symbolic carrier of practices is the beliefs and traditional thinking of the 
merchant families who manage and control listed companies; bad corporate governance such 
as no separation of the role of the chair and CEO and no independent directors means that 
there is no real monitoring or evaluation of company strategy or decisions.  
 
As well as the cultural factors that influence corporate governance practices in Kuwaiti listed 
companies, there are also the symbolic carriers in the regulations and laws that are affected by 
political factors. The interviewees illustrated that the role of parliament is to issue laws and 
acts, such as a corporate governance code, as a symbolic carriers but it is weak due to the large 
representation of the merchant families in parliament. More specifically, the monetary and 
financial committee of parliament that is responsible for studying and presenting the economic 
and financial regulations and acts is dominated by merchant families to protect their own 
interests and make sure that no codes are issued that threaten their interests and control. Also, 
the interviewees criticized the role of the government as a regulator that obtains political 
support from the merchant families when facing questions from the opposition party in 
parliament and then pays them back by not enforcing the law.   
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The above factors strengthen the merchant families influence and the networks of actors 
between the merchant families and the government facilitates them having established their 
own preferred practices that become immune for any endogenous forces to change the current 
practices, as shown below.  
 
8.3.3 A single community of practice  
 
The third research question is: ―Is there a single community of practice? In order to answer this 
question, the interviewees and questionnaire respondents were asked about listed companies‘ 
current practices in the organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. They clearly stated 
that there is just one single community of practice whereby boards are controlled by the 
merchant families, even in government owned companies.      
 
For example, board committees do not exist since the symbolic carriers, represented by the 
1960 companies‘ Act (Article 15) are not mandated. The regulators and legislators stated that 
an audit committee is compulsory for banks and investment companies as the central banks 
forces them to establish one, but even in banks the other committees do not exist. Further, 
audit committee members include family board members and executive management, contrary 
to normative practices around the world.    
 
Another practice is the existence of CEO and chair duality, where separation of the roles is 
rare since the 1960 companies‘ Act (Article 15) as a symbolic carrier does not make listed 
companies separate the chairmanship from the CEO position.  
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Another practice is the weak level of disclosure and transparency also associated with the 1960 
Act (Article 15) that does not force listed companies to disclose information and to be 
transparent in their transactions. 
 
Hence, the merchant families through actor networks and coercive normative and mimetic 
isomorphic process have established one single community of practice within the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies to satisfy their own self-interest and maintain 
their control and power. These practices contradict normative principles of corporate 
governance such as the OECD code. The isomorphic pressures that have led listed companies 
to having just one community of practice is a result of (i) coercive pressure represented by the 
existing regulations in the country and that embedded symbolic carriers of the merchant 
families‘ beliefs and traditions that pressurise the government; (ii) normative pressure from the 
merchant families over all listed companies and; (iii) mimetic pressure by merchant families 
that have established a community of practice that other listed companies mimic and by the 
merchant families mimicking the practices of government owned companies.  
    
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis contributes to our knowledge in a number of ways. First it is a preliminary study 
that investigates corporate governance practices in Kuwait, and the factors that prevent the 
issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance.  
 
Another contribution made by this thesis is the use of a new institutional sociology 
perspective as theoretical framework for interpreting the findings. In this regard, the thesis 
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provides a general understanding of how different types of institutional pressure, coercive, 
normative and mimetic influence and shape the community of practice within Kuwait.  
 
Also, the present thesis contributes to the literature about corporate governance practices in 
Kuwaiti listed companies and the role of the merchant families in establishing one community 
of practice that has been influenced by the political, cultural and legal situation of Kuwait. The 
findings also contribute to our knowledge by focusing on the perceptions of different 
stakeholders groups regarding corporate governance in Kuwait as there is a dearth of such 
research from this perspective in the corporate governance literature. In this regard, it 
provides an understanding of the factors and role of the merchant families in preventing the 
issuance of a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance. 
 
This thesis therefore contributes to our knowledge by examining the community of practice 
within the organisational field of listed companies in Kuwait and sheds light on issues related 
to board structure, board committees, the presence of independent board members, the 
separation of the chairmanship from the CEO position, the level of disclosure and 
transparency, as well as exploring the impact of the legal political and cultural system in 
Kuwait and how all of these factors block the process of corporate governance development. 
 
Additionally, this thesis finds that the material carriers such as networks of actor and 
relationships play a significant role in developing the symbolic carriers of existing codes and law; 
the network of actors, between the merchant families and the government, is dominant and highly 
valued in the culture of Kuwait. This is a major contribution to our knowledge.  
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Finally, the present thesis contributes to our knowledge by finding that the executives in 
Kuwaiti regulatory bodies lack the experience and qualifications to do their jobs and, is one of 
the main reasons why Kuwait does not have a corporate governance code. Thus, this thesis has 
a number of new insights into corporate governance and contributes to our knowledge.  
 
8.5 Limitations and the Problems related to Conducting the Research 
 
There are some important limitations to the findings of this thesis that should be taken into 
account. The first limitation is related to the small number of respondents on which the study 
focuses. This thesis conducted 23 interviews with different groups of actors within the 
organisational field of Kuwaiti listed companies. It also analysed 192 questionnaires, focusing 
on the current practices of the listed companies and the impact of legal, political, and cultural 
factors on the issuance of a corporate governance code. Moreover, only a small number from 
the merchant families participated in this thesis (interviews with 2 members, questionnaire 
completed by 6 members). Such research methods and the small number of participants, 
specifically from the merchant families‘ group, might not reflect the perceptions of all of the 
actors inside the organisational field with regard to the current practices and the factors 
preventing the issuance of a corporate governance code.  
 
Other limitations are concerned with the research methods used for this thesis. For example, 
some of the participants in the interviews or questionnaire survey may have misinterpreted or 
misunderstood some of the questions because they are unfamiliar with the concept of 
corporate governance as a result of the code not having been discussed in Kuwait, and may be 
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unwilling to reveal their lack of knowledge and understanding and so they may not have 
provided realistic answers.  
 
In addition to the above limitations, researchers who are doing a PhD thesis in a new area 
face many challenges which have to be addressed, and researchers should be aware that 
some topics and research phenomena are more difficult than others. Some of the problems 
that were encountered while conducting this research are noted below. 
 
The first problem was the empirical phenomenon itself, which was the concept and practices 
of corporate governance in Kuwait. A review of the literature on corporate governance in 
Kuwaiti listed companies has not been undertaken previously and knowledge of their current 
practices is very limited. Although it was very difficult to deal with this problem, it 
encouraged the researcher to study this phenomenon and so make a valuable contribution to 
the literature.  
 
To deal with this problem, the researcher adopted a different structure to address the literature 
review in this thesis. First, the appearance and development of corporate governance in 
Western countries such as UK and USA and internationally such as OECD were explored. 
Then, the factors that encourage the development and effectiveness of a corporate governance 
code were outlined before the available research on the MENA region was reviewed. Then, an 
attempt was made to link the development of the corporate governance code in MENA 
countries and the impact of the factors on the development of the code and its effectiveness. 
To incorporate the Kuwaiti context in the absence of any prior literature, the thesis focused on 
the impact of the legal, political, and cultural factors that had prevented the issuance and 
development of a Kuwaiti corporate governance code. 
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The second problem was that the empirical phenomenon itself is a new phenomenon. In 
Kuwait, specifically in the regulators‘ bodies, the level of participation in the study was very 
low and some rejected it without giving any reason for this. In general, the motivation to 
participate in this study was very low. Therefore, the researcher used his personal 
relationships, specifically among the regulatory bodies and listed companies, to raise the 
participation level for this thesis. 
 
The last research problem, finding a theoretical framework, was difficult, as again there 
are no prior studies on corporate governance in Kuwait to follow. My knowledge of the 
country itself and many lengthy discussions with my supervisors and other Kuwaitis 
eventually led to a useful theoretical framework of a New Institutional Sociology theory. 
 
8.6 Future Research Avenues 
 
Studies on corporate governance in Kuwait are rare. Indeed, there is a vast gap in the 
literature about corporate governance in Kuwait, and thus there is a significant need for 
further studies about the development of this by overcoming the factors that are preventing the 
issuance of the code. 
 
Future research might focus more on the role and ability of the legislators in developing a 
corporate governance code in the country since they have the power to issue acts in Kuwait. 
Another important proposal for future research is related to the role of professional 
associations as a normative influence in motivating listed companies to voluntarily adopt 
better corporate governance practices.  
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Another important proposal for future research is related to the role of the regulators in 
developing corporate governance in Kuwait. Future research should consider how to motivate 
the regulators to become more active with regard to issuing codes and forcing listed companies 
to apply them. Also, it should set a limit for government interference in the selection of 
executives on the regulatory bodies and separate them to give the regulators independence 
with regard to acting and issuing codes.    
 
Another important avenue for future research should be how to motivate the process of change 
in the organisational logics of current practices from depending on material carriers to be 
based more on symbolic carriers governed by regulations and laws rather than actor networks 
and personal relationships (material carriers). 
 
Future research should also concentrate on the cultural impact to improve Kuwaiti listed 
companies governance practices.  
 
Also, future research should compare listed companies with unlisted companies, to find out 
whether the practices of listed companies are mimicked by unlisted companies. Overall, there 
are a number of interesting avenues for future research. 
 
8.7 Concluding Thoughts 
 
The issuance of a corporate governance code in Kuwait has been affected by the political, 
legal, and cultural context of the country. Groups with political, legal power and cultural 
norms in any society can influence corporate governance practice.  
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Merchant families in Kuwait are very powerful and have influence in political life, over the 
regulatory system, and a large cultural influence in the Kuwait context. They gained this power 
and prestige through their financial contributions befor the discovery of oil, which in turn 
facilitated them to become well connected with the government and other decision makers in 
the country establishing a network of actors. This has facilitated the merchant families being 
the dominant actor inside the organisational field of listed companies; and become the sole 
actor in the field. This allows them to oppose new regulations that threaten their self interest 
and control over listed companies.  
       
The community of practice of Kuwaiti corporate governance shows contradicts normative 
practices around the world. This is a result of the 1960 companies‘ Act (Article 15) being 
outdated that prevents normative practices, such as the existence of independent board 
members, becoming established.  
       
A corporate governance code faces opposition in Kuwait since it contradicts with the symbolic 
carriers of the merchant families‘ beliefs and their current practices in listed companies. 
Hence, in order to overcome the merchant families‘ resistance a massive effort is needed from 
groups such as investors and regulators, to change the existing culture inside the organisational 
field by raising awareness and calling for change. Educated staff who work in regulators are 
currently the only drivers for change to bring in a code of corporate governance. 
      
This thesis add to my knowledge the importance of corporate governance in general, and 
specifically in Kuwait, Kuwaiti listed companies are lack to normative practices and efforts 
from associations and interested groups are needed to force regulators and legislators issue 
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Kuwaiti corporate governance code. The thesis raises my knowledge of the importance of 
independent board members and separation of chairman and CEO positions that minimise 
major shareholders control over companies‘ board and management, and strengthen the 
monitoring role of board members.  
   
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will provide useful insights for legislators and others 
and pave the way for further investigation and research. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Interview questions: regulators and investors 
 
Section (A) Corporate governance code: 
1. What is your knowledge and understanding of corporate governance and how do 
you define it? 
2. Why do you think there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance  
3. To what extent does the companyies‘ Act (Article 15) cover all aspects of corporate 
governance?  
4. What corporate governance practices are not covered in the companyies‘ Act 
(Article 15) and should they be in a code? 
5. Would a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance contradict the existing Companies‘ 
Act (Article 15) and the legal and judicial system in Kuwait? 
 
Section (B) Influence of Merchant families and other factors: 
1. Are there any influences on companies which prevent them from applying corporate 
governance and why, and if so, what are these external influences?  
2. Are there any political, economic, cultural or social factors affecting why there is no 
corporate governance code? 
3. The KSE was one of the early stock markets in GCC countries, and has its rules 
prevented the adoption of a code? 
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4. What is the influence of the merchant families in corporate governance in Kuwait? 
5. Do merchant families oppose a code, and if so why? 
6. To what extent do you think that a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance would 
threaten the merchant families control and minimise their power in both listed and 
unlisted companies? 
7. Do you think that merchant families and their networks exert their influence in CMA, 
Government, or in the parliament? 
8. Who should produce a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, the CMA, KSE, anyone 
else, and why? 
9. Do merchant families dominate companies‘ boards, and if so, how and why? 
 
Section (C) Company’s practices questions: 
 
1. How should board members elected, and why is it done this way?  
2. How should the CEO be appointed, and why should the board chose this way? 
3. Do companies have non-executive directors on the board, if so, who appoints them, 
and why do they do it that way? 
4. Should chairman be separate from the CEO, and if so why? 
5. Should companies have a nomination; remuneration and audit committee?, Who are 
the members of these committees and why? 
6. Why do you think that listed and unlisted companies voluntarily adopt corporate 
governance practices? 
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7. Does the ownership structure (major shareholder and diverse ownership) have an effect 
on the degree to which corporate governance principles are implemented and, if so, 
why? 
8. Are there any other factors that affect Kuwaiti listed and unlisted companies 
voluntarily adopting corporate governance practices? 
9. Do all companies comply with the Companyies‘ Act (Article 15), and for those that 
don‘t why is that? 
10. Should companies treat all shareholders and stakeholders equally, and why do you 
think that? 
11. Should companies be transparent and disclose information, and if so why?   
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Interview questions: board members and executive management 
 
Section (A) Corporate governance code: 
1. What is your knowledge and understanding of corporate governance and how do you 
define it? 
2. Why do you think there is no Kuwaiti code of corporate governance  
3. To what extent does the companies‘ Act (Article 15) cover all aspects of corporate 
governance?  
4. What corporate governance practices are not covered in the companies‘ Act (Article 15) 
and should they be in a code? 
5. Would a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance contradict the existing Companies‘ Act 
(Article 15) and the legal and judicial system in Kuwait? 
 
Section (B) Influence of Merchant families and other factors: 
 
1. Are there any influences on companies which prevent them from applying corporate 
governance and why, and if so, what are these external influences?  
2. Are there any political, economic, cultural or social factors affecting why there is no 
corporate governance code? 
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3. The KSE was one of the early stock markets in GCC countries, and has its rules prevented 
the adoption of a code? 
4. What is the influence of the merchant families in corporate governance in Kuwait? 
5. Do merchant families oppose a code, and if so why? 
6. To what extent do you think that a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance would threaten 
the merchant families control and minimise their power in both listed and unlisted 
companies? 
7. Do you think that merchant families and their networks exert their influence in CMA, 
Government, or in the parliament? 
8. Who should produce a Kuwaiti code of corporate governance, the CMA, KSE, anyone 
else, and why? 
9. Do merchant families dominate companies‘ boards, and if so, how and why? 
 
Section (C) Company’s practices questions: 
 
1. How are your board members elected, and why is it done this way?  
2. How is the CEO appointed, and why has your board chosen this way? 
3. Does your company have non-executive directors on the board, if so, who appoints them, 
and why do you do it that way? 
4.Is your chairman separate from the CEO, and if so why? 
5.Does your company have a nomination; remuneration and audit committee?, Who should 
be the members of these committees and why? 
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6. Why do you think that listed and unlisted companies voluntarily adopt corporate 
governance practices? 
7. Does the ownership structure (major shareholder and diverse ownership) have an effect on 
the degree to which corporate governance principles are implemented and, if so, why? 
8. Are there any other factors that affect Kuwaiti listed and unlisted companies voluntarily 
adopting corporate governance? 
9. Do all companies comply with the Companies‘ Act (Article 15), and for those that don‘t 
why is that? 
10. Should companies treat all shareholders and stakeholders equally, and why do you 
think that? 
11. Should companies be transparent and disclose information, and if so why?   
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Corporate governance in Kuwait 
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Section A 
1- Please tick all that apply to yourself:  
Your position   
Regulator: a) Capital Market Authority  
 b) Kuwait Stock Exchange  
 c) Central bank  
 d) Other (please state which)  
   
Legislator:  a) Member of Parliament  
   
Government: a) Ministry of commerce  
   
Investor:  a) Merchant families  
 b) Minor investor   
Other (please specify)   
 
 
2- Please identify your age group by ticking the appropriate box. 
 
Less than 40  51 – 60  
41 – 50  More than 60  
 
 
3- To what extent are you familiar with the following regulations, where 1= very 
familiar / 5= unfamiliar?  
Laws and code 1 2 3 4 5 
Kuwait 1960 Companies‘ act (Article 15)      
OECD principles of corporate governance      
The UK‘s combined code      
 
 
4- Please tick in which apply to the listed companies about their ownership structure? 
Group  
a. Government ownership  
b. Merchant families ownership  
c. Foreign investors  
d. Diverse ownership  
e. Other (please specify):  
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Section B 
 
5- To what extent do you agree with the following, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly 
disagree? 
 
 
Laws and code 1 2 3 4 5 
The Kuwait 1960 Companies‘ act (Article 15) is adequate      
A new corporate governance code should be introduced      
Any new code should be mandatory rather than voluntary      
 
 
6- To what extent do you agree that the corporate governance practices of various 
sectors of Kuwaiti companies are good and that they comply with the 1960 
Companies’ Act (Article 15), where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree? 
 
 
 
Sectors 
Corporate governance 
practices are good 
They comply with the 
1960 Companies’ 
Law 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Bank sector           
Investment sector           
Insurance sector           
Real estate sector           
Industrial sector           
Services sector           
Food sector           
Non Kuwaiti sector           
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7- To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence good governance 
practices, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors 
Good corporate governance 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 
a. 1960 Companies‘ Act requirements      
b. KSE regulations       
c. Government monitoring       
d. Annual General Meeting of shareholders      
e. Government ownership      
f. Merchant families ownership      
g. Mutual interest between major shareholders       
h. Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government  
     
i. Controlling shareholder(s)       
j. Executive management       
k. Experience and qualification of appointees      
l. Personal relationships      
m. Self interests       
n. Favouritism       
o. Courtesies       
p. Prestige       
q. Cultural influences       
Other (please specify)  
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8- To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence selecting chairmen, selecting 
board directors, and selecting the CEO, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree?  
 
 
Factors 
Selecting 
chairman 
Selecting  
board 
members 
 
Selecting CEO 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. 1960 Companies‘ Act requirements                 
b. KSE regulation                
c. Government monitoring                
d. Annual General Meeting of shareholders                
e. Government ownership                
f. Merchant families ownership                
g. Mutual interest between major shareholders                
h. Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government  
               
i. Controlling Shareholder(s)                  
j. Executive management                 
k. Experience and qualification of appointees                
l. Personal relationships                
m. Self interests                
n. Favouritism                 
o. Courtesies                 
p. Prestige                 
q. Cultural influences                
r. Chairman‘s preferences                 
s. Existing board member preferences                
Other (please specify)  
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9- To what extent do you agree that the following factors affect the protection of 
minority interests, and having a separate chairman from the CEO, where 1= strongly 
agree / 5= strongly disagree? 
 
 
 
Factors 
Minority 
interests 
Separation of 
the chairman 
and CEO  
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. 1960 Companies‘ Act requirements            
b. KSE regulation           
c. Government monitoring           
d. Annual General Meeting of shareholders           
e. Government ownership           
f. Merchant families ownership           
g. Mutual interest between major shareholders           
h. Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government  
          
i. Controlling shareholder(s)           
j. Executive management            
k. Experience and qualification of appointees           
l. Personal relationships           
m. Self interests            
n. Favouritism            
o. Courtesies            
p. Prestige            
q. Cultural influences           
Other (please specify)  
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10- To what extent do you agree that the following factors hinder the issuance of a 
corporate governance code in Kuwait, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly 
disagree? 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
a. 1960 Companies‘ Act requirements        
b. KSE regulation      
c. Government monitoring       
d. Government ownership      
e. Merchant families ownership      
f. Mutual interest between major shareholders      
g. Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government  
     
h. Controlling shareholder(s)       
i. Executive management       
j. Experience and qualification of legislators       
k. Experience and qualification of regulators       
l. Personal relationships      
m. Self interests       
n. Favouritism       
o. Courtesies       
p. Prestige       
q. Cultural influences      
Other (please specify)  
342 
 
11- To what extent do you agree that the following committees exist in Kuwaiti 
companies, that they comply with the OECD committee membership requirement 
structure, and whether all companies should have these committees, where 1= 
strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree? 
 
 
Committee 
Existence of 
committees 
comply with the 
OECD committee 
membership 
requirement structure 
Companies should 
have these 
committees 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Monitoring committee                
b. Audit committee                
c. Nomination committee                
d. Remuneration committee                
e. Risk committee                 
 
12- Please specify the board committees in companies you are invest in, your membership 
of those committees, and whether there are independent board members on those 
committees? 
 
 
Board committees 
 
Have one 
You are a 
committee 
member 
There are 
independent 
members on 
the committee 
a. Monitoring committee    
b. Audit committee    
c. Nomination committee    
d. Remuneration committee    
e. Risk committee    
f. Other (please specify)  
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13- To what extent do you agree that the following factors influence having these companies’ 
committees and selecting committee members, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree? 
 
 
 
 
Factors 
Having 
committees 
Influence 
appointment of 
committee 
members 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
a. 1960 Companies‘ Act requirements            
b. KSE regulation           
c. Government monitoring            
d. Annual General Meeting of shareholders           
e. Government ownership           
f. Merchant families ownership           
g. Mutual interest between major shareholders           
h. Mutual interest between major shareholders and 
government  
          
i. Controlling shareholder(s)            
j. Executive management            
k. Experience and qualification of appointees           
l. Personal relationships           
m. Self interests            
n. Favouritism            
o. Courtesies            
p. Cultural influences           
q. Chairman‘s preferences            
r. Existing board member preferences           
Other (please specify)  
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14- To what extent do you agree that the merchant families influence the decision making 
processes of the following, where 1= strongly agree / 5= strongly disagree?  
 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
a. Government       
b. Legislators (MPs)      
c. Regulators       
d. Board members      
e. Executive management      
f. Applying laws and act      
g. The process of board committee 
membership selection 
     
h. Current company practices      
i. Others (please specify):  
 
 
15- Please add any comments that you think are related to the practice of corporate 
governance in Kuwait: 
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................
.................................... 
 
 
